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Abstract
Logistics systems generally involve multiple interacting stakeholders who endogenously make decisions
based on their individual, sometimes conflicting, objectives. Meanwhile, many of such systems may be
disrupted from time to time under extreme threats (e.g., natural or human-induced disasters). These
endogenous and exogenous factors often adversely impact system performance and result in significant
societal disutility. My dissertation research focuses on developing mathematical models for design
and analysis of large-scale logistics systems, especially those under competition and uncertainties. It
holistically captures interactions and joint impacts of various objectives in large-scale supply chains,
including supply reliability (against disruptions), service competition (against competitors), as well as
demand uncertainties. Built upon a general analysis framework, we seek applications and extensions
to address concerns of the current renewable energy sector. Starting from a logistics angle, i.e., the
biofuel supply chain design, we investigate its profound economic and societal impact.
First, We develop game-theoretical models based on Continuum Approximation (CA) to study
a reliable competitive location problem where facilities are simultaneously subject to (i) symmetric
or leader-follower types of competitions, and (ii) location-dependent probabilistic failures. An opti-
mization model is formulated to capture the symmetric Nash competition between two companies.
The goal is to maximize the expected profit (service revenue minus the sum of initial facility con-
struction costs and the expected customer transportation costs) under normal and failure scenarios.
Building upon this result, we build a bilevel leader-follower Stackelberg competition model to derive
the optimal facility location design when one of the companies has the first-mover advantage over its
competitor. Our CA approach is able to effectively solve the models. For special cases, closed-form
analytical solutions can be obtained. Numerical experiments with hypothetical data and a case study
for competitive biofuel supply chain design in the State of Illinois are conducted. The results revealed
managerial insights on how competing companies should optimally plan their facility locations.
Then, we propose a systematic optimization framework to analyze how biofuel supply chain deci-
ii
sions are affected by (i) crop yield/supply uncertainty, (ii) refinery disruption risks, and (iii) compe-
tition against existing food supply chains. The interactions among the biofuel industry, farmers and
food industry are captured by a Stackelberg-Nash game, formulated under a CA scheme. The expected
profits of both the farmers and the biofuel industry are evaluated based on probability distributions of
crop yield and refinery disruption risks over space. Functional optimization, e.g., variational calculus,
is used to derive the equilibrium conditions and suggest numerical algorithms. A series of numerical
experiments are conducted for both hypothetical test cases and a Midwest case study to (i) show com-
putational performance and robustness of the modeling approach, (ii) analyze the impacts of system
parameters, as well as (iii) draw managerial insights in realistic settings.
In addition, we propose a heuristic modeling framework to overcome the challenge that applying CA
in solving dynamic facility location problems. First, we formulate a continuous model for the dynamic
version by augmenting the time dimension, while relaxing the location consistency constraints. To
translate the CA output into a set of discrete facility locations, we extend the disk model (for one static
time period) to a tube model (for multiple time periods). Then, the location consistency constraints
are enforced through a nonlinear optimization model with penalty terms. Lastly, we propose an
iterative tube regulation algorithm to solve the penalty-based optimization problem. We analyze the
accuracy and convergence of our modeling framework and conduct numerical experiments to verify its
performance. The model and the solution procedure we proposed are very generic and flexible; thus,
it can be extended to variants (e.g., incorporating existing facilities at the beginning of the horizon).
Finally, we investigate a difficult trilemma: with limited farmland, how does the government stim-
ulate the growth of the biofuel industry while, at the same time, protect food security and preserve
environmental sustainability? Our framework is applied to address such multiple cross-interacting
systems associating with the biofuel industry development in a broader context. We aim to provide
policy guidelines on governmental mandates to induce socially favorable farmland use configurations
to support a sustainable bio-economy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Facility Location Planning under Competition and Uncertainties
Facility location planning is critical in logistics systems contexts, as properly designed locations facil-
itate cost-effective service provision. In most practice, a decision maker (e.g., a government or a firm)
needs to find aspatial distribution of facilities (e.g., fire stations or local branches) in order to satisfy
various spatially distributed customer demands. Since customers generally seek service from a nearby
facility so as to reduce transportation time and/or cost, a good location design attracts customers
from the proximity of the facilities to generate profit. As such, the facility locations should be care-
fully designed to best match the spatial demand distribution. This is particularly the case when facility
construction requires huge investment and the locations cannot be easily modified. However, multiple
operational or business challenges lie ahead, which needs to be addressed to achieve the optimal facility
location design.
First, in many real-world cases, service competition exists among adjacent facilities (e.g., those be-
longing to competing service providers). The actual amount of customer demand covered by provider’s
facilities can be dramatically different if a competitor is present in the same market (Hotelling, 1929). A
comprehensive evaluation, e.g., service time, cost, and experiences, among multiple service providers
affects the decisions of customers, which directly or indirectly determines the profit of the service
provider. Furthermore, a potential competitor may need to be considered in planning for the future
benefit, especially in an emerging industry practice. Therefore, the optimal facility locations highly
rely on the decision strategy of the competitor.
In addition, various uncertainties complicate the planning. Uncertainties may occur on both de-
mand and service sides. On the demand side, the customer needs can be stochastic and exhibit
interdependency, caused by either exogenous or endogenous factors. On the service side, built facility
1
may be disrupted from time to time due to natural or human-induced disasters (e.g., flooding, power
outage, or labor actions). When a facility is disrupted, the customers it serves may seek service from
another working facility (which may belong to a competing service provider), or they may give up
service completely (Snyder and Daskin, 2005). Either way, the customers incur higher service costs
and the service provider loses revenue. From a service provider’s perspective, a large portion of cus-
tomers and revenue could be at stake. This highlights the need for an optimal facility location design
framework that takes into account probabilistic facility disruptions.
Furthermore, facility location decisions typically imply long-term commitment of significant re-
sources. Once the decisions are made (facilities are opened), they are very difficult to reverse. In
reality, however, any parameters of the system (e.g., customer demand, operating cost) may vary over
time and facility additions can occur at different times. The service provider needs to incorporate the
best timing of facility deployment that during a planning horizon. That is, not only where but also
when to build a facility becomes a critical decision.
Finding the optimal facility location design under the aforementioned factors is extremely hard,
which has resisted efficient solution by traditional discrete programming approaches (Bard, 1998; Li
and Ouyang, 2012), especially when the problem instance becomes large. To this end, continuous
approximation (CA) based approaches (Newell, 1973; Daganzo, 1999) are developed, where discrete
location variables are approximated by continuous and differentiable density functions. By using
continuous density functions, the optimality conditions for the problem may be derived analytically to
simplify the overall optimization problem. The CA solution to facility location models is normally in
the form of a continuous facility density. To translate the CA solution into a set of discrete locations,
Ouyang and Daganzo (2006) proposed a Disk Model, which approximates the service region of a
facility by a circular disk. Each disk center indicates a specific facility location and the disk size is
determined by the optimal facility density function at that location. The algorithm searches for a
spatial distribution of overlapping disks that resembles a reasonable set of facility locations and service
regions.
Although CA has been widely used to solve static facility location problems, to the best of our
knowledge, relatively little work has been done to handle the dynamic version of these problems. Some
related efforts have been made in the robotics community; e.g., Ny and Pappas (2010) proposed an
adaptive algorithm to solve dynamic vehicle routing problems given the probabilistic distribution of
random upcoming customer locations. Noting the main idea behind CA is to localize the spatial de-
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cisions, Campbell (1990) extended CA to design transportation terminals in a dynamic setting, but
assuming that the terminal locations are “mobile” and can be moved at each time instant indepen-
dently. However, in reality, locations of open facilities typically remain unchanged in the remainder of
the planning horizon. We refer to this as the location consistency constraint. Due to this constraint,
a facility deployment decision imposes a persisting impact on the remaining planning horizon and
cannot be determined over local parameters in the temporal neighborhood. In addition, even if the
solution to the DFLP is obtained using CA, a translating method is still needed to effectively convert
the CA solution into discrete facility locations over time and space. The aforementioned disk model
(Ouyang and Daganzo, 2006) is designed for static problems and hence cannot be applied directly to
the dynamic ones. Therefore, an innovative solution framework is requested to address such dynamic
problems.
1.1.2 Biofuel Supply Chain Design
Built upon a general analysis framework, we seek applications and extensions to address concerns of
the current renewable energy sector. Starting from a logistics angle, i.e., the biofuel supply chain
design, we investigate its profound economic and societal impact.
Biofuel is widely considered to be one of the promising alternatives to the traditional fossil fuels, as
it offers significant environmental and economic advantages. According to EPA (2005), biofuel from
one acre of biocrop generates 4.8 to 5.5 tons less CO2 annually as compared to equivalent fossil fuel with
the same energy content. Biofuel not only improves environmental sustainability, but also generates
positive economic opportunities for both the consumers (especially as gasoline price is expected to
keep increasing) and local biocrop farmers. It was reported that the emerging biofuel industry has
increased the revenue of farmers, reduced the cost of travelers, and created hundreds of thousands of
jobs in the U.S. (Ethanol Across America, 2011). In addition, the growing supply of domestic biofuel
will also reduce the nation’s dependence on foreign oil imports and in turn enhance energy security.
To this end, the U.S. government has issued a series of regulations, such as the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments (Environmental Protection Agency, 1990) and the 2007 Renewable Fuel Standard (EPA,
2007), to support the development of the biofuel industry (Schnepf and Yacobucci, 2013). Recent
statistics (Energy Information Administration, 2014) show that over 13 billion gallons of bioethanol
was consumed in the U.S. in 2013, constituting 21.5% of the total U.S. renewable energy consumption.
This is almost doubling the biofuel consumption merely six years ago. Most bioethanol is consumed in
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the form E10 (10% ethanol blended with 90% gasoline), which is sold at almost all U.S. fuel stations,
and E85 (85% of ethanol blended with 15% of gasoline), which is sold at more than 700 fuel stations
mainly in the upper Midwest (EPA, 2014a). The aviation industry is also seeking opportunities
to use biofuel to power airplanes (Sustainable Aviation Fuels Northwest, 2011) — In 2015, biofuel
is expected to account for 1% of the total jet-fuel for commercial aviation (Aviation Daily, 2013).
As such, the biofuel industry is expected to continue its expansion. For example, Environmental
Enterpreneurs (2013) projects that hundreds of commercial scale production facilities and billions of
dollars of infrastructure investment will occur within the next few years.
Despite its rapid growth, the biofuel industry faces a number of challenges particularly with respect
to its booming supply chain which connects the harvest of biomass to the consumption of ethanol at
local, regional, national, or even global markets. Such supply chains usually involve a large geographical
region with many farms, many possible refinery locations, and many markets. Thus, optimizing the
configuration has to be conducted in a large-scale scope. As an emerging player in the agri-business
arena, a biofuel manufacturer normally needs to focus on the following issues: (i) negotiating and
setting contract price with farmers to secure biomass supply; (ii) establishing and operating refineries
to convert biomass into bioethanol; and (iii) selling biofuel to the upper level oil companies for blending
with gasoline and shipping to the pumps. Many factors are associated with the performance and
efficiency of such a complex supply chain.
The design of biofuel supply chain should also consider both demand and service uncertainties.
First, crop yield heavily relies on environmental factors (e.g., solar radiation, temperature, precipita-
tion) that vary significantly from year to year. The annual crop yield not only is difficult to predict but
also exhibits strong spatial correlations (Basso et al., 2013). This uncertainty directly affects the total
supply and prices in both food and energy markets, and hence influence the decisions of the farmers
and the biofuel firm. On the other hand, the infrastructure capacity needed for bioethanol conversion,
i.e., a built biorefinery, is often subject to the risk of random disruptions caused by either internal
operational factors such as machine failures, power outages, and ill-planned operations, or external
factors such as hurricane, flooding, or drought.
On the other hand, the rapid development of biofuel industry is accompanied by unintended side
effects. First, the government-driven growth of the biofuel industry has led to inefficient farmland
allocation and food shortage (Wall Street Journal, 2012a,b). Indeed, recent studies (e.g., Ajanovic
(2011)) have reported that biofuel is responsible for the steep food price increase in the past few years.
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Second, the rapid growth of the biofuel industry also harmed environment by intensifying soil erosion,
depleting ground water, and reducing wild animals’ habitat (Rupp et al., 2012). Biofuel industry
also aggravates imbalanced land use which threatens bio-diversity (Inderwildi and King, 2009). To
preserve the environment, while offering subsidies to encourage biofuel production, the government
is also running a farmland rental program to retire lands from agricultural activities for conservation
purpose; a well-known example is the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) that stipulates owners to
idle the farmland in exchange of monetary compensation (CRP Farm Service Agency, 2013a).
In our context, we take the view of a biofuel firm and focus on its interactions with the farmers,
while assuming the behaviors of food conglomerates and oil companies as exogenous, i.e., the food price,
ethanol price, and reservation rental price are fully determined by their respective market equilibria.
Therefore, the biofuel firm takes the lead, establishing the supply chain for energy markets. Then the
farmers, as the followers, make their farmland use decisions based on the expected profit from each
market. Note that the farmer profit is also influenced by other farmers’ actions through market price
fluctuations. We assume farmers make land use decisions simultaneously, e.g., at the beginning of each
year, hence all farmers form a Nash game.
1.2 Objectives and Contributions
This Ph.D. dissertation mainly aims to develop innovative design and analysis frameworks for large-
scale logistics systems, especially those under competitions and uncertainties. This study, for the
first time, comprehensively investigates complex interactions and joint impacts of various uncertainty
aspects in supply chains. Meanwhile, the interdependencies among multiple subsystems are explored
so as to enhance their reliability, efficiency, resilience, and sustainability.
Most types of the problems we addressed are widely recognized to be extremely hard to solve, or
even difficult to formulate, with traditional methods. In light of this, we propose innovative modeling
frameworks, such as integration of CA schemes, pseudo-probabilistic modeling techniques, and game
theoretical models (i.e., Nash, Stackelberg, and Nash-Stackelberg) to capture stakeholders complex
behaviors under competition, disruptions, and uncertainties.
First, We develop game-theoretical models based on CA to study a reliable competitive location
problem where facilities are simultaneously subject to (i) symmetric or leader-follower types of com-
petitions, and (ii) location-dependent probabilistic failures. An optimization model is formulated to
capture the symmetric Nash competition between two companies. The goal is to maximize the ex-
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pected profit (service revenue minus the sum of initial facility construction costs and the expected
customer transportation costs) under normal and failure scenarios. Building upon this result, we build
a bilevel leader-follower Stackelberg competition model to derive the optimal facility location design
when one of the companies has the first-mover advantage over its competitor. Our CA approach is
able to effectively solve the models. For special cases, closed-form analytical solutions can be ob-
tained. Numerical experiments with hypothetical data and a case study for competitive biofuel supply
chain design in the State of Illinois are conducted. The results revealed managerial insights on how
competing companies should optimally plan their facility locations.
Then, we propose a systematic optimization framework to analyze how biofuel supply chain deci-
sions are affected by (i) crop yield/supply uncertainty, (ii) refinery disruption risks, and (iii) compe-
tition against existing food supply chains. The interactions among the biofuel industry, farmers and
food industry are captured by a Stackelberg-Nash game, formulated under a CA scheme. The expected
profits of both the farmers and the biofuel industry are evaluated based on probability distributions of
crop yield and refinery disruption risks over space. Functional optimization, e.g., variational calculus,
is used to derive the equilibrium conditions and suggest numerical algorithms. A series of numerical
experiments are conducted for both hypothetical test cases and a Midwest case study to (i) show com-
putational performance and robustness of the modeling approach, (ii) analyze the impacts of system
parameters, as well as (iii) draw managerial insights in realistic settings.
In addition, we propose a heuristic modeling framework to overcome the challenge that applying CA
in solving dynamic facility location problems. First, we formulate a continuous model for the dynamic
version by augmenting the time dimension, while relaxing the location consistency constraints. To
translate the CA output into a set of discrete facility locations, we extend the disk model (for one static
time period) to a tube model (for multiple time periods). Then, the location consistency constraints
are enforced through a nonlinear optimization model with penalty terms. Lastly, we propose an
iterative tube regulation algorithm to solve the penalty-based optimization problem. We analyze the
accuracy and convergence of our modeling framework and conduct numerical experiments to verify its
performance. The model and the solution procedure we propose are very generic and flexible; thus, it
can be extended to variants (e.g., incorporating existing facilities at the beginning of the horizon).
Finally, we extend the game-theoretical model to reveal policy implications and to enhance policy
strategies for the government to advance the emerging biofuel industry in a sustainable manner. More
specifically, the government is facing a difficult trilemma: how to stimulate the growth of the biofuel
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industry while, at the same time, protect food security and preserve environmental sustainability? First,
we characterize the biofuel firm’s optimal mandate compliance strategy (whether to comply with the
mandate or not) and highlight the complementary roles of mandate and subsidy. This demonstrates
how operational-level decisions lead to greater environmental implications and that a public policy has
to be designed with sound understanding of its consequences. Second, we investigate the impact of
coordinating in policy instruments, or the lack thereof, and draw policy insights. Lastly, we consider
the triple bottom-line (i.e., economic, environmental, and social) implications of the biofuel industry
development. By calibrating the data for the U.S. Midwest, the region where biomass feedstock
production is most active, we obtain further managerial insights.
1.3 Outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. The first section of Chapter 2 reviews related
methodology literature in the field of facility location problem. Starting from traditional static fa-
cility location problem, people then introduced game-theoretical models to analyze competition and
probabilistic models to address the facility reliability issue. Mixed integer programming is normally
used to formulate these types of problems, where solvers or heuristic algorithms such as Lagrangian
relaxation is implemented to obtain optimal solutions. To cope with the computational burden issue
when problem instances become large-scale, CA is developed. Another stream of study focuses on
dynamic facility location problems, where dynamic programming or other heuristic solution methods
are widely applied.
Next, Chapter 2 also reviews research on the biofuel industry from operational management and
agricultural economy perspectives. As a government-lead growing industry, it causes profound con-
cerns in many other sectors such as food and environment. We go through people’s efforts from the
operational level, such as deploying refinery locations, to the strategic level, like government policies.
Then, established on previous work, Chapter 3 investigate the joint impact of the two critical
factors, competition and reliability, in a general supply chain design. The problem is modeled as two
symmetric companies which deploy their facilities to compete for customers by providing service at a
higher proximity. Meanwhile, the existing facilities are subject to random disruption risks. We develop
a CA-based game-theoretical framework to incorporate both Nash and Stackelberg competitions. Our
framework provides analytical solution to the optimal deployment strategy, and a series of numerical
experiments reveal managerial insights.
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Extending the CA-based game-theoretical framework, Chapter 4 explores a more specific issue
with pressing realistic background: how to deploy biofuel infrastructure considering competition and
uncertainties. We focus on the competition between the biofuel firm and existing food markets and
incorporate wider uncertainty factors such as facility disruption risks and time-varying crop yield.
Calculus of variations technique is implemented to directly obtain solution to general heterogeneous
problems and numerical examples including a U.S. Midwest case study is provided.
As an leading effort, Chapter 5 generalize the CA method to solve dynamic facility location prob-
lem. We propose a three steps tube model algorithm framework, i.e., decomposition, estimation, and
synthesization. The proposed heuristic solution approach can effectively solve typical dynamic facility
location problem when the number of facilities monotonically increase over time. Both hypothetical
and realistic case studies are implemented.
Chapter 6 is an extension along the stream of Chapter 4, where we focus on a more strategic policy
angle to explore a challenging trilemma issue during the fast development of the biofuel industry. In
other words, how the government should sustainably balance food, energy, and environment by policy
instruments like the mandate and subsidies. The game-theoretical framework is extended to incorpo-
rate the third level to capture government decisions, while coordination strategies are investigated to
improve the efficiency of the system. A more detailed Midwest case study is provided in the numerical
study section with fruitful managerial insights.
In the end, Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and discuss further research directions.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we review the literature in the fields of facility location problems under various factors,
as well as the related concerns addressed in the biofuel supply chain design.
2.1 Facility Location Problems
Although spatial competition among service firms, customer demands, and probabilistic disruption
risks have both been studied in the context of facility location problems. These issues were traditionally
addressed in separate models each involving considerable complexity. See Daskin (1995) for a complete
review on location design under various types of customer demand. More details can be found in
reviews of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986), Kilkenny and Thisse (1999), and Kress and Pesch (2012) for
competitive facility location problems, and Snyder (2006) for random facility disruptions.
Most literature studied competitive locations on discrete networks, where customers and candidate
facility locations are located on either the nodes or the edges of the graph. For example, Hakimi
(1983) proposed a p-median type competitive facility location model when the competitor’s facilities
were already built. Serra and ReVelle (1994) developed a market pre-emptive strategy when there
exists a potential competitor who will enter the market with the same number of facilities. Dob-
son and Karmarkar (1987) presented a market monopoly strategy which sought to deter the entry
of the competitor by building redundant facilities. These discrete models may incur significant com-
putational burdens when the network scale becomes large. In such cases, continuous market models
were developed, where the customers are continuously distributed on a plane and the facility location
and customer allocation are in the form of a Voronoi diagram (Aoyagi and Okabe, 1993). Effective
computational algorithms (e.g., the Lloyds’ method (Lloyd, 1982)) have been proposed for this type
of models. For a much simpler case, where customers are uniformly distributed in a line segment,
Peng and Tabuchi (2007) proposed a location-then-variety competition model to achieve oligopoly in
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a multiproduct and multistore context.
Recent research has been conducted in addressing reliable facility location issues. Snyder and
Daskin (2005) and Cui et al. (2010) solve facility location problems when facility disruption probabilities
are either spatially uniform or site-dependent. Lim et al. (2010) consider strengthening facility to
reduce the risk of disruption. Lim et al. (2013) extend the work by considering the case in which
the disruption probability is not perfectly known. Qi and Shen (2007) and Qi et al. (2010) study the
reliability issue on both the supplier and retailer in a supply chain. Li and Ouyang (2012); Li et al.
(2013) address the facility location problem under correlated disruptions. Huang et al. (2013) study
biofuel infrastructure resiliency under natural hazards.
The efforts of earlier work provide evidences of the difficulty as only small scale instances can be
solved; for example, Bai et al. (2012) solves instances with only up to a 20 farmers, 20 food markets,
and 20 candidate refinery locations. To overcome these computational challenges, the CA approach
is developed by approximating the complex optimization design problem conveniently into one that
involves only a few key decision variables in the form of continuous quantities (Newell, 1973; Langevin
et al., 1996; Daganzo, 2005). Solutions to the CA models can often be obtained analytically, and
the resulting insights can be suitable for high-level decision-making. In recent years, CA showed
great promise as an alternative solution approach in many application areas, especially in large-scale
logistics (e.g., Shen and Qi (2007); Smilowitz and Daganzo (2007)) and facility location problems (e.g.,
Cui et al. (2010); Lim et al. (2015a, 2013)). Regarding Stackelberg competition, the closest effort in
this direction is Dasci and Laporte (2005), where the CA method was used to analyze a Stackelberg
competition problem between two firms under fixed facility investment considerations. Their model,
however, does not address probabilistic facility disruption risks or transportation costs.
Following the pioneering work of Ballou (1968), there has been a stream of research literature on
the dynamic facility location problem. See Arabani and Farahani (2012) for a review. Wesolowsky
(1973) extended the static single facility location model to one with a sequence of location decisions
in multiple periods. Schilling (1980) developed a heuristic method based on multi-objective analysis
for dynamic planning of public-sector facilities. Erlenkotter (1981) compared the performance of seven
heuristic methods with a growing demand. Roy and Erlenkotter (1982) and Frantzeskakis and Watson-
Gandy (1989) introduced branch and bound approaches based on dual ascent and state-relaxation,
respectively. Daskin et al. (1992) discussed the impact of time horizon length and found an optimal
forecast time horizon. Hormozi and Khumawala (1996) proposed a dynamic programming method to
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solve the problem with time dependent weights. Current et al. (1997) analyzed a dynamic p-Median
location problem that minimizes the expected value of opportunity loss (or the maximum regret).
Bhatti et al. (2014) considered a two-stage location problem where the demand information is learned
over time. Despite various differences among these proposed solution approaches, they typically involve
dynamic programming or its variants (often with heuristics) that determine a collection of binary
facility construction decisions at each candidate location at every instant in time. Hence, obtaining
the exact (or even a reasonable) solution becomes extremely challenging as the size of the problem
instance increases.
2.2 Biofuel Industry
There has been a vast literature that applies operations research and operations management tech-
niques to food and agricultural industry, which a short review is provided in Lowe and Preckel (2004).
With the recent initiative in the biofuel industry, there is a growing literature that studies its
impact. To address the strategic level impacts, Rajagapol et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011) used
multi-market equilibrium models to examine the food-versus-biofuel trade-off under the mandated
biofuel production. McNew and Griffith (2005) proposed a spatial econometric model to quantify the
impact of new bioethanol plants on local corn prices. On the operational level, Tursun et al. (2008)
proposed a discrete facility location model for biofuel supply chain designs to optimize the total cost for
transporting and processing biomass, delivering bioethanol, and building and operating biorefineries.
Kang et al. (2010) extended the model by incorporating by-products of bioethanol production and
different types of biomass (both corn and cellulose) and corresponding refineries in a multi-year supply
chain design scenario. A recent review of biofuel supply chain is provided in Awudu and Zhang (2012).
In understanding the impact of direct and indirect land use change, Rathmann et al. (2010) provide
a summary on the cause and effect of the trilemma problem based on the current state of research and
expert arguments. Khanna and Crago (2012) review empirical modeling approaches and discuss the
key factors that influence estimates of its magnitude. Keeney and Hertel (2009) predict the indirect
land use and its resulting environmental issues based on various factors including crop yield and global
trading. Focusing on the cases of U.S. and Brazil, the two largest biofuel producers in the world,
Nunez et al. (2013) examine how the land use affects the food and biofuel economy. These studies
employ statistical analysis (partial or general equilibrium) to predict the impact of biofuel industry on
agricultural land conversion.
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A second line of inquiry is to study the impact of governmental policy instruments and investigate
their impact to the growth of the biofuel industry and the resulting farmland allocation. We consider
the two representative instruments employed in the U.S., mandate and subsidy. There has been
few studies that examine the efficiency and implications of these policy instruments. de Gorter and
Just (2010) and Lapan and Moschini (2012) construct general equilibrium models to compare the
efficiencies of mandate and subsidies in achieving various energy and environmental targets specified
in the EISA. They find that, under many scenarios, imposing mandate is often more efficient than
providing subsidies to the industry. Wu and Langpap (2014) explore the impact of mandate and
subsidy on the price of crop markets and other environmental and social measures. Wang et al. (2013)
point out a rigid mandate may suppress the total biofuel production by studying the biofuel supply
chain design under the Renewable Identification Number (RIN) system. Although these studies offer
valuable insights understanding the impact of policy instruments, they obtain the respective impact
and insights in isolation; for example, the impact of mandate is investigated for a fixed subsidy level,
and vice versa.
On the other hand, several studies have been conducted on modeling crop yield uncertainty (Thomp-
son, 1986; Pachepsky and Acock, 1998) and its impacts on agricultural resource management. For
example, Ozaki et al. (2008) use a statistical spatiotemporal model to capture various crop yield un-
certainties and guide the pricing of crop insurance contracts. Kazaz and Webster (2011) investigate
the impact of crop yield uncertainty on an agriculture company’s pricing and production decisions.
Lim et al. (2015a) discuss the trade-off between demand agility and proximity in supply chain design.
Huang et al. (2014) further explore the impact of feedstock seasonality and uncertainty on the design
of a biofuel supply chain.
Another stream of research deals with managing the yield uncertainty of crops (Jones et al., 2001;
Kazaz, 2004; Allen and Schuster, 2004). For example, Kazaz and Webster (2011) study how yield
uncertainty affects the pricing and production decisions in the agricultural market, and Huh and Lall
(2013) study farmer’s crop choice decision under rainfall and price uncertainty incorporating irrigation
investment and usage. Other studies deal with interesting features in the agriculture industry. Burer
et al. (2008) study contract schemes between farmers and retailers prevalent in the agriculture seed
industry, and construct the coordinating mechanism that achieves the supply chain optimum in terms
of total profit. Devalkar et al. (2011) optimize a commodity supply chain integrating the procurement,
process, and trading decisions on a multi-period setting, and provide numerical studies using a soybean
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complex data.
2.3 Classic Models
In this section, we review the classic discrete model framework in solving facility location problem
considering either competitions or reliability issues.
2.3.1 Pre-emptive Facility Location
Facility location under competition is relatively a wide topic, we focus on introducing one representative
example, the work of Serra and ReVelle (1994). Consider there are two firms, A and B, and customers
i ∈ I, with demand λi, are distributed on a discrete network. Each of the two firms needs to decide
where to build a given number, i.e., p, of facilities among a set of candidate locations J . Each customer
i will patronize the nearest facility to get service regardless of the difference of firms. The distance
from customer i ∈ I to candidate facility location j ∈ J is denoted as dij . When the two nearest
facilities with identical distances are present, the customer demand is expected to break tie evenly,
i.e., half-half. Hence, the problem is, if Firm A builds all facilities first, how should it optimize the
p-facility locations to capture the most customer demand considering Firm B will enter later.
The critical problem for Firm A is to build facilities nearer to as many customers as possible than
its potential competitor, Firm B. Suppose after Firm B comes in, the nearest Firm B’s facility to
customer i is bi, then the candidate facility locations can be divided into three sets: (i) with lower
distances than dibi , denoted by Li(bi) = {∀j ∈ J, dij < dibi}; (ii) with equal distances to dibi , denoted
by Ei(bi) = {∀j ∈ J, dij < dibi}; and (iii) with higher distances than dibi , which are never visited by
customer i. Hence, Firm A will capture all λi demand if a facility is in Li(bi) and
1
2λi if there is no
facility in Li(bi) but at least one facility in Ei(bi).
Then, let xj ∈ {0, 1} denote if Firm A chooses to build facility at j and yi, zi ∈ {0, 1} represent
customer i is fully and half captured by Firm A, respectively. Given Firm B’s facility decisions, i.e.,
{bi, i ∈ I}, we have the following optimization problem for Firm A.
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max
{xj},{yi},{zi}
∑
i∈I
λi
(
yi +
1
2
zi
)
(2.1)
s.t. yi ≤
∑
j∈Li(bi)
xj , ∀i ∈ I, (2.2)
zi ≤
∑
j∈Ei(bi)
xj , ∀i ∈ I, (2.3)
yi + zi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I, (2.4)∑
j∈J
xj = p, (2.5)
xj , yi, zi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J.
In the above problem, objective (2.1) indicates maximizing the total captured customer demand.
Constraints (2.2) and (2.3) reflect the condition to fully or half capture customer demands. Constraint
(2.4) guarantees the demand is fully or half captured, exclusively. Constraint (2.5) shows exactly p
facilities will be built.
In fact, although this problem looks simple, there are two challenges. First, Firm A needs to
estimate Firm B’s decision in advance, which is typically difficult (e.g., enumerating all possible cases).
Second, even given Firm B’s decision in advance, the problem is still an integer programming problem,
which is NP-hard. Only small scale problem instances can be solved by enumeration. Heuristic or
approximation algorithms are needed to solve moderate or even larger scale problems.
2.3.2 Reliable Facility Location
Next, we introduce how to optimize facility locations when each working facility is subject to an
independent disruption risk. Cui et al. (2010) solve a reliable facility location problem based on a
network model, where each facility incurs a fixed cost while suffers a site-dependent failure risks. We
still use λi to represent the demands of customer i ∈ I, use J to represent the set of candidate facility
locations, and use dij to denote the distance from i ∈ I to j ∈ J . Each facility at j incurs a fixed cost
fj and is under a failure probability qj . Normally, customers patronize the nearest facility for service.
Once the disruption happens, each customer is given the facility disruption information at first, and
seeks service at the nearest working facility, under a given distance threshold, e.g., the Rth nearest
facility. Hence, when customers fail to get service, e.g., all facilities are disrupted, they will change to
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visit a virtual facility j∞, which never fails, i.e., qj∞ = 0 and dij∞ indicates the penalty cost for lost
services.
Now, let xj ∈ {0, 1} denote if facility j is built and let yijr ∈ {0, 1} indicate if customer i is served
by facility j at “level” r. Here level r ∈ {1, 2, ..., R} means the rth nearest facility to corresponding
customers. To facilitate the problem formulation, we introduce Pijr as auxiliary variable, indicating
the probability that customer i is served by facility j at level r. Then we balance the facility building
cost and distances for customers to obtain services, solving the following cost minimization problem.
min
{xj},{yijr},{Pijr}
∑
j∈J
fjxj +
∑
i∈I,j∈J
R+1∑
r=1
λidijPijryijr (2.6)
s.t.
∑
j∈J\{j∞}
yijr +
r−1∑
s=1
yij∞s = 1, ∀i ∈ I, 1 ≤ r ≤ R+ 1, (2.7)
R∑
r=1
yijr ≤ xj , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J\{j∞}, (2.8)
R+1∑
r=1
yij∞r = 1, ∀i ∈ I, (2.9)
Pij1 = 1− qj , ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, (2.10)
Pijr = (1− qj)
∑
k∈J\{j∞}
qk
1− qkPi,k,r−1yi,k,r−1, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, 2 ≤ r ≤ R+ 1, (2.11)
xj , yijr ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I j ∈ J, 1 ≤ r ≤ R+ 1.
Here, the objective (2.6) is the summation of facility fixed cost and the expected customer transporta-
tion cost. Constraints (2.7)–(2.9) depict the feasibility for customer i to visit facility j at level r, while
Constraints (2.10) and (2.11) reflects the iterative relationship for customer i to visit facility j at level
r, i.e., all facilities with lower level are disrupted but the facility j at level r is working.
In fact, the above problem is a mixed-integer programming problem. Fortunately, Lagrangian
relaxation algorithm can be used to estimate the optimal solution. However, the optimality gap still
increases fast as the problem scale becomes larger.
From the two examples, we can observe the difficulty of obtaining optimal solution in discrete
formulation, even only competitions or reliability issue is considered. To study their joint impact, a
novel framework is needed. The following chapters will present our new solution framework based on
CA.
15
Chapter 3
Competitive Facility Location
Design under Facility Disruption
Risks
3.1 Introduction
First of all, motivated by the concerns of the service competition and reliability, this chapter systemat-
ically analyzes its joint impact to a service provider on the facility location design perspective. In light
of this, game-theoretical models are presented to capture the service competition, while a probabilistic
facility disruption scheme is embedded. Considering the complexity of the problem, especially for a
large-scale setting, the CA approach is implemented to facilitate the analysis. 1
Specifically, in a market with a predetermined demand distribution over space, as customers nor-
mally seek the nearest functioning facility for service, it is supposed that the share of the demand only
depends on the functionality of service facilities and the presence of nearby competitors. Following this
assumption, we first analyze the existence of Nash equilibria in a symmetric two-company competition
case. Then we build a leader-follower Stackelberg competition model to derive the optimal facility
location design when one of the companies has the first mover advantage over its competitor. Both
models are solved effectively, and closed-form analytical solutions can be obtained for special cases.
Numerical experiments (with hypothetical and empirical data) are conducted to show the impacts of
competition, facility disruption risks and transportation cost metrics on the optimal design. Properties
of the models are analyzed to cast interesting managerial insights.
3.2 Notation and Formulation
Consider a two dimensional market region Ω with continuously distributed customer demand density
λ(x),∀x ∈ Ω.2 There are two companies competing in the market, denoted by company i ∈ {0, 1},
who provide identical service. Customers are supposed to have complete information about facility
1This chapter is based on a published paper, Wang and Ouyang (2013)
2For discretely distributed demand, Peng and Ouyang (2011) proposed a method to convert it into a continuous
demand density function.
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disruptions and always patronize the nearest working facility (i.e., regardless of the company). In
the CA framework, instead of looking for discrete facility locations, we seek a service area function
for a facility of company i at x, Ai(x). The inverse of the service area function, [Ai(x)]
−1 is the
facility density in the neighborhood of x. For company i, the fixed cost of setting up a facility at
location x is Ki(x), and the built facility may be disrupted independently with probability qi(x). We
assume that at each location x the facility disruption probabilities for both companies are small (e.g.
qi(x) ≤ 0.05,∀i, x). This is reasonable for many real-world hazards.
Since built facilities may be disrupted probabilistically, given Ai(x), i = 0, 1, the travel distance for
the customer at location x to the nearest working facilities of company i is a random variable, which
we denote by Zi(x). The following proposition describes the probability distribution of the random
transportation distance.
Proposition 1. (Li and Ouyang, 2010) The distance from customer location x to its nearest working
facility of company i, Zi(x), satisfies the following cumulative distribution function:
P(Zi(x) ≤ z) = 1− qni (x)
[
(n+ 1)Ai(x)− piz2
Ai(x)
+ qi(x)
piz2 − nAi(x)
Ai(x)
]
, (3.1)
where n :=
⌊
piz2
Ai(x)
⌋
, and b·c is the floor operator.
Note that (3.1) is a non-differentiable piece-wise function. The following proposition gives a high-
fidelity smooth functional approximation that will significantly reduce modeling complexity.
Proposition 2. Under small failure probability, (3.1) can be approximated by the following smooth
function:
P(Zi(x) ≤ z) ≈ min
{
[1− qi(x)] piz
2
Ai(x)
, 1
}
. (3.2)
The relative approximation error is no larger than 4% when qi(x) < 0.05.
See Figure 3.1 for an illustration of the approximation.
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Figure 3.1: Approximation of cumulative probability distribution of customer service distance.
When a customer at x faces two competing companies, each with facility density Ai(x) in its
neighborhood, the probability for this customer to patronize a facility of company i should be P(Zi(x) <
Z−i(x)), where subscript −i indicates 1− i. We assume that each customer pays a service fee of p to
the patronized facility, and the transportation cost for providing the service cZθi (x) is covered by the
service company.3 Here, parameter c is a constant while θ dictates the economy of scale (or diseconomy
of scale) of transportation cost with regard to distance; e.g., θ = 0, 1 represent the cases that the travel
cost is independent of or linearly dependent on the distance, respectively.
For company i, considering the revenue, the transportation cost and the facility setup cost, the
expected profit per unit area in the neighborhood of x is
EZi(x)[P(Zi(x) < Z−i(x))(p− cZθi (x))]λ(x)−
Ki(x)
Ai(x)
.
Note that the above unit-area profit for company i near location x is independent of any other facility
location decisions. Hence, the total expected profit in the whole market region can be approximated
as
Πi(Ai(x), A−i(x)) ≈
∫
Ω
{
EZi(x)[P(Zi(x) < Z−i(x))(p− cZθi (x))]λ(x)−
Ki(x)
Ai(x)
}
dx. (3.3)
The total expected profit is maximized when the integrand of (3.3) at each x is maximized. For
conciseness, variable x will be omitted in the rest of this chapter without causing ambiguity (e.g.
3One may wonder why customers still patronize the nearest facility when the transportation cost is covered by the
service company. First of all, our cost assumption is general; if customers pay the transportation cost, we can simply set
c = 0 for the company. Second, in many real-world cases, customers are also concerned with the quality of the service
they receive (e.g., timeliness and responsiveness). As such, we have made a simplifying assumption that the nearest
facility is capable of providing the most responsive service.
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Ai(x) is abbreviated to Ai).
We define the equivalent facility density of company i near location x as follows
Di(x) :=
pi[1− qi(x)]
Ai(x)
. (3.4)
Intuitively, Di(x) is pi times the expected density of available facilities under disruption risks, and pi
is included in the definition of Di(x) simply for convenience. From now on, we use Di, D−i instead
of Ai, A−i as the decision variables. Let pii(x,Di, D−i) be the expected profit of company i from one
unit of market area near location x. (Again x can be omitted without causing ambiguity.) Then we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For company i ∈ {0, 1}, the expected profit from one unit of market area near location
x is given by the following formula.
pii(Di, D−i) =
{
2Di
[
p
2Dmax
− c
(2 + θ)D
1+θ/2
max
]
−2DiD−i
[
p
4D2max
− c
(4 + θ)D
2+θ/2
max
]}
λ− Ki
pi(1− qi)Di, (3.5)
where Dmax = max{Di, D−i}.
Proof. From (3.3),
EZi [P(Zi < Z−i)(p− cZθi )]λ−
Ki
Ai
=λ
∫ ∞
0
P(z < Z−i)(p− czθ)dFZi(z)−
Ki
Ai
=

λ
∫√ A−ipi(1−q−i)
0
{[
1− (1− q−i) piz2A−i
]
(p− czθ) (1−qi)2pizAi
}
dz − KiAi , Aipi(1−qi) >
A−i
pi(1−q−i)
λ
∫√ Ai
pi(1−qi)
0
{[
1− (1− q−i) piz2A−i
]
(p− czθ) (1−qi)2pizAi
}
dz − KiAi , Aipi(1−qi) ≤
A−i
pi(1−q−i)
.
19
If we use (3.4) to substitute the variables, then simple calculus shows that
pii(Di, D−i) =

2Diλ
∫ 1/√D−i
0 [1−D−iz2](p− czθ)zdz − Kipi(1−qi)Di, D−i > Di
2Diλ
∫ 1/√Di
0
[1−D−iz2](p− czθ)zdz − Kipi(1−qi)Di, D−i ≤ Di
= 2Diλ
∫ 1/√Dmax
0
[1−D−iz2](p− czθ)zdz − Ki
pi(1− qi)Di
= 2Diλ
[
p
2Dmax
− c
(θ + 2)D
1+θ/2
max
− pD−i
4D2max
+
cD−i
(θ + 4)D
2+θ/2
max
]
− Ki
pi(1− qi)Di.
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
We first analyze the existence and properties of Nash equilibrium between two competing companies
{0, 1}. Suppose (D∗0 , D∗1) represents a Nash equilibrium point, then by definition it satisfies
D∗0 = arg max
D0≥0
pi0(D0, D
∗
1),
and
D∗1 = arg max
D1≥0
pi1(D1, D
∗
0).
We find a number of properties of such an equilibrium, as stated in the following propositions.
Proposition 4. Given the competitor’s strategy D−i, the payoff function of company i, pii(Di, D−i)
is concave with respect to Di. Therefore, the best response exists and is unique for each player.
Proof. Due to symmetry between the two companies, we prove the proposition for company 1.
pi1(D1, D0)
=
{
2D1
[
p
2Dmax
− c
(2 + θ)D
1+θ/2
max
]
− 2D1D0
[
p
4D2max
− c
(4 + θ)D
2+θ/2
max
]}
λ− K1
pi(1− q1)D1
=

λp− 2cλ
(2+θ)D
θ/2
1
− pλD02D1 + 2cλD0(4+θ)D1+θ/21 −
K1D1
pi(1−q1) , D1 > D0,[
λp
2D0
− 4cλ
(2+θ)(4+θ)D
1+θ/2
0
− K1pi(1−q1)
]
D1, D1 ≤ D0.
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Denote
p˜i1(D1, D0) = λp− 2cλ
(2 + θ)D
θ/2
1
− pλD0
2D1
+
2cλD0
(4 + θ)D
1+θ/2
1
− K1D1
pi(1− q1) , D1 > D0, (3.6)
and
p¯i1(D1, D0) =
[
λp
2D0
− 4cλ
(2 + θ)(4 + θ)D
1+θ/2
0
− K1
pi(1− q1)
]
D1, D1 ≤ D0. (3.7)
Since p¯i1(D1, D0) is linear with respect to D1, pi1(D1, D0) is convex with respect to D1 in [0, D0]. Then
we consider the convexity of p˜i1(D1, D0).
∂p˜i1
∂D1
=
θcλ
(2 + θ)D
1+θ/2
1
+
pλD0
2D21
− (2 + θ)cλD0
(4 + θ)D
2+θ/2
1
− K1
pi(1− q1) ,
∂2p˜i1
∂D21
= − θcλ
2D
2+θ/2
1
− pλD0
D31
+
(2 + θ)cλD0
2D
3+θ/2
1
.
Whenever a customer seeks an alternative working facility for service, the return (or revenue) of serving
that customer is likely to exceed the transportation cost. Hence we further assume that the following
holds:
p >
c
Dθ/2
. (3.8)
Hence, from (3.6) and (3.8), we have
∂2p˜i1
∂D21
= − θcλ
2D
2+θ/2
1
+
θcλD0
2D
3+θ/2
1
− pλD0
D31
+
cλD0
D
3+θ/2
1
= −(D1 −D0) θcλ
2D
3+θ/2
1
−
(
p− c
D
θ/2
1
)
λD0
D31
< 0.
Then pi1(D1, D0) is concave with respect to D1 in (D0,∞). Actually, ∂p˜i1∂D1 |D1=D0 = ∂p¯i1∂D1 |D1=D0 . We
can conclude pi1(D1, D0) is concave with respect to D1 in [0,∞).
Proposition 5. The best response of company i given the competitor’s strategy D−i is
ϕi(D−i) =

0 ∆i(D−i) ≤ 0
Dˆi ∆i(D−i) > 0
, (3.9)
where ∆i(D−i) := λp2D−i − 4cλ(2+θ)(4+θ)D1+θ/2−i −
Ki
pi(1−qi) ,∀i ∈ {0, 1} is monotonically decreasing under
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Assumption (3.8), while Dˆi can be determined as a function of D−i through the following formula:
D−i =
[
Ki
pi(1− qi) −
θcλ
(2 + θ)Dˆ
1+θ/2
i
][
pλ
2Dˆ2i
− (2 + θ)cλ
(4 + θ)Dˆ
2+θ/2
i
]−1
. (3.10)
The value of Dˆi satisfies that Dˆi > D−i when ∆i(D−i) > 0.
Specifically, ∆i(0) > 0 and ϕi(0) =
(
θcλpi(1−qi)
(2+θ)Ki
) 2
2+θ
.
Proof. We have shown pii(Di, D−i) is concave for any given D−i with respect to Di. When ∆i(D−i) ≤
0, pii(Di, D−i) is monotonically decreasing with respect to Di, therefore, ϕi = 0. When ∆i(D−i) > 0,
pii(Di, D−i) is monotonically increasing with respect to Di on interval [0, D−i]. Then the optimal
solution ϕi must be located on (D−i,∞). From the first order condition, we have ∂pii∂Di = 0, which leads
to (3.10).
Proposition 6. ξ0 = (ϕ0(0), 0) is a Nash equilibrium if ϕ0(0) ≥ ∆−11 (0). ξ1 = (0, ϕ1(0)) is a Nash
equilibrium if ϕ1(0) ≥ ∆−10 (0). When K01−q0 = K11−q1 , ξ2 = (∆
−1
0 (0),∆
−1
1 (0)) is a Nash equilibrium.
Specifically, when ξ2 is a Nash equilibrium, the payoff for both companies are zero at the equilibrium.
There is no other possible Nash equilibrium beyond ξ0, ξ1, ξ2.
Proof. The first two Nash equilibria (indicating market monopoly) are intuitive. We only need to
show the third Nash equilibrium exists. When K01−q0 =
K1
1−q1 , the payoff for both players have the same
expression. When ∆0(D1) = 0, the best response for company 0 is [0, D1]. Since the expression for
company 1 is the same, ∆1(D1) = 0, which means [0, D1] is the best response for company 1 when
company 0 take strategy D1. Therefore, (D1, D1) is a Nash equilibrium. In addition, since ∆i(D−i) is
monotonically decreasing, we can write D1 = ∆
−1
0 (0) = ∆
−1
1 (0). From (3.7), p¯i1(D1, D1) = ∆1(D1) =
0. By symmetry, p¯i0(D1, D1) = 0.
Suppose there exists another Nash equilibrium, denoted by ξn = (D0, D1). It is clear that D0 6= 0
and D1 6= 0; otherwise ξn = ξ0 or ξ1. If D1 = D0, we can easily show D1 = D0 = ∆−10 (0) = ∆−11 (0)
from (3.10), which means ξn = ξ2. Therefore, D0 6= D1. Without loss of generality, suppose D0 >
D1 > 0. Then D1 = ϕ1(D0). Because D1 > 0, from (3.9), we have ∆1(D0) > 0 and D1 = Dˆ1 > D0,
which contradicts with D0 > D1. Therefore ξn does not exist.
Depending on the system parameters (e.g. cost coefficients), the competition between the two
companies may evolve into any of the above three Nash equilibria. This will be demonstrated by
numerical examples in §3.5. We would like to note too that the system may not have any Nash
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equilibrium; e.g., when K01−q0 6= K11−q1 and ϕ0(0) < ∆
−1
1 (0), ϕ1(0) < ∆
−1
0 (0). The reason is due to the
fact that the decision on entering/exiting the market (or building a facility) is a binary one. Although
this property is derived using the continuous approximation approach, it is intrinsic to this type of
competitive location problems. Here is a simple illustrative example in a discrete setting.
Example. (No Nash equilibrium) Consider a simple case, where the market region is on a line segment
[−2, 2]. Five identical customers are located at {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2} with λ = 1, and there are three
candidate locations at {−1, 0, 1}. Suppose the competing companies can co-locate facilities at the
same location if needed, and in such case, each company gets half of the revenue (p/2) at the same
transportation cost. Suppose p = 10, c = 3, θ = 1, qi = 0, K0 = 11, K1 = K0 + ε, where ε is
an arbitrarily small positive number. Then we can show that there is no Nash equilibrium for the
competition. Given the decision of company 1, denoted by a facility location subset σ1, the best
response of company 0, denoted by ϕ0(σ1) for all possible σ1 is listed as follows
ϕ0(σ1) =

{0} σ1 = ∅, {−1}, {1}
∅ σ1 = {−1, 1}, {−1, 0, 1}
{−1, 1} σ1 = {0}
{1} σ1 = {−1, 0}
{−1} σ1 = {0, 1}
. (3.11)
Due to symmetry, the response of company 1 to company 0, ϕ1(σ0), have the same structure as (3.11).
If there are any Nash equilibria, there must be a pair (σ∗0 , σ
∗
1) such that σ
∗
0 = ϕ0(σ
∗
1) and σ
∗
1 = ϕ1(σ
∗
0)
. However, it is easy to verify by inspecting (3.11) that such a pair does not exist.
3.4 Stackelberg Competition
Suppose now that one of the two companies has the so-called first-mover advantage, such that the
competition between these two companies follows a Stackelberg leader-follower game. Without loss of
generality, we assume company 0 is the leader and company 1 is the follower. To get the best profit for
company 0, in anticipation of company 1’s response, we need to consider a bi-level optimization model.
Using the same CA modeling approach, the following problem is formulated for the neighborhood of
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each location x ∈ Ω:
max
D0≥0
pi0(D0, Dˆ1) (3.12)
s.t. Dˆ1 = arg max
D1≥0
pi1(D1, D0). (3.13)
From (3.9), the follower’s best response (3.13) is equal to
Dˆ1 = ϕ1(D0).
Then the bi-level optimization model can be addressed as a one dimensional optimization problem
max
D0≥0
pi0(D0, ϕ1(D0)). (3.14)
There are two strategies for the leader: (i) deterring the entry of the follower and establish
monopoly, or (ii) allowing the follower to enter into competition. If the leader chooses to deter the
entry of the follower, from (3.9), condition D0 ≥ ∆−11 (0) will hold and (3.14) is reduced to
max
D0≥∆−11 (0)
pi0(D0, 0). (3.15)
Otherwise, the leader let the follower enter the market. Condition 0 ≤ D0 < ∆−11 (0) will hold and
(3.14) is reduced to
max
0≤D0<∆−11 (0)
pi0(D0, Dˆ1) (3.16)
We have the following results for this leader-follower game.
Proposition 7. When the leader deters the entry of the follower, the optimal leader solution to (3.15)
is
D+0 := max
{
∆−11 (0),
(
θcλpi(1− q0)
(2 + θ)K0
) 2
θ+2
}
. (3.17)
When the leader let the follower enter the market, the optimal leader solution is given by
D−0 := min{∆−11 (0), Dˆ0}, (3.18)
where Dˆ0 =
[
K1
pi(1−q1) − θcλ(2+θ)Dˆ1+θ/21
] [
pλ
2Dˆ21
− (2+θ)cλ
(4+θ)Dˆ
2+θ/2
1
]−1
and Dˆ1 is the solution to the following
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problem:
max
Dˆ1
[
λp
2Dˆ1
− 4cλ
(2 + θ)(4 + θ)Dˆ
1+θ/2
1
− K0
pi(1− q0)
][
K1
pi(1− q1) −
θcλ
(2 + θ)Dˆ
1+θ/2
1
]
·
[
pλ
2Dˆ21
− (2 + θ)cλ
(4 + θ)Dˆ
2+θ/2
1
]−1
(3.19)
s.t. 0 ≤
[
K1
pi(1− q1) −
θcλ
(2 + θ)Dˆ
1+θ/2
1
][
pλ
2Dˆ21
− (2 + θ)cλ
(4 + θ)Dˆ
2+θ/2
1
]−1
< ∆−11 (0). (3.20)
Proof. We first prove (3.17). The payoff of the leader when deterring the entry of the follower is
pi0(D0, 0) = λp− 2cλ
(2 + θ)D
θ/2
0
− K0
pi(1− q0)D0. (3.21)
The first order condition for (3.21) is
∂pi0(D0, 0)
∂D0
=
θcλ
(2 + θ)D
1+θ/2
0
− K0
pi(1− q0) = 0.
Note that D0 ≥ ∆−11 (0). Then the optimal solution to (3.15) is
D+0 = max
{
∆−11 (0),
(
θcλpi(1− q0)
(2 + θ)K0
) 2
θ+2
}
.
Then we prove (3.18). From (3.10), we have
Dˆ0 =
[
K1
pi(1− q1) −
θcλ
(2 + θ)Dˆ
1+θ/2
1
][
pλ
2Dˆ21
− (2 + θ)cλ
(4 + θ)Dˆ
2+θ/2
1
]−1
.
Then the payoff of the leader when allowing the entry of the follower is the objective function (3.19).
Note that 0 ≤ D0 < ∆−11 (0), which leads to constraint (3.20). This completes the proof.
We are now ready to present the solution to the leader-follower game.
Proposition 8. The solution to (3.14) is
D∗0 =

D+0 , pi0(D
+
0 , 0) > pi0(D
−
0 , Dˆ1)
D−0 , otherwise
.
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Specifically, when θ = 0, the solution is in a closed-form; i.e., ∆−11 (0) =
λ(p−c)pi(1−q1)
2K1
, Dˆ1 =
λ(p−c)pi(1−q0)
4K0
, Dˆ0 =
λpiK1(p−c)(1−q0)2
8K20 (1−q1) and
D∗0 =

λ(p−c)pi(1−q1)
2K1
, K1(1−q0)2K0(1−q1) < 1
λpiK1(p−c)(1−q0)2
8K20 (1−q1) , otherwise
,
or in the form of facility service area size,
A∗0 =

2K1(1−q0)
λ(p−c)(1−q1) ,
K1(1−q0)
2K0(1−q1) < 1
8K20 (1−q1)
λK1(p−c)(1−q0) , otherwise
.
In fact, the special case when θ = 0 is a direct extension of the work in Dasci and Laporte (2005)
that additionally considers facility disruptions. We can have some interesting observations for this
special case. When the failure probability of the leader q0 increases, or when the failure probability
of the follower q1 decreases, the region for the leader to maintain monopoly shrinks (i.e., as
K1(1−q0)
2K0(1−q1)
decreases). In such cases, the optimal facility service area size for the leader decreases in its monopoly
region but increases in the duopoly region (where both the leader and the follower have a presence),
while the optimal facility service area size of the follower increases in the duopoly region. This means
that when facilities are more likely to be disrupted, the leader should adopt a more conservative
investment strategy which will shrink the area of its monopoly region, strengthen this region with
denser facilities, and give up part of the duopoly region by having sparser facilities. Since the leader
builds fewer facilities in the duopoly region, the follower can also build fewer facilities to reduce facility
cost and increase its profit.
3.5 Numerical Case Studies
The solution procedures are coded in Matlab R2010b and run on a desktop computer with 2.67 GHz
CPU and 2.00 GB memory. For all numerical examples, the computation time is within 3 seconds.
3.5.1 Hypothetical Data
In this section, we apply our model to a series of hypothetical examples that are defined on a 5×5 square
market region. We start from a Stackelberg competition case as the benchmark, and then alter the
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system setup (e.g., parameter values and competition types) to investigate their effects on the optimal
location design strategies. Whenever needed, we use Newton’s method to solve any one-dimensional
optimization problems (concave or convex) with a termination tolerance of .
Case I (Benchmark case): Suppose the constant parameters are p = 5, c = 1, θ = 1, λ = 1,
 = 0.001, and the location-dependent parameters are K0 = 2+1.9(0.4x1−1), K1 = 2−1.9(0.4x1−1),
q0 = 0.04 + 0.01(0.4x2 − 1), q1 = 0.04 − 0.01(0.4x2 − 1). The plots of these input functions are
shown in Figure 3.2. We note that the transportation cost is linearly proportional to distance, with
coefficient c. For illustration purposes, the facility setup costs (and the failure probabilities) of the two
competing companies are set to be “complementary” to each other at all locations; i.e., K0 +K1 ≡ 4
and q0 + q1 ≡ 0.08. That is, the locations with higher facility costs (or failure probability) for one
company will have lower facility costs (or failure probability) for the competitor.
The first row of Table 3.1 summarizes the cost components of the solution for this case (base on
the model in §3.4). The leader company should build facilities based on the density function in Figure
3.3(a), which sums up (i.e., by spatial integral) to a total of 17 facilities. The company will achieve
a total profit of 52 from the optimal spatial profit function as shown in Figure 3.3(c). The follower
company’s optimal facility density function is shown in Figure 3.3(b), which sums up to a total of 5
facilities. The follower’s profit function is shown in Figure 3.3(d), yielding a total profit of 33.
We can observe some interesting patterns in the solution. For example, the whole market region
can be divided into the following three types, each of which corresponds to a different set of competitor
strategies.
• In areas where K0  K1(see Figure 3.2(a) and 3.2(b)): The leader should establish monopoly in
this part of the market. As such, the follower would not be able to enter this part of the market,
nor could they affect the leader’s decision. The leader’s optimal facility number decreases with
its fixed facility cost.
• In areas where K0 ≈ K1: The leader should also establish monopoly, but now the leader has
to build more facilities to deter the entry of the follower. The optimal facility number increases
with the ratio of its fixed facility cost to the follower’s. Hence, the potential entry of the follower
does affect the leader’s strategy.
• In areas where K0  K1: The leader should let the follower enter the market. The follower’s
lower fixed cost makes it more competitive, but the leader could still occupy a portion of the
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market as part of the first-mover advantage. The optimal number of leader facilities decreases
with its fixed facility cost.
It can also be observed from the profit plots that the boundaries between the three sub-areas are also
dependent, albeit only slightly, on the facility failure probability q. The follower enters the market
mainly in areas where it has strong competitive advantages (e.g., lower facility cost and lower failure
probability).
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Figure 3.2: Spatial input functions: facility setup cost and failure probability (Case I). (a) Facility
setup cost function for the leader; (b) facility setup cost function for the follower; (c) failure probability
function for the leader; (d) failure probability function for the follower.
Case II (Identical companies): Now we let K1 = K0 = 2 + 1.9(0.4x1 − 1), q1 = q0 = 0.04 +
0.01(0.4x2 − 1), such that all parameters are identical for both companies. The model results show
that the leader should try to establish monopoly in the entire market (i.e., no follower entry anywhere)
by building a total of 59 facilities according to the density function in Figure 3.3(e). The total profit
equals 58. This case is consistent with the discussion in Case I.
Table 3.1 also summarizes the solution for this case. It shall be noted that although the first-mover
advantage prompts the leader to establish monopoly by building a very large number (i.e., 37) of new
facilities (mostly in the low cost areas), the leader’s profit only increases 11.5% despite its large increase
in investment. If we look at both companies as a whole, because the follower is now completely driven
out of the market, the system-wide profit actually decreases 31.8%. The comparison between Case II
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NE(x), input: Case 1
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Figure 3.3: Nash equilibrium distribution, optimal facility density and profit function. (a) Optimal
facility density function for the leader (Case I); (b) optimal facility density function for the follower
(Case I); (c) optimal profit function for the leader (Case I); (d) optimal profit function for the follower
(Case I); (e) optimal facility density function for the leader (Case II); (f) nash equilibrium distribution
(Case II); (g) optimal facility density function for the leader (Case III); (h) optimal facility density
function for the follower (Case III).
and Case I shows that the competition between two similar companies, when the service price is fixed,
tends to result in inefficient monopolies that generate lower system-wide market profit.
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If we remove the first-mover advantage, the optimal decision for both companies may change. To
see this, we analyze the Nash equilibria distribution based on the same input parameters as in Case I.
According to Proposition 6, there are three possible Nash equilibria ξ0, ξ1, ξ2 for each location. Hence
the Nash equilibria at location x, denoted by ξ(x), takes value from {ξ0, ξ1, ξ2}. To graphically see the
pattern, we construct an indicator function
NE(x) := ξ0(x) + 2ξ1(x) + 4ξ2(x)
which takes value 0 to 7 respectively for each equilibria combination, where
ξi(x) :=

0, ξi /∈ ξ(x),
1, ξi ∈ ξ(x).
The Nash equilibria distribution is shown in Figure 3.3(f). In the far left of the market area,
K0  K1, ξ0 is the Nash equilibrium, indicating that company 0 should establish monopoly to deter
the entry of company 1. In the far right, K1  K0, ξ1 is the Nash equilibrium, indicating the symmetric
case that company 1 should establish monopoly to deter the entry of company 0. In the central part
of the market area, K01−q0 ≈ K11−q1 , ξ2 is the Nash equilibrium, indicating that the companies compete
and share the market, but obtain zero profits at the equilibrium (see Proposition 6). In the rest of the
market area, no Nash equilibrium exists (as explained at the end of §3.3).
Case III (Constant transportation cost): To investigate the impacts of transportation cost, we
let θ = 0, such that the transportation cost is now independent of the distance. This new cost
setting favors the customers far away from the facilities, and penalizes those nearby. We keep all other
parameters the same as those in Case I. The model results show that the leader company should build
a total of 14 facilities based on the density function in Figure 3.3(g), achieving a total profit of 46. The
follower company should build a total of 3 facilities based on the density function in Figure 3.3(h),
yielding a total profit of 30.
Table 3.1 shows that both the leader and the follower decrease the number of facilities (from 17
to 14 for the leader, and from 5 to 3 for the follower) as compared to the benchmark case. One may
expect both companies to benefit from such investment savings. However, the profits for both the
leader and the follower also decrease (i.e., by 11.5% for the leader, 9.1% for the follower, and 10.6%
for the entire market). A closer look at the cost tradeoffs show that the increase of the transportation
30
Table 3.1: Comparison of system-wide results (L: leader, F: follower, S: system).
Case Input parameters #Facilities Profit Trans. Cost Investment
H
y
p
o
th
e
ti
c
a
l
I
K1 = 4−K0
q1 = 0.08− q0
θ = 1
L: 17 L: 52 L: 7.3 L: 26.8
F: 5 F: 33 F: 4.5 F: 3.7
S: 22 S: 85 S: 11.8 S: 30.5
II
K1 = K0
q1 = q0
θ = 1
L: 59 (↑42) L: 58 (↑11.5%) L: 8.6 (↑17.8%) L: 60.3 (↑125%)
F: 0 (↓5) F: 0 (↓100%) F: 0 (↓100%) F: 0 (↓100%)
S: 59 (↑37) S: 58 (↓31.8%) S: 8.6 (↓27.1%) S: 60.3 (↑97.7%)
III
K1 = 4−K0
q1 = 0.08− q0
θ = 0
L: 14 (↓3) L: 46 (↓11.5%) L: 18.4 (↑152%) L: 22.4 (↓16.4%)
F: 3 (↓2) F: 30 (↓9.1%) F: 9.3 (↑101%) F: 2.1 (↓43.2%)
S: 17 (↓5) S: 76 (↓10.6%) S: 27.7 (↑135%) S: 24.5 (↓19.7%)
Il
li
n
o
is
IV
K1 = K0
q1 = q0
θ = 1
L: 19 L: 3.28×108 L: 0.45×108 L: 3.39×108
F: 0 F: 0 F: 0 F: 0
S: 19 S: 3.28×108 S: 0.45×108 S: 3.39×108
V
K1 = 0.5K0
q1 = 0.5q0
θ = 1
L: 3 (↓16) L: 0.28×108(↓91.5%) L: 0.18×108(↓60%) L: 0.49×108(↓85.5%)
F: 11 (↑11) F: 4.76×108(↑∞%) F: 0.58×108(↑∞%) F: 1.04×108(↑∞%)
S: 14 (↓5) S: 5.04×108(↑53.7%) S: 0.75×108(↑67.7%) S: 1.53×108(↓54.9%)
costs dominates the facility setup costs for both companies: the transportation costs increase 152%
for the leader, 101% for the follower, and 135% for the entire market, while the facility setup cost only
decreases 16.4% for the leader, 43.2% for the follower, and 19.7% for the entire market.
We believe that the drop in profit is a direct result of the competition. If there were only one
company in the market (i.e., without competition), the constant transportation cost setting should
greatly benefit the company, because just a few facilities (depending on the failure probability) should
be able to serve all customers regardless of their relative travel distance from the facilities. This way,
the company can save a large portion of its facility investment and gain a much higher profit. However,
when competition exists, both the leader and the follower need to build more facilities to garner market
share against one another, which at the same time significantly reduces the range of travel distances
between facilities and their customers. Recall that the constant transportation cost setting disfavors
the customer nearby. Therefore, the profit of each facility drops, and so does the general efficiency of
the market.
3.5.2 Illinois Case Study
In this section, we study competitions among the biofuel refineries of two leading bio-energy companies
in the State of Illinois. Figure 3.4(a) illustrates the corn production volume in all 102 Illinois counties
that could be used to supply biofuel production. Suppose the demand points are located at the
centroids of the counties, and 10% of the corn production goes to biofuel refineries based on 2008 data
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(Bai et al., 2011).
Case IV: Suppose the entire market region is a rectangle covering the whole Illinois State (ap-
proximately 200× 400 sq. miles). Based on the 102 discrete corn production volumes, we first convert
the discrete data points to a continuous density function λ(x) over the rectangular region. In so doing,
each discrete point is dispersed via a Voronoi diagram to get a “step” function and smoothened into
a continuous surface function (Peng and Ouyang, 2011). The result is shown in Figure 3.4(b).
We consider the case where both companies have the same parameters (e.g., costs, probabilities).
The unit price for a biofuel company to collect corn is p = $3 per bushel. The fixed cost of building a
refinery is equivalent to a prorated investment of Ki = $18 million per year. The probability of refinery
disruption is qi = 0.05 everywhere. The transportation cost is assumed to be linearly proportional to
distance (i.e., θ = 1) with c = $0.01 per bushel per mile. The Newton’s method use a termination
tolerance of  = 1× 10−8.
(a) 2008 Illinois corn production
Corn Supply Density (bushel)
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(b) Corresponding demand density function
Figure 3.4: Illinois corn production and its corresponding continuous demand density function.
Our model results show that the leader company should establish monopoly in the entire market
by constructing 19 facilities based on the density function in Figure 3.5(a). The total profit equals
$3.28 × 108, according to the profit function in Figure 3.5(b). We again summarize the results in
Table 3.1, and note the similarity between Case IV and Case II — the leader will establish monopoly
throughout the entire market.
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Figure 3.5: Optimal facility density function, profit function and the discretized facility locations. (a,d)
Optimal facility density function for the leader (Case IV, V); (b,e) profit function for the leader (Case
IV, V); (c,f) discretized facility locations for the leader (Case IV, V); (g,h,i) optimal facility density
function, profit function and discretized facility locations for the follower (Case V).
Next, we use the disk model (Ouyang and Daganzo, 2006) to discretize the continuous facility
density function into a facility location design as shown in Figure 3.5(c). The blue circles approximately
shows the boundary of facility service areas, and the circle centers represent the corresponding facility
locations. The total expected profit calculated based on the discretized facility location design is
$3.25× 108. The error of the continuous approximation estimation is only 0.9%.
Case V: We now consider a scenario where the follower enters the market with a significant new-
comer advantage (e.g., due to newer technologies) on reducing facility setup cost and failure probability.
Suppose K1 = 0.5K0 = $9 million per year, and q1 = 0.5q0 = 0.025 everywhere, and all the other
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parameters are the same as those in Case IV. In this case, the model solution show that the leader
should yield a large portion of market to the follower. The leader only builds a total of 3 facilities
to achieve a total profit of $2.80 × 107. The leader facility density function and its profit function
are shown respectively in Figures 3.5(d) and 3.5(e). The follower should build a total of 11 facilities
to achieve a total profit of $4.76 × 108. Its facility density function and profit function are shown in
Figures 3.5(g) and 3.5(h).
Table 3.1 illustrates how the new-comer advantage affects the competition. Instead of having the
leader establish monopoly (as in Case IV), the follower enters the market completely and tends to drive
the leader out of business. The leader is forced to adopt a very conservative strategy by significantly
shrinking its market region (i.e., reducing the number of facilities from 19 to 3) and suffer a 91.5%
reduction in profit. Considering the leader and the follower as a whole, the number of facilities decreases
from 19 to 14, but the total market profit increases by 53.7%. This probably can be attributed to the
low cost and low failure probability of the follower, which ensure high efficiency of each facility it builds.
In summary, the new-comer advantage of the follower significantly affects the leader’s performance,
although the market tends to become more efficient and reliable as a whole.
The facility density functions for both the leader and the follower are discretized into facility location
design, as shown in Figure 3.5(f) for the leader and Figure 3.5(i) for the follower. The expected profits
for the leader and the follower calculated based on the discretized facility locations are $3.11×107 and
$4.71× 108 respectively, and the relative errors of the continuous approximation estimates are 10.7%
and 1.05% respectively. The reason for the slightly large error for the leader is obviously the small
number of built facilities which causes non-smoothness and boundary issues. For large scale systems
(e.g., for the follower), the error from the CA approach is much smaller.
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Chapter 4
Infrastructure Deployment under
Uncertainties and Competition:
The Biofuel Industry Case
4.1 Introduction
The last chapter discusses the joint impact of the service competition and reliability, while more factors
need to be addressed to achieve the best logistic system design. In this chapter, we further explore
the impact of uncertainties on the demand side. To be focused, we consider a pressing logistic issue
under a more practical setting, i.e., the biofuel industry context, to deal with the rising concerns in
the renewable energy sector. 1
As the aforementioned, supply chains of the rapidly growing biofuel industry face a number of
challenges such as crop yield uncertainty, refinery disruption risks, and farm land competition against
food production. This chapter offers a systematic framework to analyze how biofuel supply chain
decisions are affected by crop yield uncertainty and refinery disruption risks under competition against
existing food supply chains. Different from Chapter 3, which studies the market share competition
between two firms under deterministic demand, now we focus on the competition among one biofuel
firm, the incumbent food markets, and multiple farmers with uncertainties. Particularly, we assume
the crop yield satisfies a site-dependent probabilistic distribution and spatially correlated, i.e., a spa-
tial random field, while the disruption of each refinery is independent under a prior site-dependent
probability. In our framework, first, a CA based Stackelberg-Nash game is modeled to address the
competition between biofuel and food production. Given the probability distributions of crop yield
and refinery disruptions, the expected profits under uncertainties are evaluated for the biofuel firm
and each farmer. Such a bi-level optimization problem is proven to be equivalent to a simpler land
use optimization problem over the entire farmland region. Second, different from typical CA problems
which are decomposed into independent optimization problems for separate local neighborhoods (and
local input parameters), our model needs to seek optimal solution for the entire farmland region as a
1This chapter is based on a published paper, Wang et al. (2015c)
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whole, i.e., it is a functional optimization problem. Fortunately, such optimal solution exists in terms
of equilibrium conditions based on the variational calculus. Then, fast numerical algorithms are devel-
oped to determine the optimal densities of biorefineries as well as the optimal resource procurement
price. The optimal locations of biorefineries are further obtained from the optimal refinery density
based on the enhanced disk model (Ouyang and Daganzo, 2006; Peng et al., 2014). We conduct a
series of numerical experiments for hypothetical test cases to show the performance and robustness
of the modeling approach and to analyze the impacts of system parameters on the optimal design.
Finally, a Midwest case study is implemented to draw insights in more realistic settings.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, §4.2 studies the baseline biofuel production facility
deployment problem. §4.2.1 formulates a CA based game-theoretical model, and then §4.2.2 proposes
an exact numerical solution method. §4.3 further addresses uncertainties in both supplies and facility
operations. Finally, §4.4 presents the results and insights from the hypothetical and empirical case
studies. Proofs for all lemmas and propositions are presented in the appendix.
4.2 Building Block: Competitive Infrastructure System
Design
In this section, we first present a CA model that captures the competition between the emerging and
the existing industries. This model serves as a baseline. To stay focused, we use the biofuel industry as
the example to establish the model and conduct our analysis. The emerging industry, existing industry,
and resource suppliers are represented by a biofuel firm, a number of food markets, and a number of
farmers, respectively. The competition takes the form of a Stackelberg-Nash game, where the biofuel
firm, as the post-entry player, takes the lead to establish new markets, i.e., energy markets, by building
biorefineries and setting biocrop procurement prices, in the presence of food markets, and in response,
multiple farmers collectively make farmland use decisions based on food and energy market prices. We
then develop a solution method for this problem based on variational calculus analysis.
4.2.1 Baseline CA Model
Consider a continuous measurable farmland area Ω with crop yield density at location x ∈ Ω denoted
by g(x). Suppose for each location x, an infinitesimal farmland area in its neighborhood, denoted
by dx, is owned and operated by an independent farmer. Hence, there are infinite farmers and their
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farmland areas form a partition of Ω. Farmers can sell their crops to either food or energy markets
in Ω. The locations of food markets are exogenously given, and perfectly competitive food crop price
pf follows an inverse demand function pf = af − bfyf , where yf is the total crop sales at all food
markets and af , bf are non-negative constants. As for the energy markets, a biofuel firm chooses to
open biorefineries to collect biocrops. Given the refinery fixed cost h(x) at location x, we consider
that the biofuel firm determines the refinery density, i.e., the number of refineries built in a unit area,
instead of specific refinery locations. For illustrative convenience, we use the inverse of such a density,
i.e., the service area size of a refinery near x, A(x), as the decision. Evidences show that, in order
to reduce the transportation cost, each service area should be as “round” as possible (Newell, 1973),
or hexagonal so as to form a spatial tessellation (Cui et al., 2010; Li and Ouyang, 2010; Xie and
Ouyang, 2015). On the other hand, the biofuel firm also offers a farmer-specific contracting price p(x)
for biocrop procurement. Then, similar to the food markets, the converted bioethanol price pe in the
energy markets satisfies a perfectly competitive inverse demand function pe = ae − beye, where ye is
the total crop collected in all refineries and ae, be are non-negative constants. In addition, we assume
the area of Ω to be sufficiently large, where g(x) and h(x) are continuous and slow varying functions
over x (Daganzo and Newell, 1986).
Given the prices in food and energy markets, each farmer at x ∈ Ω will always patronize the
food market or biorefinery whichever gives the highest sale profit. We assume that the distances from
x to the nearest food market and biorefinery are denoted by rf (x) and re(x), respectively, and a
transportation cost c is incurred to ship a unit amount of crop for a unit distance, paid by each farmer.
The profit for the farmer at x to sell a unit amount of crop to the nearest food market and biofuel
refinery are respectively given as φf (x) and φe(x) below:
φf (x) = pf − crf (x), (4.1)
φe(x) = p(x)− cre(x). (4.2)
Here, the farmer’s cost for crop production is implicitly captured by the inverse demand price functions.
We further assume that the farming business is profitable; i.e., a farmer will always receive a positive
profit from one of the two sales outlets. Each farmer maximizes his/her profit over a long planning
horizon, e.g., multiple years, by choosing the best farmland use split. Since the agricultural business
involves strong seasonality (e.g., annual cycles) that is shared by all farmers, we assume all farmers
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make their land use decisions simultaneously (e.g., annually). In addition, farmers normally make the
crop sale decisions, e.g., signing contracts with the biofuel firm, before the farming season starts. Even
when the same crop (such as corn) can be sold for both food and energy productions, the land still
needs to be leased and treated differently.
In CA, the farmers served by one refinery are treated as uniformly distributed within its service
area. Given a biorefinery near x with its service area A(x), we can approximate, based on geometry,
what is the proportion of farmers it serves distributed within a certain distance, i.e., how re(x) is
distributed. Particularly, assuming the service area is approximated by a circular shape, we can define
such proportion as a “spatial probability distribution” of re(x) near a neighborhood of x,
P˜[re(x) < z] ≈ min
{
piz2
A(x)
, 1
}
, z ≥ 0,
where operator P˜ denotes the “spatial probability.” As such, the farmer’s decision can be characterized
in a probabilistic view.
Let α(x) ∈ [0, 1] be the proportion of farmers choosing energy markets in the neighborhood of x.2
Then, we have
α(x) = P˜ [φe(x) > φf (x)] , (4.3)
and further with (4.1)–(4.2), we have the following Nash equilibrium condition for farmer’s decision
near x
α(x) ≈ min
{
pi (p(x)− pf + crf (x))2
c2A(x)
, 1
}
, p(x)− pf + crf (x) ≥ 0.
Note that if pi (p(x)− pf + crf (x))2 > c2A(x) holds, the biofuel firm can always reduce p(x) to obtain
more profit without affecting α(x). Therefore, the above equilibrium condition can be simplified as
(
pi−1c2α(x)A(x)
)1/2
= p(x)− pf + crf (x), α(x) ∈ [0, 1].
2Like most strategic planning models, the models presented in this chapter do not explicitly capture detailed
operational-level practices in the biofuel industry (which may nevertheless be important), such as dynamic cultiva-
tion and harvesting of perennial crops, or crop rotation across seasons. Instead, our models focus on strategic-level
decisions such as facility locations, transportation, pricing contracts, and the long term spatial equilibrium of farmland
use. Additional features of the biofuel system (e.g., operational details of the agricultural business) can be determined,
using proper operational-level models, based on the optimal strategic model output as guidelines. For example, if our
models determine that the optimal land use proportion for energy crops near x is α(x) = 0.3, this result shall only be
interpreted as a recommendation such that on average in the long-run, 30% of the land near x should be used for energy
crop production. How the farmer near x actually makes that 30% happen is left for (future) operational-level models to
decide; e.g., crop rotation (between the food and energy crops) can still be done from year to year (or from season to
season) and/or from land parcel to land parcel.
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Now, given the decisions of farmers, we next derive the profit of the biofuel firm,
Φ =
∫
Ω
α(x)g(x) [pe − p(x)]− h(x)A−1(x)dx,
where in the integrand, the first term is the total revenue of collecting biocrop and selling bioethanol,
and the second term is the fixed cost incurred by building biorefineries. Therefore, the biofuel firm
solves the following problem:
Continuous Problem (CP)
max
A(x),p(x)
Φ =
∫
Ω
α(x)g(x) [pe − p(x)]− h(x)A−1(x)dx (4.4)
s.t.
(
pi−1c2α(x)A(x)
)1/2
= p(x)− pf + crf (x), ∀x ∈ Ω, (4.5)
0 ≤ α(x) ≤ 1, ∀x ∈ Ω, (4.6)
pf = af − bf
∫
Ω
(1− α(x)) g(x)dx, (4.7)
pe = ae − be
∫
Ω
α(x)g(x)dx. (4.8)
In the above CP, A(x) and p(x), are functionals over region Ω. It cannot be decomposed into
point-wisely optimization as traditional CA scheme would suggest, since the food price (4.7) and the
bioethanol price (4.8) are determined collectively by the decisions of all farmers in the entire region Ω.
In the following subsection, we develop a solution method for this problem.
4.2.2 Solution and Algorithm
In this subsection, we will implement variational calculus to analyze CP and provide a numerical
algorithm, which we call as the sorting method.
We first convert CP into a typical functional optimization problem. Let A∗(x), p∗(x) be the optimal
solution. For convenience, we define the total yield y :=
∫
Ω
g(x)dx and the “revenue potential of energy
crops” at location x as follows:
T (x) := ae − af + bfy + crf (x)−
(
27c2h(x)
4pig(x)
)1/3
. (4.9)
Here, T (x) is the revenue for the biofuel firm to collect one unit of biocrops from location x. Intuitively,
T (x) increases with rf (x) and g(x), but decreases with h(x); i.e., the land with larger distances to
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food markets, higher yield, and lower refinery cost could generate higher profit for the biofuel firm.
The derivation of (4.9) is given in the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose α∗(x) is the solution to
max
0≤α(x)≤1
∫
Ω
α(x)g(x)T (x)dx− (be + bf )
(∫
Ω
α(x)g(x)dx
)2
. (4.10)
Then, the solution to CP is given by
A∗(x) =
1
α∗(x)
(
4pih2(x)
c2g2(x)
)1/3
,
p∗(x) =
(
pi−1c2α∗(x)A∗(x)
)1/2
+ p∗f − crf (x),
where p∗f = af − bf
∫
Ω
(1− α∗(x)) g(x)dx.
Lemma 1 shows that the key decision of the biofuel firm is to achieve the optimal farmland use
α∗(x) at equilibrium, while the location and pricing decisions can be made correspondingly.
Note that when α∗(x) = 0, we have A∗(x) → ∞, which corresponds to the scenario of having no
refineries near location x. In such a case, p∗(x) does not have meaningful interpretation since there is
no farmer selling crop to energy markets. Implementing variational calculus analysis, we can obtain
the solution of α∗(x) at equilibrium conditions, and we obtain the following.
Proposition 9. The solution to (4.10) exists and is unique. Furthermore, it satisfies
α∗(x) =

1, if T (x) > 2(be + bf )y
∗
e ,
0, otherwise,
∀x ∈ Ω,
y∗e =
∫
Ω
α∗(x)g(x)dx.
Since the solution given by Proposition 9 is implicit, we still need an approach to obtain α∗(x) given
T (x) and g(x). The proof of Proposition 9 hints that the value of y∗e satisfying the equilibrium condition
can be numerically obtained. By discretization of Ω, we propose the following sorting method.
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Algorithm 1 Sorting Method
Step 1. Discretize Ω into a series of cells, Ωi, i = 1, 2, ..., n, each with a center at xi. For x ∈ Ωi,∀i,
we initially set g(x) ≡ g(xi) = gi and T (x) ≡ T (xi) = Ti, and thus α(x) ≡ α(xi) = αi.
Step 2. Sort Ti for all i, without loss of generality, we assume Ti > Ti+1. If Ti = Ti+1, a small
perturbation can be added to guarantee the order.
Step 3. For k =1 to n, compute the cumulated crop flow ye(k) =
∑k
i=1 gi, which results in an
increasing number sequence {ye(k)}. Terminate as soon as 2(be + bf )ye(k) > Tk is satisfied; otherwise,
terminate at k = n.
Step 4. The solution is approximated by αi = 1 for i ≤ k; and αi = 0 otherwise.
The validity of the algorithm follows the proof of Proposition 9 and the complexity of the algorithm
is obviously O(n log n). As n increases, the resulting solution will be more accurate. For slow varying
g(x) and T (x), the solution α∗(x) is insensitive to n when n is sufficiently large. This will be discussed
further with numerical experiments (see §4.4.1).
The sorting method not only accelerates the solution procedure, but also provides important in-
sights. It shows that the preference of farmers to energy markets can be evaluated individually, simply
according to T (x). This explains why we define T (x) as the “revenue potential of energy crops” at
location x. Although the solution is obtained numerically, it has good analytical properties, i.e., this
revenue potential is in closed-form and can be sorted. In addition, such ordered properties of the
solution implies that its sensitivity can be depicted by T (x) — the farmland use decisions are only
affected by those borderline farmers (i.e., those near the boundary for α∗(x) to change value), but very
insensitive to the farmers with either higher or lower revenue potentials.
4.3 Generalization: Incorporating Uncertainties
In this section, we extend the proposed model and solution method by taking into account uncertainties
in annual crop yield and risks of random biorefinery disruption.
4.3.1 CA Model under Uncertainties
Suppose the crop yield at each location x is now random, given by g(x) = g¯(x) + (x), where g¯(x) is
the average yield density and (x) is a random variable with mean zero and standard deviation σg¯(x).
Note that the standard deviation is assumed to be proportional to the mean, as in (Kantanantha,
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2007). We further assume that the spatial correlations of crop yield satisfies the following continuous
Gaussian random field (Adler and Taylor, 2009),
corr((x1), (x2)) = e
−ρ||x1−x2||2 , ∀x1, x2 ∈ Ω
where ρ > 0 is a parameter capturing the weakness of spatial dependency (i.e., large ρ leads to a small
correlation coefficient for given x1 and x2). Hence, nearby locations have strong positive correlation.
3
Furthermore, we consider the refinery near location x has a location-dependent disruption probability
q(x), which is assumed to be small (< 5%). Whenever a refinery is disrupted, we assume farmers
patronize the next nearest working refinery. In addition, we assume farmers have full information
on the randomness in both crop yield and refinery disruption (i.e., g(x) and q(x)) and they make
decisions to maximize the expected profit. Note that farmers need to make decisions by predicting the
uncertainties rather than after their realizations (e.g., they have to choose to grow food/energy crops
at the beginning of each year, while actual yield and refinery disruption realize during the year). Thus,
the proportion of energy land use near x, i.e., (4.3) becomes
α(x) = P˜ [Eφe(x) > Eφf (x)] .
Then, with (4.1) and (4.2), we have
α(x) = P˜ [p(x)− cEre(x) > Epf − crf (x)] .
Note that pf , pe, and y are now random variables as well. For convenience, define their expectations
p¯f := Epf = af − bf
∫
Ω
(1− α(x)) g¯(x)dx, (4.11)
p¯e := Epe = ae − be
∫
Ω
α(x)g¯(x)dx, (4.12)
and y¯ :=
∫
Ω
g¯(x)dx.
Given the distribution of re(x) under a small biorefinery failure probability q(x), Wang and Ouyang
(2013) showed that
P˜[Ere(x) < z] ≈ min
{
(1− q(x)) piz
2
A(x)
, 1
}
, z ≥ 0,
3These assumptions on yield uncertainty and correlation are based on mathematical convenience, but they can be
easily generalized to allow other mathematical forms.
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and the equilibrium condition for the farmers’ decision is now given by
(
pi−1c2 (1− q(x))−1 α(x)A(x)
)1/2
= p(x)− p¯f + crf (x), α(x) ∈ [0, 1]. (4.13)
Further, the expected profit of the biofuel firm can be expressed as
EΦ = E
[∫
Ω
α(x)g(x) (pe − p(x))− h(x)A−1(x)dx
]
. (4.14)
In (4.14), we calculate the expectation for each term. With (4.11)–(4.12), noticing the correlation
between crop yield and market prices, we have
EΦ =
∫
Ω
[
α(x)g¯(x) (p¯e − p(x))− h(x)A−1(x)− beα2(x)ξ(x)
]
dx, (4.15)
where
ξ(x) = E
[
(x)
∫
Ω
(x)dx
]
.
Therefore, the biofuel firm solves the following problem:
Continuous Problem with Uncertainty (CPU)
max
A(x),p(x)
(4.15)
s.t.(4.11), (4.12), (4.13)
0 ≤ α(x) ≤ 1, ∀x ∈ Ω.
Note that ξ(x) highly depends on the spatial correlation and it is difficult to obtain an exact
closed-form expression in general. However, we can fortunately approximate ξ(x) by
ξ(x) =
∫
Ω
e−ρ||x−z||
2
σ2g¯(x)g¯(z)dz ≈ σ2g¯2(x)
∫
r
∫
θ
e−ρr
2
rdrdθ ≈ ρ−1piσ2g¯2(x), (4.16)
if ρ is not too small or too large.4 Note that the first approximation is based on the slow varying
assumption of g¯(x), i.e., the variation of g¯(x) in the neighborhood of x is dampened exponentially, and
hence can be neglected. The second approximation is done by ignoring the boundary of a sufficiently
large service area Ω, i.e., the upper limit of integration over r goes to infinity.
4When ρ→∞, we have corr(x1, x2) → 0, and hence ξ(x) =
∫
Ω E [(x)(z)] dz → 0. On the contrary, when ρ→ 0, we
have corr(x1, x2) → 1, and hence ξ(x) = σ2g¯(x)
∫
Ω g¯(z)dz = σ
2yg¯(x).
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CPU and CP almost share the same structure – most parameters in CP correspond to the expec-
tations of their counterparts (random variables) in CPU. There are only two major differences: (i) the
constraints are now functions of refinery failure probability q(x), and (ii) the objective function now
has an extra quadratic term of ξ(x). Nevertheless, the farmers make decisions based on their predic-
tion of uncertainties, and hence CPU is still a deterministic problem. Next, we revisit the solution
procedure to accommodate uncertainties.
4.3.2 Solution under Uncertainties
Most of the derivations in §4.2 still hold under uncertainties, and hence the solution algorithm requires
only relatively minor modifications. First, we define
T¯ (x) := ae − af + bf y¯ + crf (x)−
(
27c2h(x)
4pi (1− q(x)) g(x)
)1/3
,
and obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose α∗(x) is the solution to
max
0≤α(x)≤1
∫
Ω
α(x)g¯(x)T¯ (x)dx− (be + bf )
(∫
Ω
α(x)g¯(x)dx
)2
− be
∫
Ω
α2(x)ξ(x)dx. (4.17)
Then, the solution to CPU is given by
A∗(x) =
1
α∗(x)
(
4pi (1− q(x))h2(x)
c2g¯2(x)
)1/3
,
p∗(x) =
(
pi−1 (1− q(x))−1 c2α∗(x)A∗(x)
)1/2
+ p¯∗f − crf (x),
where p¯∗f = af − bf
∫
Ω
(1− α∗(x)) g¯(x)dx.
Similarly, we have a modified equilibrium condition described in the following proposition.
Proposition 10. Suppose ξ(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ Ω. The solution to (4.10) exists and is unique. Furthermore,
it satisfies
α∗(x) = mid
{
0, 1,
g¯(x)T¯ (x)− 2(be + bf )g¯(x)y¯∗e
2beξ(x)
}
, ∀x ∈ Ω,
y¯∗e =
∫
Ω
α∗(x)g¯(x)dx,
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where mid(·) takes the median of all arguments.
To obtain an explicit form of the solution (given for each location x), we can similarly conduct a
binary search on y¯e, as shown in Algorithm 2. Unfortunately, the sorting method introduced in the
previous section cannot be simply extended for CPU. This is because the solution now depends on
ξ(x) besides the sorted order of T¯ (x). However, we can still adopt the notion of “revenue potential of
energy crops” for each location; i.e.,T¯ (x), to interpret the solution procedure.
Algorithm 2 Binary Search Method
Step 1. Discretize Ω into a series of cells, Ωi, i = 1, 2, ..., n, each with a center at xi. For x ∈ Ωi,∀i,
we assume all parameters take values equal to those at xi.
Step 2. Set the lower and upper bounds of y¯∗e as y¯
min
e = 0 and y¯
max
e = y¯, respectively. Set a positive
termination threshold ∆y.
Step 3. Estimate yˆ∗e =
1
2 (y¯
min
e + y¯
max
e ) and update α
∗(x) by setting y¯∗e = yˆ
∗
e for all x ∈ Ω based on
Proposition 10.
Step 4. Terminate if
∣∣yˆ∗e − ∫Ω α∗(x)g¯(x)dx∣∣ < ∆y. Otherwise, if yˆ∗e < ∫Ω α∗(x)g¯(x)dx, set y¯mine = yˆ∗e ;
else, set y¯maxe = yˆ
∗
e . Then, repeat Step 3.
Step 5. The solution is obtained as α∗(x).
Note that the optimal service area function from the above numerical algorithm is indeed a dis-
cretized sampling of the continuous density function. When discrete refinery locations are needed, we
can approximate the optimal number of refineries by N∗ =
∫
Ω
A∗−1(x)dx, and then implement the
disk model (Ouyang and Daganzo, 2006) or enhanced disk model (Peng et al., 2014).
4.4 Numerical Examples
In this section, we apply the proposed modeling framework to two sets of problem instances. The
first hypothetical case is used to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm and to conduct
sensitivity analysis. We then conduct a U.S. Midwest case study to further explore managerial insights
under more realistic settings.
4.4.1 Hypothetical Problems
Consider a farmland region in a unit square, i.e., Ω = [0, 1]2, in which two food markets are located
at (0.2, 0.2) and (0.7, 0.7). The inverse demand curve coefficients for the food and energy markets are
given as af = ae = 1 and bf = be = 0.01, with proper units. The unit transportation cost is 2. For
convenience, based on (4.16), we define ξ0 := ρ
−1piσ2 to capture the joint impact of σ and ρ on the
solution, and ξ(x) ≈ ξ0g¯2(x). When σ is fixed, ξ0 is inversely proportional to ρ. Larger ξ0 indicates
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smaller ρ, i.e., stronger local dependency. On the other hand, when ρ is fixed, ξ0 is proportional to
the variance σ2, and hence larger ξ0 now indicates more fluctuation of annual crop yield.
We first consider the following four cases:
• Homogeneous Baseline Case: all system parameters are deterministic; there is no disruption
risk; crop yield and refinery fixed cost are both constant over Ω; i.e., ξ0 = 0, q(x) ≡ 0, g(x) ≡ 1,
and h(x) ≡ 0.01.
• Homogeneous Case with Uncertainty: crop yield becomes random but has an identical
marginal expectation across locations, and refineries are disrupted under an equal failure proba-
bility; i.e., ξ0 = 20, q(x) ≡ 0.02, g¯(x) ≡ 1, and h(x) ≡ 0.01.
• Heterogeneous Case with Uncertainty (Yield and Fixed Cost): crop yield now is random
with location-dependent marginal expectations (increasing from left to right), and the refinery
fixed cost are also varying over space (increasing from top to bottom); i.e., ξ0 = 20, q(x) ≡ 0.02,
g¯(x) = x(1) + 0.5, and h(x) ≡ 0.01 (1.5− x(2)), where (x(1), x(2)) represents the 2D coordinates
of location x.
• Heterogeneous Case with Uncertainty (Disruption): crop yield is random but has an
identical marginal expectation across locations, and refineries are now disrupted under a location-
dependent failure probability; i.e., ξ0 = 1, q(x) = 0.05
(
1− sin(3pi(x(1) − x(2)))), g¯(x) ≡ 300, and
h(x) ≡ 400.
We discretize Ω into 1000 × 1000 grid cells, i.e., n = 106. The optimal land use proportion for
growing biocrops, α∗(x), and the estimated refinery locations in each case are shown in Figure 4.1.
The shaded region represents the area captured by the energy market; and the darker shade indicate
higher biocrop concentration.
In Figure 4.1 (a), we observe that the biofuel firm signs contracts with farmers only outside of the
two circles around the food markets. This is intuitive, since α∗(x) is binary under the baseline case,
thus a distinct boundary exists that separates the farmers with distinct land use decisions. Figures
4.1 (b) and (c) illustrate the impact of uncertainties and heterogeneity. Specifically, in Figure 4.1 (b),
the uncertainties of crop yield and refinery disruption lead to a gradual transition of α∗(x) from 0
to 1. The biofuel firm shall sign contracts with a portion of the farmers in the transition region so
as to optimize the expected profit. Under spatially heterogeneous crop yield and refinery cost, the
transition of α∗(x) over space is somewhat distorted, as shown in Figure 4.1 (c). Since the yield is
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Figure 4.1: Food market locations (stars), optimal refinery locations (triangles), and optimal α∗(x)
(contour graph): (a) Homogeneous Baseline Case, (b) Homogeneous Case with Uncertainty, (c) Hetero-
geneous Case with Uncertainty (Yield and Fixed Cost), and (d) Heterogeneous Case with Uncertainty
(Disruption).
lower and the fixed cost is higher in the bottom left, the light colored circle in the bottom left (i.e., food
production region) is larger than that in the top right, and the contour lines are somewhat skewed. On
the other hand, the dark regions on the bottom right is larger than that on the top left, implying that
under uncertainties, the biofuel firm should be even more conservative about entering the region with
lower yield and higher fixed cost. When both the crop yield and the refinery fixed cost are high, the
heterogeneity of refinery disruption risks has observable impacts on the transition of α∗(x), as shown
in Figure 4.1 (d). In contrast to those in previous cases, the light colored circle near both food markets
are now distorted and become somewhat triangular. Higher failure probability, i.e., toward the top
left direction of the food markets, leads to lower α∗(x), implying the detrimental effect of refinery
disruptions to the energy market.
We next explore the sensitivity of selected parameters, n, ξ0, g¯, h, and q. Let g¯(x) = 1+δ(x
(1)−0.5),
h(x) = 0.01
{
1− δ(x(2) − 0.5)}, and q(x) ≡ q, where constant δ captures the spatial heterogeneity.
The results for the following nine instances are summarized in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Statistics of results under different cases.
Cases n ξ0 δ q EΦ∗ N∗ p¯∗f p¯∗e y¯∗f y¯∗e Time (s)
1a 104 0 0 0 0.2438 10.25 0.9968 0.9930 0.3239 0.6962 0.005
1b 106 0 0 0 0.2363 10.01 0.9968 0.9932 0.3225 0.6795 0.1
1c 108 0 0 0 0.2356 9.99 0.9968 0.9932 0.3222 0.6780 183
2a 106 10 0 0.01 0.1756 8.23 0.9955 0.9944 0.4454 0.5566 0.1
2b 106 20 0 0.02 0.1313 6.55 0.9944 0.9956 0.5603 0.4417 0.1
2c 106 30 0 0.03 0.0999 5.27 0.9935 0.9965 0.6478 0.3542 0.1
3a 106 20 0.5 0.02 0.1302 6.67 0.9944 0.9956 0.5574 0.4446 0.1
3b 106 20 1 0.02 0.1272 6.93 0.9944 0.9956 0.5571 0.4449 0.1
3c 106 20 1.8 0.02 0.1213 8.90 0.9944 0.9956 0.5585 0.4435 0.1
Cases 1b, 2b, and 3b, which are shown in bold font, correspond to the first three of the four earlier
cases, respectively.5 Cases 1 consider the Homogeneous Baseline Cases. Under this setting, we observe
that the discretization of Ω leads to an over estimation of Φ∗ (the expectation operator is omitted
since the problems are deterministic), which decreases over n. Although the solution when n→∞ is
accurate, choosing very large n normally brings unnecessary computational burden and only marginal
accuracy improvement. Comparing the n = 106 to n = 108 case, the difference in Φ∗ is about 0.3%,
which is negligible, thus we choose n = 106 as the input for Cases 2a–3c. Cases 2a–2c consider the
Homogeneous Cases with Uncertainty. Under this setting, as ξ0 increases, EΦ∗, N∗, and y¯∗e decrease,
while p¯∗f , p¯
∗
e, and y¯
∗
f increase. This trend implies that uncertainties in crop yield are detrimental
to the energy business. Cases 3a–3c consider the Heterogeneous Cases with Uncertainty. When the
heterogeneity of yield and refinery fixed cost increase, EΦ∗ decreases, N∗ increases, while y¯∗f and y¯∗e are
not monotone. In addition, p¯∗f and p¯
∗
e are very insensitive, remaining almost the same. This implies
that the biofuel firm should build more refineries under spatial heterogeneity, although its expected
profit decreases slightly.
4.4.2 Midwest Case Study
We further use our modeling framework to design a biofuel supply chain for the U.S. Midwest region,
which, as shown in Figure 4.2(a), consists of 738 counties. The annual corn yield for each county
(density per unit area) is estimated from the 2007 annual corn production (National Agricultural
Statistics Service, 2014a; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013) and shown in Figure 4.2(b). The prorated annual
refinery fixed cost at each county is linearly interpolated between $9 million and $27 million (Ellinger,
2008) based on the population of the county (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). We consider one food market
5The fourth case is not comparable due to discrepancy in parameter settings.
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for each state is located at the county with the highest population, as shown in Figure 4.2(a).
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Figure 4.2: Midwest case study: (a) the U.S. Midwest region (eight states) and food market locations
(round dots); (b) estimated county-level annual corn yield.
Since most of our data are collected at the county level, we assume all input parameters are
constants within each county; i.e., g¯(x) and h(x) are piecewise step functions. We set n = 738, i.e.,
each county is a discrete point, for convenience of demonstration.
We set the coefficients af = $4.4 per bushel and bf = $0.1 per billion bushel (prorated based on
the data of Anderson and Coble (2010)) for the inverse food demand function. In addition, we set
ae = $1.49 per gallon (Gehlhar et al., 2010) with a 2.8 gallon per bushel corn-to-bioethanol conversion
ratio (Chen et al., 2011), and be = bfae/af = $0.095 per billion bushel for the inverse bioethanol
demand function. We set the unit transportation cost is c = $0.0035 per bushel per mile (Mcvey et al.,
2007). The uncertainty parameters are set to ρ = 1.6×10−7, σ = 10% (Holly Wang and Zhang, 2003),
i.e., ξ0 = 0.2× 106, and q(x) ≡ 2%.
This case is obviously heterogeneous, but the optimal continuous solution can be obtained almost
instantly (i.e., < 0.002 seconds) due to the much lower discretization resolution. Results are illustrated
in Figure 4.3. We consider scenarios with or without uncertainties. Figures 4.3(a),(c),(e) show the
optimal land use, contract price, and refinery density and locations without yield and disruption
uncertainties. The optimal profit for the biofuel firm is $1.04 billion with 15 built biorefineries. The
total crop supplies to the food and energy markets are 6.18 and 2.17 billion bushels, respectively, at
equilibrium prices $3.78 and $3.97 per bushel. Figures 4.3(b),(d),(f) show the counterpart solutions
under uncertainties. The optimal expected profit for the biofuel firm decreases to $0.58 billion with
only 12 refineries built. The total expected crop supply to the food market increases to 6.93 billion
bushels and the expected food price decreases to $3.71, while the total expected crop supply to the
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energy market significantly decreases to 1.40 billion bushels at unit price $4.04.
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Figure 4.3: Optimal solutions under no uncertainties: (a) land use α∗(x), (c) contract pricing p∗(x),
(e) refinery density and estimated locations; optimal solutions under uncertainties: (b) land use α∗(x),
(d) contract pricing p∗(x), (f) refinery density and estimated locations.
The comparison between these two scenarios, again, suggests that uncertainties are detrimental to
the biofuel production business. This is consistent with the results of the hypothetical instances. Under
yield and disruption uncertainties, the biofuel firm is forced to enlarge the service region to capture
more crop supply and also offer higher prices to compete against the food markets. For example, we
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observe from Figures 4.3(a) and (b) very different farm land use patterns. Some energy production
in Figure 4.3(a) (such as central Midwest region) shifts to other locations when uncertainties are
introduced (e.g., to upper Wisconsin). This shows that uncertainties not only spread out the energy
production regions, but also shift such regions to those where crop yield rates are lower. The decrease
of total crop supply to energy market, as a result of the uncertainty, increases the attractiveness of
low yield regions. Meanwhile, regions with higher crop yield also suffer from higher yield uncertainty.
Hence, according to Proposition 10, increase of attractiveness in low yield regions is larger than that
in high yield regions. This observation also confirms that uncertainty in crop yield is detrimental to
the biofuel firm’s profit.
Table 4.2: Results under variations of uncertainty parameters.
Scenario ξ0(×104) q(%) EΦ∗(×108) N∗ p¯∗f p¯∗e y¯∗f (×109) y¯∗e(×109)
LL 2 0.5 9.08 14.36 3.7648 3.9844 6.3515 1.9790
LM 2 2 9.06 14.41 3.7646 3.9846 6.3538 1.9767
LH 2 5 9.02 14.51 3.7642 3.9850 6.3584 1.9721
ML 20 0.5 5.80 11.67 3.7076 4.0387 6.9244 1.4061
MM 20 2 5.79 11.70 3.7073 4.0389 6.9265 1.4039
MH 20 5 5.75 11.77 3.7069 4.0393 6.9311 1.3994
HL 200 0.5 1.76 4.49 3.6141 4.1273 7.5894 0.4711
HM 200 2 1.75 4.51 3.6140 4.1274 7.8603 0.4702
HH 200 5 1.74 4.53 3.6138 4.1276 7.8622 0.4683
To further understand the impact of uncertainties, we consider scenarios under different uncertainty
magnitudes; ξ0 ∈ {2× 104, 2× 105, 2× 106}, and q(x) ≡ q ∈ {0.5%, 2%, 5%}. The results under these
scenarios are summarized in Table 4.2. For a fixed ξ0, as q increases, the number of biorefineries
increases, but the expected profit and the total crop supply to the energy market decrease. On the
other hand, for a fixed q, we find that the expected profit, the number of refineries, and the total
crop supply to the energy market all increase when the joint uncertainty ξ0 decreases. This could be
reflecting on the case when crop quality or farming technology improves (i.e., variance σ2 decreases but
the spatial dependency ρ remains unchanged), or the case when weaker spatial correlation is present
due to climate or environmental change (i.e., σ2 is fixed but ρ increases).
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Chapter 5
Dynamic Facility Location Problem
in a Growing Market
5.1 Introduction
Note that the previous chapters mainly focus on long-term equilibrium analyses, where the facility
location decisions are supposed to be made only once and simultaneously. However, under a long-time
planning horizon, the system parameters are inevitably time-variant. The work in this chapter aims
to answer the question that when to build a facility besides where. 1
For a large-scale instance, even static facility location problems become extremely difficult, not to
mention its dynamic version. The CA approach, developed for solving large-scale static problems, now
faces multiple challenges under such extensions. This chapter seeks to fill this gap, implementing a
CA model to solve a general dynamic facility location problem for a large-scale growing market. The
objective is to determine the optimal facility location and deployment time that minimize the costs for
facility construction and customer service in a planning horizon. In particular, we consider a growing
market environment where demand increases (whereas the unit operating cost may decrease) such that
new facilities are added over time. The goal of this chapter is to provide an effective solution method
that is suitable for large-scale instances of such dynamic facility location problems.
Suppose a set of facilities, indexed by i = 1, 2, · · · , are opened in a continuous compact2 service
area Ω ⊆ R2 over a finite planning horizon Ψ = [0, T ]. Customer demand is specified as a continuous
density 3. Facility i will be opened at location xi ∈ Ω at time τi ∈ Ψ, covering a set of customers
in its service region Si(t) ⊆ Ω for all t ∈ Ψ (or Si(t) = ∅ for all t < τi). Each customer is assumed
to be served by a facility, hence {Si(t)}i forms a partition of Ω at any time t. We consider that
the total system cost consists of three parts: one-time fixed facility investments, operating costs over
1This chapter is based on a published paper, Wang et al. (2015a)
2More generally, the service area could also contain multiple separated continuous compact subareas as long as each
is large-scale; see discussion in Ouyang and Daganzo (2006).
3For a practical problem where the customers are discrete, further approximation is needed (such as interpolation)
to convert the input into its continuous counterpart as shown in Peng et al. (2014)
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time, and transportation costs over time. Suppose near location x at time t, the fixed investment
is h(x, t), and the prorated customer service cost including facility operating cost and transportation
cost per unit area per unit time is an integrable function over space and time, z (x, xi, Si(t), t), where
x ∈ Si(t) and facility i is the corresponding serving facility. Considering the time value of money, both
cost functions are converted into the present value. In addition, we assume opened facilities cannot
be closed or relocated due to high penalties associated with such actions (Current et al., 1997). For
convenience, we define Si := {Si(t)}t. Then, the system design decisions with respect to location,
service region, and timing are represented by {xi}i, {Si}i, and {τi}i, respectively. Therefore, we can
formulate a generic form of a dynamic facility location problem as follows.
Dynamic Facility Location Problem (DFLP):
min
{xi}i,{Si}i,{τi}i
P =
∫
Ψ
∫
Ω
z (x, xi, Si(t), t) dxdt+
∑
i
h(xi, τi) (5.1)
s.t. Si(t) = ∅,∀i, t ∈ [0, τi), (5.2)
Si1(t) ∩ Si2(t) = ∅,∀i1 6= i2, t, (5.3)⋃
i
Si(t) = Ω,∀t, (5.4)
τi ∈ Ψ, xi ∈ Ω,∀i. (5.5)
The objective (5.1) minimizes the total customer service cost over the entire spatiotemporal continuum
Ω × Ψ, and the sum of fixed facility investment costs. Constraints (5.2) enforce that a service region
should be an empty set before the construction of its corresponding facility. Constraints (5.3)–(5.4)
stipulate that the set of service regions of the opened facilities always form an non-overlapping partition
of Ω. We assume customers are always served by the nearest facility where ties can be broken arbitrarily.
Following the pioneering work of Ballou (1968), there has been a stream of research literature on
the DFLP. See Arabani and Farahani (2012) for a review. Wesolowsky (1973) extended the static single
facility location model to one with a sequence of location decisions in multiple periods. Schilling (1980)
developed a heuristic method based on multi-objective analysis for dynamic planning of public-sector
facilities. Erlenkotter (1981) compared the performance of seven heuristic methods for the DFLP with a
growing demand. Roy and Erlenkotter (1982) and Frantzeskakis and Watson-Gandy (1989) introduced
branch and bound approaches based on dual ascent and state-relaxation, respectively. Daskin et al.
(1992) discussed the impact of time horizon length on DFLP and found an optimal forecast time
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horizon. Hormozi and Khumawala (1996) proposed a dynamic programming method to solve the
DFLP with time dependent weights. Current et al. (1997) analyzed a dynamic p-Median location
problem that minimizes the expected value of opportunity loss (or the maximum regret). Bhatti
et al. (2014) considered a two-stage location problem where the demand information is learned over
time. Despite various differences among these proposed solution approaches, they typically involve
dynamic programming or its variants (often with heuristics) that determine a collection of binary
facility construction decisions at each candidate location at every instant in time. Hence, obtaining
the exact (or even a reasonable) solution becomes extremely challenging as the size of the problem
instance increases.
One approach that showed promise in overcoming the computational difficulties associated with
large-scale facility location problems is continuum approximation (CA). The underlying idea of CA is
to approximate discrete facility locations and their service regions by using continuous facility service
area functions. The overall problem then reduces to a set of point-wise optimization problems, each
determining the optimal service area size (or optimal facility density) in a spatial neighborhood based
only on local parameters. This approach avoids the combinatorial nature of facility location decisions
and typically yields an analytically tractable solution, often in closed-form (e.g., Newell, 1973; Langevin
et al., 1996; Daganzo, 2005). The CA approach has been applied extensively to various sorts of facility
location problems as shown in the review paper by Geoffrion et al. (1995). In addition, there has been
more diverse applications of CA in the recent literature. Shen and Qi (2007) implemented CA to solve
a nonlinear sub-problem from a Lagrangian relaxation framework for supply chain network design.
Cui et al. (2010), Li and Ouyang (2010), and Lim et al. (2013) used CA to investigate facility location
problems under the impacts of random facility disruptions. Dasci and Laporte (2005) and Wang and
Ouyang (2013) used continuous models to optimize bi-level facility location design in the presence of
competition. Wang et al. (2013) further developed CA models for Stackelberg games that address
complex interactions and competitions among manufacturers, farmers, markets, and the government
in a biofuel supply chain.
The CA solution to facility location models is normally in the form of a continuous facility density.
To translate the CA solution into a set of discrete locations, Ouyang and Daganzo (2006) proposed a
Disk Model, which approximates the service region of a facility by a circular disk. Each disk center
indicates a specific facility location and the disk size is determined by the optimal facility density
function at that location. The algorithm searches for a spatial distribution of overlapping disks that
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resembles a reasonable set of facility locations and service regions. We will soon discuss this model in
more detail.
Although CA has been widely used to solve static facility location problems, to the best of our
knowledge, relatively little work has been done to handle the dynamic version of these problems. Some
related efforts have been made in the robotics community; e.g., Ny and Pappas (2010) proposed an
adaptive algorithm to solve dynamic vehicle routing problems given the probabilistic distribution of
random upcoming customer locations. Noting the main idea behind CA is to localize the spatial de-
cisions, Campbell (1990) extended CA to design transportation terminals in a dynamic setting, but
assuming that the terminal locations are “mobile” and can be moved at each time instant indepen-
dently. However, in reality, locations of open facilities typically remain unchanged in the remainder of
the planning horizon. We refer to this as the location consistency constraint. Due to this constraint,
a facility deployment decision imposes a persisting impact on the remaining planning horizon and
cannot be determined over local parameters in the temporal neighborhood. In addition, even if the
solution to the DFLP is obtained using CA, a translating method is still needed to effectively convert
the CA solution into discrete facility locations over time and space. The aforementioned disk model
(Ouyang and Daganzo, 2006) is designed for static problems and hence cannot be applied directly to
the dynamic ones.
This chapter aims to fill these gaps. We propose a CA based modeling framework constructed as
follows. First, we formulate a continuous model for the DFLP by augmenting the time dimension,
while relaxing the location consistency constraints. To translate the CA output into a set of discrete
facility locations, we extend the disk model (for one static time period) to a tube model (for multiple
time periods). Then, the location consistency constraints are enforced through a nonlinear optimiza-
tion model with penalty terms. Lastly, we propose an iterative tube regulation algorithm to solve
the penalty-based optimization problem. We analyze the accuracy and convergence of our modeling
framework and conduct numerical experiments to verify its performance. The model and the solution
procedure we propose are very generic and flexible; thus, it can be extended to variants of the DFLP
(e.g., incorporating existing facilities at the beginning of the horizon).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In §5.2, we present the CA model framework
for the DFLP; §5.2.1 first reformulates the DFLP into a continuous version, and then derives the
optimal solution with approximate facility building time; §5.2.2 extends the disk model into a tube
model and shows how the CA solution is translated into discrete facility locations; §5.2.3 describes the
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tube regulation algorithm that enforces location consistency over time and discusses its convergence.
In §5.3, we discuss the approximation accuracy of the proposed algorithm. Finally, in §5.4, we show a
series of numerical examples to verify model performance and draw insights.
5.2 Model Framework
5.2.1 Continuum Approximation
We first present a continuous reformulation of the DFLP where the location consistency constraint is
relaxed. Suppose Ω is sufficiently large and both z and h are slow-varying with respect to space and
time4. Instead of determining specific discrete facility locations, we consider a density representation
of facilities, or equivalently, the size of individual facility’s service region. For most location models
where travel distances play a critical role in the objective function, it is shown that the optimal spatial
service region on a homogeneous plane should be as “round” as possible (Newell, 1973), or hexagonal so
as to form a spatial tessellation (Cui et al., 2010; Li and Ouyang, 2010; Xie and Ouyang, 2015), and the
service region size rather than the specific location largely dictates the overall system cost. In addition,
when the system parameters are slow-varying over space and time, the service region sizes shall also be
slow-varying. In light of this, we approximate the service region size by a smooth function A(x, t) ≈
|Si(t)| for x ∈ Si(t) and use it as a decision variable. The cost for providing customer service over the
service region also depends on the service area size A(x, t) and can be approximated by a slow-varying
function zC (x,A(x, t), t). More detailed analyses and derivations for A(x, t) and zC (x,A(x, t), t) are
problem specific. The facility fixed cost can be prorated over time and space as h(x, t)/ (A(x, t)T ),
resulting in a local cost function pC(x,A(x, t), t) = zC (x,A(x, t), t) +h(x, t) [A(x, t)T ]
−1
per unit area
per unit time. Hence, the DFLP can be reformulated as follows.
min
A(x,t)
PC =
∫
Ψ
∫
Ω
pC(x,A(x, t), t)dxdt
s.t. A(x, t) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ Ω, t ∈ Ψ.
To solve the above problem, we use the solution to a homogeneous system where all parame-
ters are constant over time and space as a building block toward a general heterogeneous system.
4Interested readers are referred to Cui et al. (2010) for detailed discussions on how the assumptions of a sufficiently
large service area (i.e., boundary has negligible impacts on the solution) and slow-varying parameters (i.e., having
relatively constant values on the spatial scale of a facility service region) may influence the accuracy of CA.
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In a homogeneous system, the fixed cost h(x, t) ≡ h is constant and the customer service cost
zC (x,A(x, t), t) ≡ zC(A(x, t)) is only a function of the service region size. Under this assumption,
the DFLP is reduced to a simple static facility location problem, and it is straightforward to see that
all facilities should be built uniformly in the beginning of the planning horizon, i.e., A(x, t) ≡ A.
Hence, the optimization problem for such a homogeneous system reduces to
min
A≥0
pC(A) = zC(A) + h(AT )
−1. (5.6)
When facility cost h > 0 and zC(A) <∞, the optimal service region size, A∗, should be non-zero and
can be solved from the first order condition of (5.6); i.e.,
d
dA
[zC(A)]− h
(
A2T
)−1
= 0.
For a simple example, consider the case where the fixed facility cost is constant and the customer
service cost equals the `1-norm distance to its nearest facility, i.e., z (x, xi, Si(t), t) = ||x − xi||1,
and then the optimal Si(t) = {x ∈ Ω : ||x − xi||1 ≤ ||x − xi′ ||1, ∀i′ 6= i} should take the form of
identical squares that tessellate Ω. As such, suppose the size of the squares is A(x, t) = A, and then
zC(A) =
1
A
∫
‖x‖1≤
√
A/2
‖x‖1dx =
√
2A/3, pC (A) =
√
2A/3 + h(AT )
−1
, and A∗ = 3
√
18(h/T )
2/3
.
For a general heterogeneous system, the optimal service region size near location x ∈ Ω and time
t ∈ Ψ, A∗(x, t), is approximated by the solution to a homogeneous system that takes local parameters
at (x, t) as the input. That is,
∂
∂A
[
zC (x,A
∗(x, t), t)
]− T−1h(x, t)[A∗(x, t)]−2 = 0,∀x, t. (5.7)
The number of opened facilities at time t for the above problem can then be approximated by
n(t) =
⌊∫
Ω
[A∗(x, t)]−1 dx
⌉
,
where operator bxe yields the nearest integer to x. In a growing market, n(t) is a monotone increasing
step-function over time t, hence it contains n(T ) − n(0) discontinuous jumps in the interval (0, T ).
Without loss of generality, we assume that the facilities are sorted based on their opening time; i.e.,
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τi+1 ≥ τi for all i. The optimal facility opening time can be approximated by
τi ≈ inf
t≥0
{n(t) = i} . (5.8)
For notational convenience, we let n0 = n(0) and nT = n(T ) respectively denote the numbers of
facilities opened at the beginning and the end of the planning horizon. Hence, facilities i = 1, · · · , n0
are all opened at time 0; i.e., τi = 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n0. We further let τnT+1 := T , and divide the
entire planning horizon Ψ into a set of (nT − n0 + 1) levels (i.e., time intervals) that each starts and
ends at some facility opening time, {Ψj : [τn0+j−1, τn0+j ], j ∈ J}, where J = {1, 2, · · · , nT − n0 + 1}.
We denote lj = |Ψj | to be the length of level j. When facilities n0 + j − 1 and n0 + j happen to be
opened at the same time, Ψj will degenerate into a single point and hence lj = 0. As such, the number
of facilities remains constant within each level but increases by one across adjacent levels.
In the next subsection, we introduce a tube model that translates the CA solution into discrete
facility locations.
5.2.2 Tube Model
In this subsection, we extend the disk model (Ouyang and Daganzo, 2006) to a tube model by incor-
porating a time dimension. To stay focused, in the rest of the chapter we assume all distances are
Euclidean (although our entire model can be easily extended to other distance metrics). The disk
model approximates the service region of a facility to a circular disk in a static problem. As illustrated
in Figure 5.1(a), Si is the service region of facility i, located at xi. This is then approximated by
a disk with size A(xi) ≈ |Si|, also centered at xi. Given the output of the CA model, the optimal
service region size function A∗(x),∀x ∈ Ω, the disk model first generates a set of disks as an initial
approximation, while the number of disks is approximated by
∫
Ω
[A∗(x)]−1 dx. At the beginning, the
algorithm arbitrarily selects the center of each disk, xi, and computes its size as A
∗(xi). In order to
automatically move these disks toward a non-overlapping pattern, virtual repulsive forces are imposed
on disks that overlap with another disk or with the boundary of Ω, whereas each force is toward the
opposite direction of an overlap. These forces (or their vector sums in case of multiple overlaps) enable
the disks to reposition themselves to reduce the overlaps. As the disks move along, the repulsive forces
and disk sizes are updated according to the new disk locations. This iterative process repeats until
an equilibrium distribution of non-overlapping disks is found (see Figure 5.1(b)). Then a suitable
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weighted Voronoi tessellation5 can be used in obtaining facility service areas based on the disk centers.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5.1: (a) Approximating service regions by disks; (b) disk movements under repulsive forces.
We now incorporate the time dimension into the disk model. Recall that the definition of levels
from the CA solution approximates facility opening times. For the DFLP, the optimal service region
of a facility i, Si(t), is often time-varying or even discontinuous, as shown in Figure 5.2(a). However,
with slow-varying parameters, the service regions will not vary significantly over time unless a new
facility is opened in the neighborhood area. In other words, we can approximate the service region of
an open facility within a level j by a prism, as shown in Figure 5.2(b), i.e., Si(t) ≈ Si(tj),∀t ∈ Ψj
where tj =
1
2 (τn0+j + τn0+j−1) is the median of Ψj .
Under this condition, the facility fixed cost and the service cost per unit area near x in level j can
be respectively approximated as follows:
h (x, τn0+j−1) ≈ h (x, tj) , (5.9)∫ τn0+j
τn0+j−1
z (x, xi, Si(t), t) dt ≈ ljz (x, xij , Si(tj), tj) . (5.10)
5Ouyang and Daganzo (2006) used multiplicative weights for a centrally controlled logistics delivery system. In
addition to multiplicatively weighted Voronoi tessellations (Reitsma et al., 2007), other types of weighted Voronoi tessel-
lations can be used, largely depending on the form of z (x, xi, Si(t), t), such as additively weighted Voronoi tessellations
(Aronov et al., 2009; Carlsson and Devulapalli, 2012) or power diagrams (Aurenhammer et al., 1998). For example, if
every autonomous customer always goes to a facility with the minimum transportation and facility-dependent service
cost, then, an additively weighted Voronoi diagram shall be appropriate.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5.2: (a) An example of time varying Si; (b) approximation of {Si(t)}t∈Ψj by Si(tj) × Ψj ; (c)
cylinder approximation of {Si(t)}t∈Ψj .
Therefore, given {tj}j∈J and {lj}j∈J , the original DFLP can be approximated by the following level-
based DFLP.
Level-Based DFLP:
min
{xij}i,j ,{Si(tj)}i,j
∑
j∈J
{
lj
∫
Ω
z (x, xij , Si(tj), tj) + h(xn0+j−1,j , tj)
}
dx+
n0−1∑
i=1
h(xi1, t1) (5.11)
s.t. xij = x¯i,∀i, j, (5.12)
Si(tj) = ∅,∀i, j < i− n0 + 1, (5.13)
Si1(tj) ∩ Si2(tj) = ∅,∀i1 6= i2, j, (5.14)⋃
i
Si(tj) = Ω,∀j, (5.15)
xij ∈ Ω,∀i, j. (5.16)
The level-based DFLP focuses on the variations of service regions when a new facility is open. The
objective function (5.11) approximates (5.1) by summing the approximated costs (5.9)–(5.10) across
all levels. The terms in the first summation capture the total service cost and facility fixed costs for
all the facilities opened within each level, while the second summation captures the facility fixed costs
for all those opened at time 0. Constraints (5.12) enforce location consistency of facilities across all
levels. Constraints (5.13)–(5.15) are reformulations of Constraints (5.2) to (5.4) in each level.
Note that Si(tj) can be approximated by a circular disk (Ouyang and Daganzo, 2006). We extend
this method to approximate {Si(t)}t∈Ψj by a cylinder Sij as shown in Figure 5.2(c), where the height
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of the cylinder is lj , the cross-section of the cylinder is a circle with size |Si(tj)|, and its center is
located at xij . When i > n0 + j − 1, facility i has not been opened at time tj (Si(tj) = ∅) and the
cylinder degenerates to a line.
Then a collection of cylinders corresponding to facility i across all levels j ∈ J , {Sij}j∈J , forms a
tube that approximates Si. That is, each time level is represented by a cylinder and a set of cylinders
form a tube. The location consistency constraints require xij = xi,∀j ∈ J . We refer to such a tube
satisfying the location consistency constraints as a right tube, as shown in Figure 5.3(a). Otherwise,
we say a tube is oblique if there exists j, j′ ∈ J such that xij 6= xij′ , as shown in Figure 5.3(b). The
center of a general tube {Sij}j∈J is defined as the weighted average of all its non-degenerated cylinder
centers; i.e.,
x¯i :=
 nT−n0+1∑
j=max{i−n0+1,1}
ljxij
 nT−n0+1∑
j=max{i−n0+1,1}
lj
−1 . (5.17)
Hence, by approximating each prism by a cylinder, the optimal solution to the level-based DFLP can
be represented by a set of non-overlapping right tubes.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: (a) A right tube; (b) an oblique tube.
The above tube approximation inspires us to convert the CA solution (to the original DFLP,
A(x, t)) into the solution to the level-based DFLP (which is approximated by a set cylinders that are
piled into right tubes); i.e., A(x, t) ≈ Si(tj),∀x ∈ Si(t), t ∈ Ψj . The optimal CA solution A∗(x, t),
obtained from (5.7), can therefore be discretized into a set of non-overlapping right tubes. In doing
so, we propose a two-step method: (i) first relax the location consistency requirement (over time) and
convert A∗(x, t) to a set of (oblique) tubes; (ii) enforce the tubes into right ones via penalty-based
regulation method. The first step is rather straightforward. We implement the disk model for each
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level j ∈ J to convert A∗ (x, tj) into a set of cylinders {Sij}i∈I , each with a given height lj . Since the
disk model is implemented independently on each level, it is likely that xj1i 6= xj2i for j1 6= j2 and
{Sij}j∈J collectively form an oblique tube (see Figure 5.3(b)). The second step involves an iterative
tube regulation algorithm to adjust the cylinder centers in each tube. Once the tubes converge to a
set of non-overlapping right ones, we have obtained an solution to the level-based DFLP. More detail
on tube regulation will be introduced in the following subsection.
Our model solves the optimization problem in a time-space continuum and then use the result
(i.e., facility opening times) as the basis for discretizing the time dimension. We should note that
there are other ways to discretize the time dimension. For example, we could discretize time into a
set of predetermined time epochs at the very beginning, such that facility opening times all fall onto
these epochs, and all cylinders (except those degenerated ones) will have the same height. Such an
approach may be suitable when the facility opening decisions are tightly aligned with predetermined
timeline (e.g., fiscal years), but it also often involves higher computational efforts. The choice of time
discretization approach is largely problem-dependent, and somewhat similar to the choice between
continuous versus discrete Markov chains.
5.2.3 Tube Regulation
Note that any set of oblique tubes approximates a feasible solution to the level-based DFLP, where the
location consistency constraints (5.12) are relaxed. We now allow the locations of facilities to change
over time and enforce Constraints (5.12) by imposing a penalty term in the objective. Hence, the
level-based DFLP is extended to the following problem.
Tube Regulation Problem (TRP):
min
{xij}i,j ,{Si(tj)}i,j
∑
j∈J
{
lj
∫
Ω
z (x, xij , Si(tj), tj) + h(xn0+j−1,j , tj)
}
dx+
n0−1∑
i=1
h(xi1, t1)
+
∑
i
nT−n0+1∑
j=max{i−n0+1,1}
φ (λij ||xij − x¯i||)
s.t. (5.13)− (5.16), (5.18)
where
φ(r) :=

0, r ≤ 1,
∞, r > 1,
62
is a step-wise penalty function and λij > 0 is the penalty coefficient bounding the location “deviation”
of cylinder Sij . When there exists a facility location xij such that ||xij − x¯i|| > 1/λij , the objective
function goes to infinity. Hence, the feasible region of xij in the TRP is given by {x : ||x−x¯i|| ≤ 1/λij}.
Given {λij}i,j , the optimal solution to the TRP, {xij(λij)}i,j and {Si(tj , λij)}i,j , determine a set of
oblique tubes. For all i, j, there exists a minimum penalty coefficient, i.e., λ¯ij = ||xij − x¯i||−1, with
which the optimal solution to the TRP corresponds to the aforementioned oblique tubes converted
from A∗(x, t) via the disk model (as described in Section 5.2.2). Hence, we set the initial value of
{λij}i,j to its corresponding minimum penalty coefficient, {λ¯ij}i,j .
To solve TRP, we increase the penalty coefficients λij ,∀i, j, in each iteration k; e.g., making it
proportional to
√
k. As λij increases over the iterations, the feasible region for xij shrinks, which
forces the cylinders to align toward the center. Thus, the corresponding tubes become “less” oblique.
This however may result in a greater degree of overlaps among the cylinders. This procedure reflects
the trade-off between the system cost and the facility location consistency requirement.
We define a repulsive force between any two overlapping cylinders, and let its magnitude represent
the loss of the objective value due to such overlap. To illustrate the idea, we use the simpler notation
from the homogeneous continuous model (5.6), and assume the objective pC(A) is twice differentiable
(due to the slow-varying assumption). When the cylinders are with the optimal size A∗, the first order
derivative of pC is zero, i.e.,
d
dApC(A)
∣∣
A=A∗ = 0. Suppose the size of the cross-sectional overlapping
area between two adjacent cylinders is ∆A  A, from Taylor series expansion of pC at A∗, the change
of pC due to the change in ∆A can be approximated as
∆pC = pC(A
∗ + ∆A)− pC(A∗) ≈ ∆
2
A
2
· d
2pC(A)
dA2
∣∣∣∣
A=A∗
.
Then, we let the repulsive force f(∆A) be a function of the overlapping area ∆A (Peng et al., 2014),
whose magnitude equal to the gradient of ∆pC with respect to ∆A; i.e.,
|f(∆A)| = d(∆pC)
d(∆A)
= ∆A · d
2pC(A)
dA2
∣∣∣∣
A=A∗
. (5.19)
The direction of the repulsive forces f(∆A) is along the line connecting the centers of overlapping
cylinders.
At every step of the iteration, for every level j, all repulsive forces are calculated based on the
current locations and the sizes of the cylinders. Figure 5.4(a) illustrates the generation of repulsive
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forces among overlapping cylinders. The total force on each tube {Sij}j∈J is computed as the weighted
vector sum of all forces across all non-degenerated cylinders, with weights equal to the cylinder heights.
The formula would have a similar form to that of the tube center formula (5.17), except that location
is now replaced by a vector force.
Based on the repulsive forces, we shift each cylinders and tubes to find the best displacement as the
solution to the TRP for each iteration k. The single movement of each cylinder or tube is controlled by
a diminishing and cumulatively unbounded force-to-distance factor, γk, satisfying limk→∞ γk = 0 and∑∞
k=1 γk =∞, and a small force perturbation is added to avoid local optima at each move. Specifically,
the shift includes the following two stages: (i, cylinder movement), for each tube, shift all cylinders in
the tube according to their repulsive forces (when the cylinder center goes out its feasible region, it
will be projected to the nearest feasible point) until convergence, as shown in Figure 5.4(b), updating
the repulsive forces after each movement; (ii, tube movement) shift the entire tube according to the
total force until converging, i.e., all cylinders in the tube are moved identically. Such an algorithm
continues for each iteration until the system converges to a set of right tubes with non-overlapping
cylinders at each level, and its convergence is shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 11. (a) Convergence of cylinder movements. Consider a non-degenerate cylinder.
Suppose all the other cylinders and the feasible region sizes are fixed. The cylinder center location will
converge to a local minimum with respect to the total cost over iterations.
(b) Convergence of tube movement. Consider a tube. Suppose the relative locations of each
cylinder in the tube, feasible region sizes, and all other tubes are fixed. The tube center location will
converge to a local minimum with respect to the total cost under such forces over iterations.
Proof. Proof. (a) Without loss of generality, let’s consider a cylinder S11. When all other cylinders are
fixed, the total cost increment is a function of the location of S11. From the definition of the repulsive
force (5.19), we know the vector sum of all repulsive forces on S11 is a gradient descent direction of the
total cost increment (caused by the overlaps between S11 and its adjacent cylinders or boundaries).
Hence the total cost decreases when S11 moves along such a direction for a sufficiently small distance.
Note that each movement is projected into a convex circular feasible region. Given a diminishing
force-to-distance factor, S11 will converge to a local minimum with respect to the total cost under such
gradient projection method (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004).
(b) The tube movement convergence is a simple extension of cylinder movement convergence. From
the first term in the objective function (5.11), we know the total cost increment caused by a tube is
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the weighted sum of all those from its cylinders across all time levels. Hence, the weighted vector sum
of overlapping forces is the gradient descent direction of the total cost. Given a diminishing force-to-
distance factor, the tube will converge to a local minimum with respect to the total cost under such
gradient search method.
The aforementioned algorithm fixes the locations and sizes of all other cylinders or tubes while
searching for a local minimum for one tube. Although this is an accurate process, solving the TRP
at each iteration can be very time consuming and ineffective in practice. Therefore, we propose an
accelerated algorithm by shifting all cylinders and tubes simultaneously without awaiting convergence
for a particular tube. We observe that the step size of cylinder movements approaches zero as the
feasible region shrinks to the center of the tube, and as such, the tube movement will become the
dominating component of the recursion (which resembles solving the TRP to convergence). Obviously,
the rate at which the penalty coefficients increase affects the convergence rate of cylinder movements
in the accelerated algorithm. To see this, we consider a polar coordinate system built at the center of
the tube with the polar axis pointing from the tube center to the cylinder center. Suppose the angle
between the polar axis and the joint repulsive force on the cylinder is θ, simple calculation shows that
in iteration k, the angular coordinate of the cylinder center changes by a small angle
c2 sin θ
k/λk + c2 cos θ
,
where c2 is a positive constant, and λk is a parameter related to the value of λij in iteration k. As long
as λk increases at a rate that is sublinear to k, the change of the angular coordinate of the cylinder
will converge to zero. In our algorithm, we choose λk = λ¯ij
√
k.
To conclude this section, we summarize the proposed DFLP solution procedure as follows.
Step 1. DFLP to CA.
1.1. Relax the location consistency requirement and decompose the DFLP into (uncountably many)
independent static problems, one for each time instant.
1.2. Reformulate and solve each static problem under CA to yield the optimal facility density (or
service region size) over time and space.
1.3. Use the optimal facility density function to determine (i) the optimal number of facilities over
time, and (ii) a series of facility opening times.
Step 2. CA to Level-Based DFLP.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.4: Tube regulation: (a) repulsive forces; (b) location adjustment.
2.1, Discretize the time horizon into multiple time intervals, to which we refer as levels. Solve for
facility locations within each level using the disk model.
2.2. Approximate a facility’s service region in each level by a cylinder. The collection of these cylinders
forms a set of oblique tubes and offers a relaxed solution to our problem (in which location consistency
is violated).
Step 3. Level-Based DFLP to DFLP.
3.1. Enforce location consistency by imposing penalties associated with tube obliqueness, using the
solution from Step 2.2 as an initial solution.
3.2. Update tube locations by gradually increasing penalties until tube obliqueness is reduced to a
certain acceptable level.
5.3 Approximation Error Bounds
In this section, we evaluate the approximation error of our solution and explore upper and (approx-
imate) lower bounds to the optimal DFLP solution. Note that we have obtained two solutions from
our proposed solution procedure: (i) an intermediate CA solution from §5.2.1, which is not necessarily
feasible; and (ii) a feasible discrete solution from §5.2.3. It is straightforward that the objective of the
feasible discrete solution provides an upper bound to the original DFLP. We now show that the ob-
jective of the CA solution gives a lower bound to a class of discrete solutions (when certain conditions
hold).
To stay focused, we consider the following specific DFLP (similar analyses can be conducted for
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other problems). Near location x at time t, the customer demand is denoted by D(x, t) and the facility
operating cost is denoted by C(x, t). Suppose customers always choose the nearest facility and the
transportation cost is 1 per unit distance. Then, the objective function of this DFLP is
P =
∫
Ψ
∑
i
∫
Si(t)
||x− xi||D(x, t)dxdt+
∫
Ψ
∑
i
C(xi, t)dt+
∑
i
h(xi, τi), (5.20)
and we let P ∗ be the true optimum.
Suppose the objective obtained by the tube model is Pˆ ∗. Since it is feasible, we have P ∗ ≤ Pˆ ∗.
Accordingly, the average travel distance in a service region (assumed to be circular) with size A(x, t)
is = 2
3
√
pi
A1/2(x, t). Therefore the service cost in the CA formulation is
zC (x,A(x, t), t) =
2
3
√
pi
D(x, t)A1/2(x, t) + C(x, t)A−1(x, t)
and the objective function of CA per unit area per unit time is
pC (x,A(x, t), t) =
2
3
√
pi
D(x, t)A1/2(x, t) + C(x, t)A−1(x, t) +
1
T
h(x, t)A−1(x, t).
Hence, we can calculate the first and second order derivatives of pC with respect to A to obtain the
optimal service region size function as follows:
A∗(x, t) =

[
3
√
pi
D(x,t)T (C(x, t)T + h(x, t))
]2/3
, if ∂
2
∂A2 [pC(x,A(x, t), t)]
∣∣∣
A(x,t)=A∗(x,t)
> 0
∞, otherwise.
.
Further, the minimum of the CA objective can be obtained by
P ∗C =
∫
Ψ
∫
Ω
pC (x,A
∗(x, t), t) dxdt.
Proposition 12. We have P ∗C ≤ P ∗ if the following three conditions are satisfied:
(a) xi is the centroid of Si(t) for all i and t;
(b) within each service region Si(t) at a given time t, the demand density D(x, t) is constant, Di(t),
and the operating cost C(x, t) is concave with respect to x; and
(c) the fixed cost h(x, t) is uniformly far smaller than the total serving cost, or decreasing over time
and far larger than the total serving cost, or remains constant across all x and t.
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Proof. Proof. We build a piece-wise constant service area function As(x, t) satisfying As(x, t) =
|Si(t)|,∀t, x ∈ Si(t). It is obvious that P ∗C ≤
∫
Ψ
∫
Ω
pC (x,As(x, t), t) dxdt since A
∗(x, t) is the minimum.
We only need to show P ≥ ∫
Ψ
∫
Ω
pC (x,As(x, t), t) dxdt.
First, we consider the transportation cost term and show
∫
Ψ
∑
i
∫
Si(t)
||x− xi||D(x, t)dxdt ≥
∫
Ψ
∫
Ω
2
3
√
pi
D(x, t)A1/2s (x, t)dxdt.
It is sufficient to show
∫
Si(t)
||x− xi||D(x, t)dx ≥
∫
Si(t)
2
3
√
pi
D(x, t)A1/2s (x, t)dx, ∀i, t,
which is equivalent to ∫
Si(t)
||x− xi||dx ≥ 2
3
√
|Si(t)|
pi
(5.21)
due to the piece-wise constant property of D(x, t) and As(x, t). Since xi is the centroid of Si(t), (5.21)
holds (Ouyang and Daganzo, 2006).
Then we consider the operating cost term. Since C(x, t) is concave with respect to x, the Jensen
inequality indicates
C(xi, t) ≥ 1|Si(t)|
∫
Si(t)
C(x, t)dx, ∀i, t.
Hence C(xi, t) ≥
∫
Si(t)
C(x, t)A−1s (x, t)dx. Integrating it over time Ψ and summing it across i leads to
∫
Ψ
∑
i
C(xi, t)dt ≥
∫
Ψ
∫
Ω
C(x, t)A−1s (x, t)dxdt.
Finally, we investigate the fixed cost term. A trivial case is when h(x, t) is significantly smaller than
the total service cost. We can directly neglect the fixed cost and conclude P ≥ ∫
Ψ
∫
Ω
pC (x,As(x, t), t) dxdt.
When h(x, t) is significantly larger than the total serving cost and decreases over t, most facility should
be built at the beginning and we have
∫
Ψ
∫
Si(t)
1
T
h(x, t)|Si(t)|−1dxdt ≤ h(xi, τi).
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When h(x, t) ≡ h,∀x, t, we have
∫
Ψ
∫
Si(T )
1
T
h(x, t)|Si(T )|−1dxdt ≤ h.
Now, we have shown each term in P is greater or equal to that in
∫
Ψ
∫
Ω
pC (x,As(x, t), t) dxdt, that
is, P ≥ P ∗C always holds. This implies P ∗ ≥ P ∗C , which completes the proof.
It shall be noted that the conditions for P ∗C to be a lower bound may not strictly hold; e.g., demand
density may vary within a service region, and the facility may not always be at the centroid. However,
under the assumption of slow-varying conditions, and knowing that location problem objectives are
generally insensitive to small perturbations to facility locations, we expect the above result is still
insightful; i.e., it still offers a good approximation to a true lower bound. Given these bounds, the
optimality gap is approximately Pˆ ∗ − P ∗C . In the following section, we always use P ∗C to provide the
approximate optimality gap of continuous models.
5.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we provide numerical examples to illustrate the application of the proposed CA frame-
work, test its computational performance, and explore the impact of heterogeneity. In addition, we
apply the proposed approach to a case study for the Illinois State, so as to highlight its applicability
to real world problems.
5.4.1 Illustrative Example
00.56 3.69 6.37 8.72 100
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
t
n
(t)
(a)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.5
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
x1
x2
A(
x,0
)
(b)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.5
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
x1
x2
A(
x,T
)
(c)
Figure 5.5: (a) Result of n(t); (b) A∗(x, 0); (c) A∗(x, T ).
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We consider the specific type of DFLP discussed in §5.3, whose objective function follows (5.20).
Suppose the entire customer area is a unit square, i.e., Ω = [0, 1] × [0, 1]. Further, we set T = 10,
D(x, t) = 500 cos(||x||)e1+0.04t, C(x, t) = 3 sin(||x||)e2−0.04t, and h(x, t) = 10 cos(||x||)e1−0.04t. Since
D(x, t) increases and C(x, t), h(x, t) decrease with respect to t, it is intuitive that A∗(x, t) decreases
with t. This implies a growing market. The optimal facility deployment times, n(x, t), are obtained via
continuum approximation, as shown in Figure 5.5(a). The solution to this numerical example suggests
deploying five facilities in the beginning, n0 = 5, and adding four additional facilities until the end of
the planning horizon, nT = 9. Specifically, we have τi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and τ6 = 0.56, τ7 = 3.69,
τ8 = 6.37, and τ9 = 8.72. Figures 5.5(b) and 5.5(c) illustrate the optimal service region at t = 0 and
T , respectively.
We now illustrate how the tube model is implemented for this example. For each iteration k, we
update λij = λ¯ij
√
k to generate a force perturbation satisfying a bivariate uniform distribution in
[−0.05, 0.05]2, and set the force-to-distance factor as 0.01k .
Figures 5.6 (a)–(d) exhibit some snapshots of the tube regulation procedure. For clear illustration,
each cylinder of a tube is simply represented on a plane, and cylinders of the same tube are connected
through lines. The five planes in each sub-figure represent the timing for new facility construction,
where the Voronoi diagram captures the service region of each facility (i.e., we let customers choose
the nearest facility). The square markers represent the facility locations xij and the star markers on
the first level give the center of each tube x¯i, at convergence to a right tube. The converged solution
shown in Figure 5.6(d) is reached after 581 iterations, where x¯i becomes an approximation of xi. In
addition, we compute the upper and approximate lower bounds of the problem based on the discussion
in §5.3. For this example, the approximate lower and upper bound of the optimal total costs are 2544.4
and 2683.5, respectively, indicating a 5.47% approximation error.
5.4.2 Comparison with Discrete Model
Next, we compare the performance of our proposed CA model to that of the discrete model (5.1)–(5.5)
through a series of DFLP instances. The first group of test cases have the same problem structure as
that in §5.4.1. For the CA model, we set the customer demand density, facility operating cost, and
facility fixed cost to D(x, t) = 400 cos(||x||)ϕ
(
1+0.05t
1+||x||
)
, C(x, t) = cos(||x||)ϕ
(
2−0.05t
1+||x||
)
, and h(x, t) =
0.001 cos(||x||) ·ϕ (1− 0.05t), respectively. We consider the following three representative ϕ(t) functions
that highlight different ways parameters change over time: Model Ia (convex), ϕ(t) = exp(t); Model
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Figure 5.6: Tube model solution: (a) initial oblique tubes generated by the disk model; (b) solution
after 10 iterations, where λij = 3.2λ¯ij ; (c) solution after 50 iterations, where λij = 7.1λ¯ij ; (d) converged
solution after 581 iterations.
Ib (concave), ϕ(t) = 1 + log(1 + t); Model Ic (S-shaped), ϕ(t) = 1 + 3/ (1 + exp (12t− 10t)). For the
discrete model, we discretize Ω into q × q discrete spatial grid cells and use the center of each cell to
represent a customer and a candidate facility location. Thus, we have q2 overlapping customer demand
points and candidate facility locations. We then discretize Ψ into 10 time periods. The total demand
of each discrete point is aggregated from each cell. The remaining input parameters are the same as
those in §5.4.1. The discrete model is solved by the CPLEX solver. We set a maximum optimality
gap of 1% and a maximum CPU time of 10 hours. The resulting solution and CPU times for various
q values are summarized as Models Ia–Ic in Table 5.1.
In addition, we consider another group of test cases and repeat the same analysis. The customer
demand density is now given by D(x, t) = 400 cos(||x||)ϕ
(
1+0.2t
1+||x||
)
, and the facility operating cost is a
function of the total demand served per unit time, C(xi, t) = 1.5
(∫
Si(t)
D(x, t)dx
)1/2
. We consider
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the same set of ϕ(t) functions and keep the remaining parameters unchanged. Note that these DFLPs
are no longer linear (not even convex), and hence the discrete models are solved by the GAMS-SBB
solver (with the same termination criteria). The solution and CPU times for various q values are also
summarized as Models IIa–IIc in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Solution comparison for continuous and discrete model.
Model q n∗0 → n∗T Pˆ ∗ Opt. Gap CPU Time (s)
Ia
8 12→16 806 0.1% 57
Discrete 10 10→14 805 0.1% 343
15 12→13 824 3.6% 36000
20 Out of memory
Continuous ∞ 10→15 792 3.8%, 4.9% 114
Ib
8 14→16 542 0.9% 57
Discrete 10 13→13 541 0.2% 253
15 13→16 555 1.8% 36000
20 Out of memory
Continuous ∞ 13→15 526 2.8%, 3.7% 38
Ic
8 11→15 445 0.8% 41
Discrete 10 11→14 445 0.2% 321
15 9→16 457 6.5% 36000
20 Out of memory
Continuous ∞ 10→15 437 4.3%, 5.9% 120
IIa
8 7→36 3158 0.0% 254
Discrete 10 4→32 3136 0.0% 2744
15 No feasible solution founded 36000
20 Out of memory
Continuous ∞ 6→10 2805 4.5%, 5.8% 55
IIb
8 3→19 1793 0.0% 255
Discrete 10 5→33 1868 0.1% 1148
15 No feasible solution founded 36000
20 Out of memory
Continuous ∞ 5→6 1619 2.2% ,3.1% 13
IIc
8 4→30 2235 0.0% 261
Discrete 10 3→29 2266 0.1% 1033
15 No feasible solution founded 36000
20 Out of memory
Continuous ∞ 4→8 2011 2.7% ,4.2% 39
For the CA model, we solve each case 10 times and present the best n∗0 , n
∗
T , Pˆ
∗, the best
and the average optimality gaps (e.g., in Row Continuous of Model Ia, the best and the
average optimality gaps are 3.8% and 4.9%, respectively), and the average CPU time.
We observe that the computation time for the discrete model increases drastically as q2 increases
for all cases. Further, the solver fails to obtain a solution for the larger instances, running either out
of time or out of memory. In contrast, the CA approach yields a reasonable approximation of the true
optimal solution within a very short amount of time, which highlights its practical value.
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5.4.3 Sensitivity to Heterogeneity
In this subsection, we study how spatial and temporal heterogeneity in data input influences the
optimal solution. We consider the same problem instance as in §5.4.1 and generate spatial and
temporal heterogeneity with respect to three key parameters: D, C, and h. We set D(x, t) =
150(1 + ρD cos(
pi√
2
||x||)e1+0.05(1+ρt)t, C(x, t) = (1 + ρC sin( pi√2 ||x||)e2−0.05(1+ρt)t, and h(x, t) = 10(1 +
ρh cos(
pi√
2
||x||)e1−0.05(1+ρt)t, where ρD, ρC , and ρh capture spatial heterogeneity and ρt captures tem-
poral heterogeneity. Note that the system becomes spatially homogeneous when ρD = ρC = ρh = 0.
To illustrate the impact of heterogeneity, we solve a series of DFLPs, each with one heterogeneity
parameter increasing from 0 to 0.5, while others are fixed at zero. The relative difference in the total
costs with respect to each type of heterogeneity is shown in Figure 5.7. Since the solution to DFLP
from our CA approach is not necessarily unique, we solve each instance five times and plot the average.
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Figure 5.7: Sensitivity of spatial and temporal heterogeneities.
The results show that the total cost decreases as spatial heterogeneity increases, and the het-
erogeneity of demand density has the most significant impact. In contrast, we find that the total
cost increases as temporal heterogeneity increases. As demand density varies faster and the facility
operating/opening cost decreases faster over time, it becomes more challenging to maintain low cost.
5.4.4 Illinois Case Study
In this subsection, we implement the proposed solution method to the State of Illinois and illustrate
its applicability to a more realistic setting. We consider a transshipment problem as an extension of
the example in Ouyang and Daganzo (2006). In particular, we consider a third-party logistics (3PL)
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vendor which needs to ship agricultural products from farmers (or local co-operatives) in 102 Illinois
counties to an agricultural production firm’s warehouse (such as ADM in Illinois) by opening a set
of terminals during a 20-year period from 2014 to 2033; i.e., Ψ = [0, 20]. For simplicity, we ignore
terminal opening and operating costs and assume sufficiently large inbound vehicle capacity. Now Ω
represents the entire state, and each location is denoted by x =
(
x(1), x(2)
) ∈ Ω, where x(1) and x(2)
are the coordinates with the origin at the gravity center of Ω. Then the objective function of the
DFLP becomes
P =
∫
Ψ
(
α
∑
i
∫
Si(t)
||x− xi||D(x, t)dx+ β
∑
i
√
||xi − xw||
∫
Si(t)
D(x, t)dx
)
dt, (5.22)
where α, β are positive cost parameters and xw indicates the location of the warehouse. The first
and second terms capture the outbound and inbound costs, respectively. The customer demand is no
longer directly represented by a continuous density function but as a discrete value for each county.
We first assume customers are uniformly distributed within each county, and then approximate it into
a continuous density function D(x, t), as proposed in Peng et al. (2014).
Now we derive the CA counterpart of (5.22). Given the service region size A(x, t) as in §5.3, the
average distance of ||x−xi|| for x ∈ Si(t) can be approximated by 23√piA1/2(x, t). Let r(x) = ||xi−xw||,
and we have
pC (x,A(x, t), t) =
2α
3
√
pi
D(x, t)
√
A(x, t) + β
√
r(x)D(x, t)/A(x, t), (5.23)
which is minimized when
A∗(x, t) =
3
√
piβ
2α
√
r(x)/D(x, t). (5.24)
For illustration, we consider a baseline case in which the cost parameters are α = 1 and β = 25,
and the warehouse is located in Chicago (Cook County). The demand D(x, t) is estimated from
the following procedure. First, we obtained the actual Illinois annual corn production data at the
county level in 1974–2014 (National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2014b). Next, we conducted a
series of linear regressions to obtain the annual growth trend rate in each county. Then, we used
these county-specific growth rates to project future shipment demand for each county in a 20-year
period from 2014 to 2033, assuming hypothetical market share targets of this 3PL vendor (i.e., 3%
in 2014 when entering the market, and 20% by 2033). Finally, actual geographic configurations (e.g.,
county size, distance) are obtained from GIS data (Prairie Research Institute, 2014). As such, we have
D(x, t) = (1 + ∆D(x)t)D(x, 0), t ∈ [0, 20], where ∆D(x) is the growth rate and D(x, 0) is demand
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density in 2014. Both have constant values for all x within each county.
Figure 5.8(a) shows the 2014 Illinois annual corn production for each county. The proposed ap-
proach yields the best Pˆ ∗ = 4.67 × 105 with a 3.2% optimality gap after running 10 times, with the
average CPU time of 140s. We observe twelve total terminals opened, three of which are opened in the
beginning (t = 0), while the other four are gradually added in the remaining time horizon t ∈ (0, 20]
as shown in Figure 5.8(b). In Figure 5.8(c), the squares indicate the optimal terminal locations while
the associated numbers inside track the opening sequence. We observe a clear pattern in which the
first three terminals offer an initial service layout and the later additions further fill the service region
with relatively larger traveling distances.
To compare the continuous and discrete models, we conduct a similar analysis as that in §5.4.2.
The possible time for facility opening decision for the discrete model is set to be every two years, since
the commercial solver we used (i.e., GAMS-SBB) failed to solve the 20 time-period case. Hence, we
discretize Ψ into 10 time periods, and the optimal cost is 4.77 × 105. It is worse than Pˆ ∗, which is
probably due to fewer time periods and limited choices of terminal locations (i.e., only among 102
county centers).
To highlight the dynamic nature of the problem, we first contrast this solution to that of a static
problem. We pretend that the demand at each location is time-invariant and equal to the average
value over the entire planning horizon. Obviously, all terminals should be opened simultaneously, and
the triangles in Figure 5.8(c) indicate the optimal terminal locations for the static problem. Note only
five terminals are opened, and the terminals are spatially distributed more evenly. The static problem
solution, when evaluated under the dynamic demand, yields a higher total cost of 4.80× 105. Second,
we contrast our model solution to one from a simple greedy heuristic, in which the terminals are opened
as needed to satisfy the present demand (without looking into the future). The opening time of each
added terminal is estimated by the aforementioned tube model. The circles in Figure 5.8(d) show the
greedy solution in contrast to the dynamic solution (gray squares). The greedy solution yields a total
cost of 4.88× 105.
Figures 5.9(a)–(c) illustrate respectively the impacts of temporal and spatial heterogeneity in de-
mand variation. First, for temporal heterogeneity, we employ D(x, t) = (1 + ∆D(x)t
2/T )D(x, 0), t ∈
[0, 20], indicating that the growth of demand accelerates over time, while D(x, 0), D(x, 20), and all
other parameters remain the same. Figure 5.9(a) shows the optimal terminal locations and their
opening sequences, in contrast to the solution to the baseline problem (gray squares). We observe
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Figure 5.8: Input and solutions to the Illinois case study. (a) 2014 Illinois annual corn production; (b)
terminal opening times for the baseline problem; optimal terminal locations (numbers indicate opening
sequences) for/from (c) the baseline problem and its static counterpart, (d) the proposed approach
and the greedy heuristic.
that, although the same number of terminals are opened, their spatial distribution is quite different
— the terminals are now more clustered toward the warehouse at Chicago. Under accelerating growth
(while initial and final values are fixed), customer demand is relatively lower (than its baseline coun-
terpart) at the beginning of the planning horizon, and the deployment of facilities will be slightly
sparser everywhere. When demand experiences sharper growth in the later part of the horizon, most
added terminals will likely be deployed near the warehouse to benefit from lower costs. Next, for
spatial heterogeneity, we employ D(x, t) =
[
1 + ∆D(x)t sin
(
1
pix
(2)/x
(2)
max
)]
D(x, 0), t ∈ [0, 20], where
x
(2)
max = maxx∈Ω x(2); i.e., demand growth increases faster in Northern Illinois. We fix D(x, 0) and all
other parameters to be the same as those in the baseline problem. Figure 5.9(b) shows the optimal
terminal locations and opening sequences. As expected, we observe that the terminals are now more
concentrated in the northern part due to higher demand.
Table 5.2: Summary of result statistics under different parameters.
Case β ∆D(x) Pˆ ∗(105) n∗0 → n∗T
Opt. Gap Avg. CPU
Best Avg. Time(s)
baseline 25 100% 4.67 3→7 3.2% 4.5% 140
a 20 100% 4.26 4→9 4.2% 5.5% 265
b 30 100% 5.08 3→6 2.6% 4.5% 110
c 25 80% 4.11 3→6 2.9% 4.7% 153
d 25 120% 5.17 3→7 2.8% 5.5% 255
Next, we investigate how the solution is affected by the location of the warehouse. Figure 5.9(c)
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shows the optimal locations of nine terminals (four opened at t = 0) in case the warehouse is moved
to Springfield (thus, approximately the gravity center of Ω). Compared with the baseline problem, the
change of warehouse location leads to two more terminals. This may be due to the decrease of average
travel distance from a terminal to the warehouse. This is consistent with (5.24), which suggests that
the optimal facility service region size increases with the distance to the warehouse.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5.9: Impact of parameters. Optimal terminal locations (numbers indicate opening sequences)
for: (a) problem with nonlinear demand growth, (b) problem with spatially heterogeneous demand
growth, and (c) problem with warehouse located in Springfield.
Finally, we evaluate how cost parameters and demand growth rate influence the optimal design.
The result statistics are reported in Table 5.2. The first case corresponds to the baseline problem
with the warehouse located at Chicago. Cases a,b address the impact of inbound cost parameter β,
while Cases c,d capture the impact of demand growth rate. All other parameters remain the same
as those in the baseline case, and we solve each instance 10 times. For most instances, the solutions
are obtained with a reasonable time (CPU time<265s) with reasonable quality (average optimality
gap<5.5%). When inbound cost β increases, we observe that the total cost decreases but the number
of terminals increases. As the demand grows faster, both the total cost and the number of terminals
increase.
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Chapter 6
Food, Energy, and Environment
Trilemma: Sustainable Farmland
Use and Biofuel Industry
Development
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is an extension along the framework proposed in Chapter 4, where the land use com-
petition now involves food, energy, as well as environment sectors. Building on the game-theoretical
framework between the biofuel firm and all farmers, we investigate how the government should guide
the development of the biofuel industry sustainably. 1
In recognition of biofuel advantages, the U.S. government has been supporting the biofuel industry
with various policies from the early 1990s. The two notable policy instruments in the U.S. are the
biofuel production mandate and subsidy programs. In Energy Independence and Security Act (2007),
the Congress first announced the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) mandate requiring the annual pro-
duction to reach 36 billion gallons by 2022. This was subsequently updated in RFS2 to focus more on
the renewable biomass composed of crop residues and dedicated energy crops (EPA, 2013). In addition
to mandate, the federal government enacted the 2008 farm bill which established subsidy programs
such as Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP) to incentive farmers for growing biomass feedstock
(BCAP Farm Service Agency, 2013). Biorefineries are also offered with a loan guarantees through the
Biorefinery Assistance Program with funding set at $100 million for fiscal year 2014 (Agricultural Act
of 2014 §9003).
As aforementioned, the rapid development of biofuel industry is accompanied by unintended side
effects. Farmland, as a scarce resource, exacerbates the competition among food, energy, and the
environmental reservation. This leads to a difficult trilemma: how to stimulate the growth of the biofuel
industry while, at the same time, protect food security and preserve environmental sustainability?
Given the significant and far-reaching implications of land use allocation, the farmland trilemma
1This chapter is based on a submitted paper, Wang et al. (2015b)
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problem is one of the most heatedly discussed bioenergy issues among agronomists and environmental
and bioenergy scientists nowadays (e.g., Tilman et al. (2009)). Khanna et al. (2009) and Harvey (2014)
further describe the sustainability challenges of the biofuel industry and discuss factors affecting the
economic, environmental, and social viability of current and next-generation biofuels. Whereas these
studies make effort to qualitatively characterize the impact of biofuel industry on various measures,
there has been limited analytical attempt in characterizing the farmland trilemma problem.
To this end, this chapter’s first objective is to develop an analytical framework that enables sys-
tematic analysis of bioenergy industry development and farmland use planning. The second objective
of this chapter is to investigate the impact of coordination (and lack thereof) in policy instruments and
provide relevant policy guidelines to induce socially favorable farmland use configurations to support
sustainable development of the biofuel industry. The final objective is to investigate the implication
of biofuel industry on environment and society.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The notations, assumptions, and description
the model are introduced in §6.2. In §6.3, we obtain the solution of the problem and study the
implications in policy instruments. In §6.4, focus on studying the impact of coordination in the two
policy instruments. Finally in §6.5, we draw further insights based on the data for the U.S. Midwest
region. All technical details are presented in appendix.
6.2 Model
We consider a utility-maximizing farmer facing three market options for his farmland use: (i) grow
food crops and sell them to a food market, (ii) rent out the land to an environmental reservation
market, or (iii) grow energy crops and sell them to a biofuel firm in the energy market. The biofuel
firm then converts the crops into biofuel and distributes the biofuel to the end consumers.
To capture the distinct decision of each player and to characterize the farmland use trilemma,
we employ a Stackelberg-Nash competition framework, where the biofuel firm takes the lead and
the individual farmers form a Nash competition in lieu of food, energy, and reservation markets.
Specifically, in Stage 1, given the mandate and subsidy levels, the biofuel firm attempts to maximize
its profit by making the capacity and pricing decisions while competing against the incumbent food
and reservation markets for the limited farmland resource. Then in Stage 2, provided the specifics of
the three markets, individual farmers make the land use decisions to maximize their profit. Later in
§6.4, we augment the problem by considering another stage (i.e., Stage 0) that captures the government
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agencies’ policy decision on the optimal mandate and subsidy levels. In what follows, we introduce
the model setting in detail along with the specifics of the three markets and the characteristics of each
player involved in the problem.
6.2.1 Crops and Markets
Consider a large, continuous, and compact farmland region, Ω ⊆ R2, with area size A. The farmland
can be used to meet the demand for the three markets, food, energy, and reservation market, denoted
by ξ ∈ {f, e, r}, respectively. We assume homogeneous crop yield for each type of market ξ, denoted
by gξ. Note that, for expositional generality, we interpret the land conservation decision as “grow-
ing environmental-friendly crops” at a yield of gr (per unit farmland) although the land used for the
reservation market does not grow any crops. In other words, gr represents the quality of the reserved
farmland, which in turn determines the payment return from the reservation market (e.g., CRP pro-
gram (CRP Farm Service Agency, 2013b)). For tractability purpose, we do not consider geographical
heterogeneity such as land quality and weather condition that may affect the crop yield in our model.
We consider the heterogeneous farmland in the numerical study in §6.5.
We assume each type of market is uniformly distributed in Ω, and that all markets are accessible to
farmers. Food markets consist of local grain elevators and regional grain distribution centers (facilities
for receiving and storing crops), which belong to food processing firms or conglomerates (such as
Cargill and ADM). The food market has been established for a long time and its distribution channels
are already densely deployed near the farmland. Thus, we assume the cost of transporting harvested
food crops to nearby elevators is zero.2 Reservation markets consist of governmental/environmental
organizations who intend to preserve farmland via conservation reserve programs. The amount of
rental payment per unit land is determined by the land quality and total amount of currently reserved
land in the government jurisdiction (CRP Farm Service Agency, 2013b). We assume the unit crop price
($/bushel) of the food or reservation market, denoted by pξ∈{f,r}, follow linear inverse demand functions
of the expected total amount of crops sold at the corresponding market, i.e., pξ(ηξ) = aξ−bξηξgξ where
aξ and bξ are some positive constants.
For the energy market, we consider a biofuel firm (and its distribution network) in-between the
farmers and the market. A detailed description of the biofuel firm will be given later in the section. The
energy market deals with the end users, mostly vehicle drivers, who purchase bioethanol through local
2A uniform transportation cost across farmers can be easily accommodated by adjusting the inverse demand function
of the food market, which will be introduced below.
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gas stations. Akin to the other two markets, we assume the ethanol price in the energy market also
follows a similar functional form based on the expected total energy crop amount, pe(ηe) = ae− beηege
where ae and be are some positive constants.
3 Given the ethanol price pe, the biofuel firm then
determines the unit energy crop price pq (as a decision variable) and makes an offer to the farmers.
Based on the crop prices from the three markets, the farmers then make individual farmland use
decision in the beginning of the planting season. We assume they agree to a contract with the respective
market (i.e., food processing firm, biorefineries, and the local land reservation agency) to lock up the
crop price for that planting season. This is a typical setting in reality, as the price of each crop is
generally determined well in advance before the planting season and are transparently observable to
the farmers. For example, the commodity corn price in the futures market for December 2018 is
already available as of June of 2015 (Chicago Board of Trade, 2015). Also, the unit land reservation
price for the CRP program is also announced to farmers (USDA Farm Service Agency, 2014). For
the energy market, farmers sign a contract with the local biorefineries for the first-generation biomass
feedstock. For example, Arkalon Energy is currently contracting with local farmers to produce ethanol
in 2014 (Syngenta, 2013). Similar contracting mechanisms are expected to be established for the
advanced-generation crops as the market matures (Rosch et al., 2012).
6.2.2 Government Policy Instruments
The two government’s policy instruments, mandate and subsidy, collectively play a critical role in
shaping the biofuel industry as they directly regulate and incentivize farmland use decisions and the
profit of each stake-holder.
The mandate on biofuel production was first passed by the Congress in 2005 and is currently
regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) through its authority under the Clean Air
Act (Energy Independence and Security Act, 2007). Specifically, the EPA can adjust the annual
mandate level from the original RFS requirement based on the growth and the capability of the
industry, and enforces this volumetric quota to the biofuel industry (e.g., blenders and distributers).
We denote the mandate value by M > 0. If the biofuel firm fails to meet the mandate, it is subject
to a fine of cp per unit of shortage. For simplicity, we do not consider foreign biofuel imports, because
not only the current import level is low, achieving the mandate through imports is not the intent of
the government; rather, the goal of the governmental intervention is to induce a sustainable growth of
3For convenience, we assume the bioethanol price has already been corrected by the biomass-to-ethanol conversion
ratio γ (gallon/bushel). The unit of bioethanol price is $/gallon.
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the domestic biofuel industry.
In addition to mandate, subsidy programs in the forms of direct payment, tax credits, and loans
to the farmers also play a critical role in supporting the biofuel production. Most biofuel subsidy
programs such as the BCAP program are charged by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) under the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (Farm Service Agency, 2015). For simplicity, we aggregate FSA subsidy
programs into a single program, and denote its subsidy value per unit crop by s. For generality, we
allow s to take a negative value which can be interpreted as tax.
In §6.3, we first consider the case with exogenous mandate and subsidy levels. We then explicitly
model the EPA’s and the FSA’s problems to endogenize the mandate and subsidy decisions, and study
the impact of policy coordination in §6.4.
6.2.3 Farmer
Consider a set of uniformly distributed farmers each with a unit size of farmland at location x ∈ Ω. We
assume each unit farmland is sufficiently small and that farmers independently choose the farmland
use for the three markets. Given the crop yield (per unit farmland), gξ∈{f,e,r}, the farmers can allocate
ηξ∈{f,e,r} fraction of their land to grow each type of crop. Since each farmer makes an independent
decision, farmers engage in a Nash competition for their land use decision. In the following, we use
η := [ηf , ηe, ηr] to denote the the farmland use configuration, where
∑
ξ ηξ = 1. Farmer’s operating
cost for growing each type of crop is denoted by cξ∈{f,e,r}. We note that reserving the farmland from
agricultural activity implies cr = 0, but we keep cr in the formulation for expositional generality.
Hence, given the government subsidy s and the unit crop prices from each market, pξ∈{f,r} from the
food and reservation markets and pq from the biofuel firm, each profit-maximizing farmer’s problem is
as follows:
max
η
ϕ(η) =
∑
ξ∈{f,r}
(pξ − cξ) ηξgξ + (pq − ce + s) ηege (6.1)
s.t.
∑
ξ∈{f,e,r}
ηξ = 1, (6.2)
ηξ ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ {f, e, r}. (6.3)
In the objective function (6.1), the first term indicates the profit from food and reservation markets,
and the second term captures the profit from energy markets with a subsidy level s. Given the
82
homogenous characteristics of farmland, we note that the above problem is identical for all farmers
over Ω. However, the prices pξ∈{f,r} are determined by the collective decisions of all farmers. Given
that the entire farmland region Ω is sufficiently large (and that each farmer’s land is small), pξ can
be treated as an exogenous parameter for each farmer. Hence, the above problem results in a linear
programming with a unique solution of optimal farmland use configuration that is shared by all farmers.
We assume farmers obtain positive profit from each market to avoid trivial scenarios.
6.2.4 Biofuel Firm
The crops sold to the energy market, biomass feedstock, are first shipped to biorefineries and con-
verted to bioethanols. These ethanols are then blended with gasoline and subsequently distributed to
the retail outlets such as gas stations by the distributors. Although not all biorefineries are owned by
the distributers, they generally maintain close cooperative relationship throughout its supply chain.
Hence, we consider biorefinery and distributer as an integrated entity, referred to as the biofuel firm.
This allows us to avoid complicating issues such as double marginalization while to focus on the main
research question of farmland use trilemma and policy implications. The integration of biofuel industry
is also a growing trend in practice given the high upfront deployment cost of the biorefineries. Distrib-
utors such as BP and Exxon Mobil operate the entire biofuel conversion to blending to distribution
through its own facilities.
Biofuel firm, as an emerging player, faces the problem of market penetration where the incumbent
markets are already in place. One of the main factors in designing the biofuel firm’s distribution
network is the transportation cost. Due to the bulky nature of biomass feedstock, the transportation
cost accounts for about 18% to 28% throughout its supply chain, and thus is one of the critical
determinants in biofuel supply chain network configuration (National Academy of Sciences, 2009). We
consider the firm’s biorefinery density decision to capture this trade-off between the transportation
cost and the biorefinery deployment. In particular, the firm determines the refinery density decision ρ,
which in turn will give the approximated number and locations of refineries to deploy, balancing the
refinery building cost and the transportation cost. In addition to the density decision, the firm also
makes the pricing decision pq, the unit price of biomass feedstock offered to the farmers.
Given the uniformly distributed farmers with homogeneous farmlands, we also consider the firm
uniformly distributes the refineries over Ω. Hence, the firm’s density decision sufficiently captures the
facility cost and the transportation cost sithout considering specific facility locations. This modeling
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approach, referred to as the continuous approximation, is often used in analyzing large-scale logistics
network problems to avoid computational challenges (Daganzo, 2005). In a supply chain context,
Cachon (2014) and Lim et al. (2015b) employ this approach to approximate the firm’s retail store dis-
tribution decisions. Once the firm makes the refinery density decision, ρ, each refinery’s service region
is given by 1/ρ in Ω. We approximate this service region as a circle, as in the continuous approximation
literature (e.g., Newell (1973), Dasci and Laporte (2005)). Since the biofuel firm is a profit maximizer,
it procures biomass feedstock from closest farmers so as to minimize the transportation cost. Thus,
the resulting farmland allocation to the energy market forms a smaller circle of area ηe/ρ within each
refinery’s service region. The average transportation distance for the energy crop is then given by
κ
√
ηe/ρ, where κ =
2
3
√
pi
.4
The biofuel firm’s decisions on ρ and pq will influence the farmers’ decision on land use, η. As
such, the biofuel firm and the farmers follow a Stackelberg-Nash competition. We assume both the
biofuel firm and farmers are rational and have complete information. As introduced earlier, upon
converting the biomass feedstock to biofuel, the firm sells it to the energy market at pe ($/bushel).
The final stage of biofuel distribution is identical as the conventional gasoline distribution through the
existing infrastructure and thus we do not consider the transportation cost of this stage. We denote
the prorated annual opening and operating costs of each biorefinery by h, unit production cost by cv,
and unit transportation cost by ct. Then, given the mandate level M and unit fine cp in case the firm
cannot comply with the mandate, the biofuel firm maximizes its profit as follows:
max
pq,ρ,η
Φ =
(
ae − beηege − pq − ctκ
√
ηe/ρ− cv
)
geηeA− ρhA− cp[M − ηegeA]+ (6.4)
s.t. pξ = aξ − bξηξgξ, ∀ξ ∈ {f, r}, (6.5)
η solves (6.1)− (6.3). (6.6)
In the objective function (6.4), the first term represents the profit associated with biofuel sales. The
second term represents the refinery fixed cost, and the last term captures the penalty associated with
the mandate. The constraints (6.5) provide the food and reservation market prices. The constraints
(6.6) provide the equilibrium condition of the farmers’ land use decision, hence making the biofuel
4The average transportation distance is estimated based on the assumption that the firm procures energy crops from
its closest farmers. In reality, the refineries may not be able to do this when the characteristics of farmers may be
heterogeneous. In such case, farmers’ decision will be affected by other factors and the firm may need to “reach out”
to fill up the procurement to a wider region at a higher transportation cost. Hence, the current assumption leads us to
overestimation in the energy market flows. This can be accommodated by introducing an adjustment factor.
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firm’s problem a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC).
6.2.5 Performance Measures
To explore the impact of the growth of biofuel industry, our primary interest lies in the farmland
allocation (farmer’s decision), biofuel industry’s sustainability (firm’s profitability), and the policy
implications of mandate and subsidy. In addition, we evaluate the following 3BL measures to provide
comprehensive perspective in understanding the impact of emerging biofuel industry.
First, as an economic measure, we use the aggregate profit of farmers’ and biofuel firm’s:
WEco = Φ + ϕA.
This captures the aggregate financial performance of the ‘producers’ of the industry, the farmer and the
biofuel firm. However, we shall note that this need not be the sole measure for evaluating the industry’s
economic performance. It is intuitive to see that the farmers are one of the primary beneficiaries of
the new emerging industry, since the governmental subsidy and the competition among three markets
only help increase their profit.
Second, as mentioned earlier, direct and indirect land use change is one of the most critical con-
cerns over the development of biofuel industry. To this end, we consider the balanced farmland use
configuration to capture the environmental impact of the biofuel industry:
WEnv = λTη,
where λξ ≥ 0, for ξ ∈ {f, e, r} and
∑
ξ∈{f,e,r} λξ = 1. The two main sources of environmental
benefit come from the land allocation of energy and reservation. In particular, the amount of energy
crop production (which is proportional to the energy crop land allocation) directly reduces the GHG
emissions that otherwise come from the gasoline. Also, the amount of land reservation represents the
ecological benefits as it helps avoid soil erosion, protect wild-life animal habitat, and improve water
quality. Hence, a convex combination of farmland allocation captures the monetizations (dollar values)
of the benefits from emissions reductions and ecological benefits, respectively.
Lastly, we capture the social impacts by considering the sum of consumer surplus, CSξ∈{f,e,r},
from each market. We also consider the government’s subsidy expenditure on biofuel production
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which otherwise can be used for other social benefits. Hence, for the social measure, we have:
WSoc =
∑
ξ∈{f,e,r}
CSξ −GE =
∑
ξ∈{f,e,r}
1
2
bξη
2
ξg
2
ξ − sηegeA.
6.3 Policy Analysis and Implications
In this section, we obtain the farmland allocation equilibrium and its 3BL implications for exogeneously
given levels of subsidy and mandate.
6.3.1 Equilibrium Analysis
Recall that, we employ a Stackelberg-Nash competition framework, where the biofuel firm takes the
lead (in making the refinery density and energy crop pricing decisions) and the individual farmers
form a Nash competition in their land use decision (in lieu of food, energy, and reservation markets).
Tackling the problem backwards, we first obtain the land use equilibrium for the farmer’s problem.
Let the Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to (6.2) be ϕ¯. Then, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
optimality conditions for farmers are given by:
0 ≤ ϕ¯− (pξ − cξ) gξ ⊥ ηξ ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ {f, r},
0 ≤ ϕ¯− (pq − ce + s)ge ⊥ ηe ≥ 0,
or equivalently,
(ϕ¯− (pξ − cξ) gξ) · ηξ = 0, ∀ξ ∈ {f, r}, (6.7)
(ϕ¯− (pq − ce + s) ge) · ηe = 0, (6.8)
ϕ¯ = max {(pf − cf ) gf , (pq − ce + s)ge, (pr − cr) gr} . (6.9)
Here, (6.9) holds since at least one ηξ is positive. Note that ϕ¯ indicates the farmer’s profit in
equilibrium, i.e., ϕ∗ = ϕ¯. This implies that the farmer’s (per unit land) profit from each market with
a positive land use to be equal. Otherwise, the profit from markets with no land allocation (zero sales)
must be lower than ϕ¯.
Given the energy crop price pq, we note that the land use configuration in equilibrium, denoted
by η∗, can be determined by (6.5) and the above (6.7)–(6.9). Note that the farmland use allocation
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can be characterized into seven possible cases based on combination of whether the land allocation for
each type of market is positive or not. Please see Lemma 7 in the appendix for details. To facilitate
the analysis, we refine our scope to the case where land allocation for all three markets are positive
(i.e., ϕ∗ξ > 0). This is the most interesting and relevant case, as it reflects the current land use reality
in the U.S. Then, we have the following lemma for the farmer’s problem.
Lemma 3. Given the energy crop price pq, farmer’s optimal land allocation decision for a given
subsidy level s is:
η∗f (pq) =
af − cf
bfgf
− (pq − ce + s)ge
bfg2f
, η∗r (pq) =
ar − cr
brgr
− (pq − ce + s)ge
brg2r
, η∗e(pq) = 1− η∗f − η∗r .
Further, the corresponding farmer’s profit is ϕ∗(pq) = (pq − ce + s)ge.
We find that the biofuel firm’s pricing on energy crop directly affects the farmland use configuration
and the farmer’s profit. Specifically, as pq increases, the land use for food and reservation decrease at
the rate of ∆f :=
ge
bfg2f
and ∆r :=
ge
brg2r
, respectively. This in turn increases the the energy land use
at the rate of ∆e := ∆f + ∆r. As the energy crop price increases, the farmer’s profit also increases
correspondingly.
Building on the farmers’ equilibrium, we now address the biofuel firm’s problem. Given the
mandate level M , it may or may not be optimal for the biofuel firm to comply with the man-
date. We refer this mandate compliance strategy as compliance (C) and non-compliance (N), re-
spectively. For characterizing the biofuel firm’s decision, we define bq =
(∑
ξ∈{f,r}
g2e
bξg2ξ
)−1
and
aq = bqge
(
1−∑ξ∈{f,r} aξ−cξbξgξ )− ce for notational convenience, where bq and aq characterize the rela-
tionships between η∗e and pq. Specifically, as we show in the proof of Lemma 7, these are the “effective”
linear inverse demand curve for the biofuel firm’s energy crop pricing, where bq represents the biofuel
firm’s marginal price for collecting the energy crop and aq is the offset corresponding to the minimum
pq required for a positive energy crop land use. In a similar vein, we define cq :=
(
27
4 c
2
tκ
2hg−1e
)1/3
+ cv
to represent the “effective” processing cost for the biofuel firm once its density decision is optimized.
Then, we can characterize the biofuel firm’s optimal decisions on the mandate compliance as follows.
Lemma 4. The biofuel firm’s profit under mandate compliance strategy is:
ΦC :=
(
ae + aq + s− (be + bq)ηCe ge − cq
)
geη
C
e A, (6.10)
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where ηCe :=
[
ae+aq+s−cq
2(be+bq)ge
, MgeA
]+
and
ΦN :=
(
ae + aq + s− (be + bq)ηNe ge − cq
)
geη
N
e A− cp(M − ηNe geA), (6.11)
where ηNe :=
[
ae+aq+s−cq+cp
2(be+bq)ge
, MgeA
]−
.
The optimal compliance strategy is then chosen based on the larger profit value between (6.10) and
(6.11), i.e., Φ∗ = max{ΦC ,ΦN} with the corresponding energy farmland use of ηCe or ηNe . Further,
the biofuel firm’s optimal pricing and density decisions are given by p∗q = −aq + bqη∗ege − s and
ρ∗ = 1h
(
cqgeη
∗
e
3
)3/2
, where η∗e corresponds to the optimal energy farmland use.
We note that the land use allocation for energy market is determined by two layers of firm’s
decisions. First, the land use configuration is affected by the biofuel firm’s compliance strategy based
on the mandate and subsidy levels. We will discuss this more detail in the following subsection. Second,
within each compliance strategy, the firm’s operational level decisions, pricing and density, directly
affect the land use for energy. Specifically, an increase in p∗q or ρ
∗ leads to an increase in η∗e . Figure
6.1 (a) illustrates the firm’s compliance strategy with respect to mandate and subsidy.
Finally, we note that the government may also provide subsidies to the biofuel industry. In our
model, the subsidy to the biofuel firm (through energy crop sales transactions) yields the same outcome
as the subsidy to farmers. Hence, we focus on the farmer’s subsidy only. We shall note that most of the
current biofuel-related subsidy programs in the U.S. actually target farmers, and the loan guarantee
program available for the biorefineries is an one-time fixed subsidy that help lower the high upfront
facility investment.
6.3.2 Policy Implications
In the previous subsection, we have explored the farmland allocation problem in the perspectives of
farmers and the biofuel firm. We now explore the government’s perspective by exploring the implica-
tions of policy instruments. Refining the result of Lemma 1, we obtain the following proposition on
the biofuel production.
Proposition 13. Let M(s) :=
ae+aq+s−cq
2(be+bq)
A and M(s) := min
{
ae+aq+s−cq+cp
2(be+bq)
A,
ae+aq+s−cq
be+bq
A
}
. For
given levels of mandate M and subsidy s, there are four possible biofuel production outcomes:
(i) Over-production (ΓO): If (M, s) ∈ ΓO := {(M, s)|M < M(s)}, the firm produces the biofuel of
ae+aq+s−cq
2(be+bq)
A that is greater than the mandated level;
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(ii) Mandated-production (ΓM ): If (M, s) ∈ ΓM :=
{
(M, s)|M(s) ≤M ≤M(s)}, the firm complies
with the mandate and produces the exact mandated level of M ;
(iii) Under-production (ΓU ): If (M, s) ∈ ΓU :=
{
(M, s)|ae+aq+s−cq+cp2(be+bq) A < M ≤
(ae+aq+s−cq+cp)2
4(be+bq)cp
A
}
,
the firm does not fully comply with the mandate and produces the biofuel of
ae+aq+s−cq+cp
2(be+bq)
A that is
less than the mandated level. The corresponding fine amount is cp
(
M − ae+aq+s−cq+cp2(be+bq) A
)
.
(iv) Infeasibility (ΓI): If (M, s) ∈ ΓI := (ΓO ∪ ΓM ∪ ΓU )C , the firm cannot make positive profit
and thus does not produce any biofuels.
The four regions in biofuel production levels are intuitive. If the mandate is low and subsidy is
high, the firm finds it beneficial to produce more than the required mandate level (ΓO). In contrast,
if the mandate level is high, the firm may lie in either ΓU or ΓI . Specifically, if the subsidy level
is low while the mandate is sufficiently high, then the firm cannot yield a positive profit and falls
into the infeasibility region (ΓI); however, if the subsidy level is high enough, then the firm can stay
profitable although it does not fully comply with the mandate (ΓU ). Finally, if the mandate and
subsidy levels are moderately given, the firm chooses to comply with the mandate and produces the
exact required amount of biofuels (ΓM ). We note that regions ΓO and ΓM imply the biofuel firm’s
compliance strategy, whereas regions ΓU and ΓI imply the firm’s non-compliances strategy.
We refer the region ΓM as the binding window. In particular, for a given s, we refer the interval M ∈[
M(s),M(s)
]
as the mandate binding window, the levels of mandate that enable the firm to produce
the exact mandated amount of biofuels for a given subsidy level. Similarly, we have the counterpart
notion of the subsidy binding window, the levels of subsidy that enable the firm to meet the mandated
production level for a given M , in s ∈ [s(M), s(M)] where s(·) := M−1(·) and s(·) := M−1(·). Note,
M(s) and M(s) are monotonically increasing and invertible. Hence, the binding window implies the
effectiveness of mandate and subsidy with respect to the firm’s compliance strategy and the resulting
biofuel production. Figure 6.1 (b) is a refinement of the (a) depicting the four biofuel production
outcomes. The gray region in the center is the binding window ΓM . The vertical height represents the
mandate binding window for a given s,
[
M(s),M(s)
]
, and its horizontal width represents the subsidy
binding window for a given M , [s(M), s(M)]. The resulting biofuel production value is given in the
contour lines.
One important observation from Figure 6.1 (b) is that the mandate affects the biofuel production
only within the binding window; i.e., the biofuel production increases with M in ΓM , but stays constant
in ΓU and ΓO. In contrast, the subsidy affects the biofuel production only outside the binding window;
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Figure 6.1: Illustrations of compliance strategy and corresponding biofuel production. Parameters are
set as af = ar = gξ = bξ = h = A = 1, ae = 1.6, ct = 0.7, cp = 0.5, and the rest are set to zero.
Table 6.1: Summary comparative statistics.
Parameter Region WEco (ϕ∗,Φ∗) WEnv (η∗f , η
∗
e , η
∗
r ) W
Soc (CSf , CSe, CSr,−GE)
Increase in M :
ΓM y (↑, ↓) l† (↓, ↑, ↓) x (↓, ↑, ↓, 0)
ΓU and ΓO 0 and ↓ (0, 0 and ↓) 0 (0, 0, 0) 0 (0, 0, 0, 0)
Increase in s:
ΓM ↑ (0, ↑) 0 (0, 0, 0) ↓ (0, 0, 0, ↓)
ΓU and ΓO ↑ (↑, ↑) l† (↓, ↑, ↓) ↓ (↓, ↑, ↓, ↓)
†: ↑ holds if and only if λe∆e > λf∆f + λr∆f holds, where ∆ξ represents the land use change rates in pq for each
market as introduced in §3.1.
i.e., the biofuel production increases with s in ΓU and ΓO, but stays constant in ΓM . This means
that mandate and subsidy have different roles in steering the firm’s behavior in different regions, and
highlights their complementary roles in shaping the biofuel industry. Therefore, it is crucial that the
government chooses the appropriate levels of the two policy instruments under coordination to guide
the industry in a sustainable manner. We will discuss the optimal choices of instrument levels and
explore the impact of coordination in §6.4.
In the following proposition, we explore the implications of mandate and subsidy to the 3BL
measures. We omit the ΓI region and focus on the remaining three regions of interest.
Proposition 14. The implications of mandate M and subsidy s to 3BL measures (and their break-
downs in parenthesis) are summarized in Table 6.1.
In the table, the arrows ↑ and ↓ indicate the measure monotonically increases and decreases,
respectively; bidirectional arrow l indicates the measure can either monotonically increase or decrease
depending on exogenous parameters; curved arrows y and xindicate the trend of the measure
monotonically changes from increasing to decreasing and from decreasing to increasing, respectively;
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and 0 indicates the measure remains constant.
We find that, within the binding window, WEco increases with M for the first part of the binding
window and then decreases thereafter. The critical point is given by MˆEco =
ae+aq−cq+s+bqge
2(be+bq)
A as
derived in the proof of the proposition. This is because, although increase in mandate always benefits
the farmers, an overreaching mandate level destructs the biofuel firm’s profitability and eventually
harms the economic performance of the industry. Interestingly, we find that WSoc follows an opposite
trend, with the critical point given by MˆSoc =
bqge+s
be+bq
A. Whereas the mandate harms the consumer
surpluses of the food and reservation markets for small M , the consumer surplus gain in the energy
market outgrows the losses from the other two for sufficiently large M . Lastly, the impact of mandate
on WEnv highly depends on the land use value of each purpose, λ, and the land use change rates in
each market, ∆ξ∈f,e,r. This implies that the choice of M must consider the trade-off between WEco
and WSoc, while incorporating WEnv within the binding window ΓM . In what follows, we make an
interesting note regarding the impact of mandates on the 3BL measures.
Corollary 1. There exists a subregion within the mandate binding window such that 3BL measures
all increase or decrease in M . Specifically:
if λe∆e > λf∆f +λr∆r and Mˆ
Soc < min
{
MˆEco,M(s)
}
hold, then dW
Eco
dM ,
dWEnv
dM ,
dWSoc
dM > 0 hold
in all (M, s) ∈ ΓM ;
if λe∆e < λf∆f +λr∆r and Mˆ
Eco < min
{
MˆSoc,M(s)
}
hold, then dW
Eco
dM ,
dWEnv
dM ,
dWSoc
dM < 0 hold
in all (M, s) ∈ ΓM .
Corollary 1 implies that, within the binding window, it is possible that an increase in mandate
leads to a increase in all 3BL measures resulting in a win-win-win scenario. In contrast, it is also
possible that an increase in mandate leads to a decrease in all 3BL measures resulting in a lose-lose-
lose scenario. This highlights the importance of government’s choices in the instrument levels as their
3BL consequences may lead to very different outcomes based on the market parameters.
Whereas the impact of mandate is pronounced within the binding window, its impact becomes
insubstantial outside the binding window. That is, the increase in M does not affect any measures
except reducing the biofuel firm’s profit as a result of a non-compliance fine under the under-production
scenario.
We now focus on the impact of subsidy. Contrary to the mandate, the subsidy plays a more critical
role outside the binding window. Within the binding window, the increase in s only makes the biofuel
firm more profitable without affecting the farmers. However, outside the binding window, the subsidy
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always benefits both the farmers and the firm, leading to an increase in WEco. In contrast, an increase
in subsidy results in a high government expenditure and leads to a decrease in WSoc. Hence, in essence,
the subsidy results in a direct trade-off between the biofuel industry’s economic performance and the
social benefits. On the environmental performance WEnv, the impact of subsidy depends on λ, which
is similar to the mandate case.
6.4 Policy Instrument Coordination
In section 6.3, we observed that the two policy instruments play complementary roles and thus high-
lights the need for coordination in choosing the proper mandate and subsidy levels. In light of this,
in this section, we endogenize the policy instrument decisions by explicitly modeling the government’s
problem. In particular, we consider the respective mandate and subsidy problems of Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and Farm Service Agency (FSA) in Stage 0 before the decisions of biofuel
firm and farmers. We first solve the individual problems without coordination. Then, we extend this to
a coordinated problem to examine the inefficiencies that may arise due to lack of coordination between
the two agencies.
6.4.1 Impact of Policy Coordination
We first construct the mandate problem faced by the EPA. Based on the Clean Air Act, the EPA
sets the annual mandate level based on the industry’s projected feasibility, with the goal of stipulating
the growth of biofuel industry (Energy Independence and Security Act). In this spirit, we assume the
EPA seeks to maximize the utility that is increasing in both the biofuel firm’s profitability Φ∗ and
the biofuel production (i.e., mandate level M within the binding window). For analytical tractability,
we employ a simple linear combination of αM + Φ∗, where α > 0 is the weight on mandate that
can interpreted as the value of energy security in relation to the biofuel firm’s profit. In addition, we
assume the EPA chooses the mandate level within the binding window such that the firm chooses to
comply with the required level. Ensuring the firm to meet the mandate is in line with the primary
objective of the government; after all, the fundamental motive behind the legislation is to grow the
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industry in a sustainable manner. Hence, we have the following EPA’s utility maximizing problem:
max
M>0
U1 = αM + Φ
∗
s.t. M(s) ≤M ≤M(s).
We assume α < cp to avoid the unrealistic case in which the fine level cp is not sufficiently high for the
firm to comply with the mandate.
Next, we construct the subsidy problem faced by the FSA. Given the FSA’s mission statement,
“serving all farmers, ranchers, and agricultural partners through the delivery of effective, efficient
agricultural programs” (Farm Service Agency, 2015), we identify the key objective of the agency as
improving farmers’ welfare by appropriately executing the subsidy programs. Hence, we assume the
FSA seeks to maximize the utility which increases with farmers’ aggregate profits and decreases with
its subsidy expenditure. Similar to the EPA’s problem, we choose a simple linear relationship to
capture this trade-off along with the binding window constraint. Hence, we have the following FSA’s
utility maximizing problem:
max
s
U2 = ϕ
∗A− sη∗egeA
s.t. s(M) ≤ s ≤ s(M).
In the following lemma, we obtain each agency’s optimal decision given the decision of the other,
M∗(s) and s∗(M), and characterize the resulting equilibrium.
Lemma 5. (i) (Best Response) For a given subsidy level s, the EPA’s optimal mandate level is
M∗(s) = min
{
M(s),
ae+aq+s−cq+α
2(be+bq)
A
}
. In addition, for a given mandate level M > 0, the FSA’s
optimal subsidy level is s∗(M) = s(M).
(ii) (Equilibrium) The biofuel firm has zero profit at the Nash equilibria, denoted by (MNE , sNE),
which are given as follows:
MNE ∈
(
0,
α
be + bq
A
]
and sNE = s(MNE).
Lemma 3(i) characterizes the individual decisions of mandate and subsidy under no coordination.
First, the EPA seeks to maximize its utility by setting the mandate at
ae+aq+s−cq+α
2(be+bq)
A, the value that
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strikes the balance between the energy security associated with biofuel production and the profit to
biofuel firm. If this value lies outside the binding window (i.e., ΓI), then the EPA reduces its mandate
to M(s) to preserve the feasibility. Second, the FSA sets the subsidy level to s∗(M) = s(M) to ensure
the firm to comply with the mandate. In fact, this is the minimum subsidy amount for a given M
that warrants the compliance. Any additional subsidy within the binding window will not contribute
to increase the FSA’s utility, since it becomes a sheer cost (expenditure) that does not improve the
farmers’ profit.
Given the best response functions of EPA and FSA, Lemma 3(ii) characterizes the resulting Nash
equilibrium. We note that the equilibrium is not unique and forms a line segment in the binding
window (on the boundary between ΓM and ΓI), where the biofuel firm’s profit is reduced to 0. This
is due to the FSA’s interest in minimizing its subsidy expenditure; subsidizing just enough for the
industry to meet the mandate while not leaving any surplus beyond the minimum.
Now, as a benchmark, we consider the case in which the EPA and FSA closely coordinate in making
the policy instrument decision. To this end, we consider the following coordinated problem, a joint
mandate-subsidy decision made by a single entity to maximize the sum of the two utilities:
max
M>0,s
U = Φ + ϕA+ αM − η∗egesA
s.t. (M, s) ∈ ΓM .
To facilitate the analysis, we define Ψ := ae +aq + bqge− cq. The value Ψ represents the maximum
possible economic return to the biofuel industry (i.e., sum of profits of biofuel firm and farmers) for
growing a unit energy crop without receiving any subsidy. This value is useful as it can be interpreted
as a proxy for the capacity of biofuel industry at different stages of its development; that is, a low Ψ
represents the capacity in an early stage of the industry (in which the economic return is low), and an
increase in Ψ demonstrates a higher return. Using this measure, we characterize the solution to the
coordinated problem in the following proposition.
Lemma 6. Under the policy instrument coordination, the optimal mandate and subsidy equilibrium is
given as follows:
if Ψ ≤ −α holds, U is decreasing in M and yields MCoor → 0 and sCoor → s(0);
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otherwise, if Ψ > −α holds, the optimal MCoor and sCoor exist and are given by
MCoor =
Ψ + α
2(be + bq)
A and sCoor ∈ [s(MCoor) ≤ s ≤ s(MCoor)] .
First, Ψ ≤ −α represents the low biofuel industry capacity in which its economic return is suffi-
ciently low even taking into account the energy security aspect given by α. Hence, the optimal coordi-
nated mandate level approaches 0. This implies that the industry may not by worthy of an investment if
the parameters are not expected to improve in the future. When the industry capacity is large enough,
Ψ > −α, then the optimal levels of mandate and subsidy are obtained by MCoor and sCoor, respec-
tively. In the equilibrium, the region for the optimal subsidy sCoor ∈ [s(MCoor) ≤ s ≤ s(MCoor)]
reflects the utility indifference that the subsidy can be arbitrarily distributed between the two agencies
without affecting the coordinated utility. Specifically, s(MCoor) represents the case in which the FSA’s
subsidy is minimized, whereas s(MCoor) represents the case in which the maximum amount of subsidy
is transferred to the EPA. Without loss of generality, we refine the equilibrium to sCoor = s(MCoor),
which is more realistic. We now compare the equilibriums under the uncoordinated and coordinated
cases in the following proposition.
Proposition 15. (i) If Ψ ≤ −α holds, the lack of coordination leads to over-production of biofuels,
i.e., MCoor ≤MNE and sCoor ≤ sNE.
(ii) If −α < Ψ < α holds, the lack of coordination can lead to both under-production and over-
production depending on the value of (MNE , sNE).
(iii) If Ψ ≥ α holds, the lack of coordination leads to under-production of biofuels, i.e., MCoor ≥
MNE and sCoor ≥ sNE.
The above proposition offers insights on the impact of lack of coordination in the policy instruments.
First, in case (i), we find that the lack of coordination results in mandate and subsidy that are greater
than the optimal levels. That is, despite the low industry capacity, the agencies may feed the industry
with lofty subsidy and mandate due to lack of coordination. In contrast, the opposite is observed in
case (iii). When the industry capacity is sufficiently high, the lack of coordination results in mandate
and subsidy levels that are less than the optimal levels. That is, although the industry is in an advanced
stage, the agencies aim for less biofuel production. Lastly, in case (ii), the lack of coordination may
lead to an arbitrary equilibrium state despite the fact that unique optimal coordinated levels exist.
Hence, the industry can be led to either over-production or under-production than its ideal level. This
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(a) Lack of coordination leads to over-
production
(b) Lack of coordination impedes con-
vergence to optimal policy levels
(c) Lack of coordination leads to
under-production
Figure 6.2: Illustration of different stages of biofuel industry development (α = 0.35). The solid line
represents the uncoordinated equilibrium and the circle represents the coordinated equilibrium.
highlights the importance of coordination in policy instruments. An illustration of the three cases
above are depicted in Figure 6.2 below.
In what follows, we further investigate the impact of coordination in policy instruments in conjunc-
tion with the biofuel industry development.
6.4.2 Policy Coordination under Industry Development
In early 2014, EPA released the adjusted biofuel production mandates for the years 2014 to 2016 (EPA,
2014b). The proposed levels were significantly reduced from the statutory standards in the Energy
Independence and Security Act (2007); EPA eased the original 18.15 billion gallon biofuel requirement
for 2014 to 15.21 billion gallons. The EPA’s rationale was that the current infrastructure capacity is
not sufficient to support the original requirement and thus the mandate must be adjusted accordingly.
The news received mixed responses. On the one hand, the proponents to biofuel industry criticized
that EPA’s decision on mandate reduction was over-cautious and noncommittal, asserting that this
“goes against Congressional intent.” On the other hand, others such as oil companies praised the
EPA’s effort for bringing down the target to a realistic level and avoiding unnecessary conflicts.
While determining the levels of policy instruments, the government bases its decision on the pro-
jection of the industry development which can be often overestimated. Although the intent of setting
an ambitious target is natural and understandable, we find that this can be detrimental to the industry
especially when the two agencies do not coordinate during the decision making process. In light of this,
we explore the impact of policy coordination with respect to varying stages of industry development.
We capture the degree of biofuel industry development with the three relevant parameters; that is,
increase of ge represents the increase in yield rate of biomass energy crop, decrease of ce represents the
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(a) Trajectory of (MCoor, sCoor) and the correspond-
ing binding window (right to left represents the indus-
try development)
(b) Impact of lack of coordination under overestima-
tion in industry development
Figure 6.3: Illustration of biofuel industry development.
decrease in the growing cost of biomass, and decrease of h represents the decrease in the biorefinery
deployment cost.
Proposition 16. (i) Ψ increases in ge and decreases in both ce and h.
(ii) MCoor increases in ge and decreases in both ce and h; however, s
Coor decreases in ge and
increases in both ce and h.
The first part of Proposition 16 confirms that Ψ serves as a good proxy for capturing the biofuel
industry development. Hence, as the second part shows, with the development of biofuel industry,
the optimal mandate increases while the optimal subsidy level decreases. The coordinated instrument
trajectory is illustrated in 6.3 (a). We observe that, as the industry develops, the binding window
shifts toward left upward direction resulting in an increased M with a decreased s. This means that,
if the policy instruments are coordinated, then the biofuel industry can sustain a greater mandate
production with less subsidy support as the industry develops.
When the two agencies are not closely coordinating their efforts, we find that the impact of overes-
timation in industry development can be aggravated. When industry’s development is underwhelming
than its projection, the mandate needs to be adjusted downwards while the subsidy needs to be ad-
justed upwards. Specifically, the increasing rate of mandate must be eased while the rapid cut down
in subsidy must be delayed. However, in reality, due to the natural difference in the cycle time of the
policy implementation, the industry may result in an under-production.
This phenomenon is illustrated via an example presented in Figure 6.3(b). The termination period
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of current subsidy programs are scheduled (thus, the downward trend of subsidy expenditure is ex-
pected) but delaying the subsidy reduction may not be implemented within a short period of time since
its renewal decisions typically need to go through thorough debate and investigation. The downward
adjustment of annual mandate is also not an easy decision as its implication draws considerable polit-
ical tension across multiple stake-holders. Therefore, when the FSA’s subsidy programs are promptly
cut based on the overestimated projection, the burden of meeting the industry feasibility (i.e., bind-
ing window) falls to the EPA’s mandate adjustment following the realization of the underwhelming
industry development. Under such circumstance, we find that the final adjusted mandate tends to be
even lower than the optimal coordinated mandate level. Whereas the original target mandate may be
obtained based on the estimation (star point), the policy adjustment following the realization of actual
industry development, the biofuel production may result in a much lower level (circle point) than the
coordinated equilibrium (square point) without the policy coordination.
6.5 Numerical Study
In this section, we implement the proposed model to the U.S. Midwest, where biomass feedstock
production is most active. We first introduce the data set in §6.5.1 and draw insights from model
results in §6.5.2.
6.5.1 Case Description and Data
We consider the 12 states in the U.S. Midwest, as shown in Figure 6.4(a), and focus on a time horizon
from 2008 when the RFS2 biofuel mandate became effective (Energy Independence and Security Act,
2007). Since most of the corn production in the U.S. comes from the Midwest, we consider corn as
the representative food crop. As for the energy crop, we consider a mix of conventional (e.g., corn-
based) and advanced-generation (e.g., cellulosic) feedstocks, whose mix ratio is estimated based on
the ratio of the mandated advanced biofuel to the total renewable fuel mandate in each year. We
assume the yields and growing costs of food-grade and the industrial-grade (i.e., energy-purpose) corns
are identical, and estimate the annual corn yields at the county level (USDA National Agricultural
Statistics Service, 2015), as demonstrated in Figure 6.4(b). For the advanced-generation feedstock,
we take cellulosic biomass as a representative feedstock as it contributes to the majority of the future
biofuel production increase. In particular, the annual yields are estimated based on switchgrass (Jain
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Figure 6.4: Case study illustration.
et al., 2010), which is a leading biomass crop in the U.S. The annual energy crop yield then is estimated
based on the combination of the corn yield and the switchgrass yield. The total farmland area for each
county is obtained as the sum of those used for corn production and reserved for land conservation
(USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2015; USDA Farm Service Agency, 2015). The growing
costs (e.g., labor, fertilizer) for corn and switchgrass are estimated based on the respective production
operating cost (USDA Economic Research Service, 2015b; Duffy, 2007). For estimating the crop yields
from year 2015, we consider an annual 1.21% increase (USDA Economic Research Service, 2015a).
To reflect the varying degree of farmland quality, we assume the crop yield at each county follows a
normal distribution with a mean of its county-level yield and a standard deviation estimated based on
its state-level data.
For the biofuel firm, running each refinery incurs an annual fixed cost of $18 million, estimated
based an ethanol plant with 100 million gallon annual processing capacity for a 10-year service life
(Ellinger, 2008). The bioethanol processing cost is $0.88 per gallon with a conversion rate of 2.84
gallon per bushel for corn (Wallace et al., 2005) and 96.7 gallon per dry ton biomass for switchgrass
(US Department of Energy, 2015). The unit transportation cost is set to $0.0035 per bushel per mile
(Mcvey et al., 2007).
We estimate the coefficients of the inverse demand functions of three markets based on their respec-
tive demand elasticity of price, which are given by −0.298 for corn (Anderson and Coble, 2010) and
−3.0 for both bioethanol and land conservation (Luchansky and Monks, 2009). As for the parameters
associated with 3BL measures, we first estimate λe as follows. We obtain λe = $17.93 per acre for
corn-based ethanol with 0.5kg per liter GHG credit and a $10 per ton GHG trading price (Kumarap-
pan and Joshi, 2011); similarly, we obtain $52.84 per acre for switchgrass-based ethanol with 1.7kg per
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Figure 6.5: Biofuel mandate by RFS2 and EPA’s adjustment.
liter GHG credit5. Hence, we have λe ∈ [17.93, 52, 84] depending on the biomass feedstock mix ratio.
Further, we set λr = $30.31 per acre based on the benefits of CRP (USDA Farm Service Agency, 2008)
and λf = $0 per acre since the ecological benefit resulting from food cultivation is close to zero.
The original biofuel mandate set by RFS2 (Energy Independence and Security Act, 2007) and a
recent mandate adjustment by EPA for 2014 to 2016 (EPA, 2015a) are shown in Figure 6.5. Based on
historical biofuel production in the Midwest compared to the entire production of the U.S. (Nebraska
Government, 2015), we consider 90% of mandate in this case study. We adopt the actual biofuel
subsidy in the U.S. (in the form of tax credits), which is $0.51 per gallon from 2008 to 2009, $0.45
per gallon from 2010 to 2012, and zero since 2013 for the the conventional corn-based biofuel, and
a constant subsidy level of $1.01 per gallon for the advanced-generation biofuel since 2008 (Grafton
et al., 2014). The unit penalty fine for mandate non-compliance is set to cp = $3.0 (EPA, 2015b).
6.5.2 Implementation and Analysis
Whereas our model is constructed on homogeneous farmland, we note that our data set is piece-
wise constant by county. Nevertheless, our model can be extended straightforwardly to accommodate
heterogeneous input parameters; the farmer’s land use problem is now solved at the county level using
local parameters of crop yield, growing cost, and the specific energy crop price. The extended model
incorporating heterogeneous inputs is provided in Appendix A.1.2.
Impact of mandate and subsidy on biofuel industry, farmland allocation, and 3BL measures from
years 2008 to 2016 based on our model are summarized in Table 6.2. The respective land use configu-
5Note that other factors, e.g., the water consumption for growing energy crop, can also be used to estimate λe.
Considering the scope our model, which focuses on the scarce farmland resources (rather than the water resources), we
simply choose the GHG emission reduction as the representative in estimating λe.
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Figure 6.6: The U.S. Midwest farmland use configuration.
ration for each county in 2008 and 2016 (based on EPA’s adjusted mandate) are shown in Figure 6.6.
We note that our model estimates the actual land use configuration reasonably well; for example, as
for the land uses in 2008, we find that the sum of land for food and energy, and the land for reservation
obtained by our model (in Figures 6.6(a)) respectively match their real-world counterparts fairly well
(in Figures 6.4(b) and (c)).
Comparing the land use configurations from 2008 to 2016 in Figures 6.6, we observe a clear trend in
land use decrease for food and reservation, due to the rapid increase of the biofuel mandate. Specifically,
as presented in Table 6.2, the farmland for food production decreased from 64.8% to 55.0% and land
conservation decreased from 7.5% to 2.9%. This confirms that the biofuel industry development indeed
contributes to the food price increase and reduction in the land conservation. Although, the rapid
development of biofuel industry is not necessarily detrimental to the environment (WEnv), we find
that the economic and social measures generally decrease as the mandate level increases. Specifically,
the high mandate level pushes down the biofuel firm’s profit substantially (hence, decreases WEco)
while significantly driving up the government subsidy expenditure (hence, decreases WSoc).
Further insights can be obtained from Table 6.2. First, we confirm that the original RFS2 biofuel
mandate was indeed ambitious. Under the RFS2, the total biofuel production was scheduled to pass
the 20 billion gallons mark in 2016 with 33% to be advanced biofuels. While the intent of setting
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Table 6.2: Impact of mandate and subsidy on biofuel industry, farmland configuration, and 3BL
measures.
Year
M s Adv. Act. Φ∗ ϕ∗S Land use configuration 3BL measures (bil $)
(bil gal) ($/gal) biofuel prod. (bil $) (bil $) ηf ηe ηr W
Eco WEnv WSoc
2008 8.10 0.51 0% 8.60 9.44 10.68 64.8% 27.8% 7.5% 20.13 0.62 80.34
2009 9.99 0.54 5% 10.00 5.87 8.61 61.9% 27.9% 10.2% 14.48 0.74 61.90
2010 11.66 0.49 7% 11.66 7.95 8.45 53.5% 33.9% 12.6% 16.39 1.00 51.75
2011 12.56 0.50 10% 12.56 15.52 10.58 54.5% 39.4% 6.2% 26.10 1.06 88.78
2012 13.68 0.52 13% 12.76 2.14 16.08 44.7% 50.9% 4.4% 18.22 1.52 73.72
2013 14.90 0.17 17% 11.46 -5.02 22.10 60.2% 37.2% 2.6% 17.08 1.14 102.13
2014 16.34 0.21 21% 14.12 -1.61 23.51 55.6% 41.6% 2.9% 21.90 1.37 58.57
2015 18.45 0.27 27% 14.43 -5.77 23.33 55.1% 42.0% 2.9% 17.56 1.53 58.14
2016 20.03 0.33 33% 14.75 -8.28 23.23 54.6% 42.5% 2.9% 14.96 1.67 57.62
2014∗ 14.34 0.17 17% 14.09 3.76 23.00 55.8% 41.4% 2.9% 26.76 0.90 59.48
2015∗ 14.67 0.18 18% 14.43 4.14 22.68 55.3% 41.8% 2.9% 26.82 1.09 59.87
2016∗ 15.66 0.20 20% 14.72 2.72 22.05 55.0% 42.2% 2.9% 24.76 1.27 60.32
2014C 14.81 0.75 17% 14.80 10.68 28.49 54.0% 43.2% 2.9% 39.17 0.93 47.29
2015C 15.07 0.77 18% 15.06 11.55 27.61 53.7% 43.4% 2.9% 39.15 1.13 47.78
2016C 15.31 0.80 20% 15.30 12.77 26.61 53.5% 43.6% 2.9% 39.38 1.31 48.09
∗ these values are based on EPA’s adjusted mandate;
C these values are based on the optimal mandate and subsidy under coordination.
high mandate levels is to stimulate the growth of the biofuel industry, we find that such aggressive
target can become a disservice to the industry as we observe Φ∗ drops dramatically in around 2013. In
addition, we observe that the discrepancy between the mandate level and the actual biofuel production
amount opens up widely from around 2013; in 2016, only 74% of the mandate was expected to be met
under the original plan. Hence, the EPA’s decisions in lowering both the total and the advanced-
generation biofuel production requirements for the years 2014 to 2016 (denoted by superscript ∗) are
well justified. We note that, while this adjustment has helped the biofuel firm to stay profitable, the
profits are still trending down and further adjustments may be needed unless the industry parameters
(e.g., production efficiency) improve significantly in the near future.
While the high mandate due to overestimating the industry’s development certainly hurts the
industry, we also point out that lack of coordination in policy decisions may also have contributed to the
industry’s recent setback. In particular, the biofuel firm’s profit turned negative in 2013, precisely the
year the conventional biofuel subsidy was expired. This suggests that the subsidy to the conventional
biofuels was probably terminated too soon, given that the production scale/technology of advanced-
generation was far behind schedule. With considerably reduced subsidy level (from $0.52/gallon in
2012 to $0.17 in 2013), the EPA was forced to lower the mandate from 2014 to warrant the biofuel
firm’s profitability, which in turn slows down the rate of the industry’s development. The series of
these events and their interactions highlight the need for policy coordination.
In light of this, we investigate the mandate and subsidy under coordination. The coordinated
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mandate and subsidy values from 2014 to 2016 are presented in Table 6.2 (denoted by superscript
C). We use α = 0.1 based on the estimate from the first six years of mandates (from 2008 to 2013).
We find that, through coordination, a greater biofuel production can be achieved than the both the
original or the current adjusted mandate levels. While the coordinated mandate levels are lower than
the original RFS, they enable the industry to comply with the mandate resulting in greater levels of
actual production. We note that this is achieved through providing higher subsidy. This demonstrates
that, rather than reducing the mandate level, the government could have increased the subsidy (e.g.,
should have renewed the previous subsidy programs) and supported the growth of the industry to
be closer to the original trajectory. Clearly, the lack of coordination in policy making entailed the
industry to settle at an underachieving state, which in turn hinders its future development. We find
that the 3BL measures under the coordinated policy also result in a strong industry profitability while
delivering reasonable environmental and social benefits.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Research
Directions
7.1 Conclusions
Logistics systems generally involve multiple interacting stakeholders who endogenously make decisions
based on their individual, sometimes conflicting, objectives. Meanwhile, many of such systems may be
disrupted from time to time under extreme threats (e.g., natural or human-induced disasters). These
endogenous and exogenous factors often adversely impact system performance and result in significant
societal disutility. This dissertation research focuses on developing mathematical models for design
and analysis of large-scale logistics systems, especially those under competition and uncertainties.
First of all, we propose game-theoretical models in the continuous approximation scheme to seek
optimal facility location design under spatial competition and probabilistic facility disruption risks.
We analyze the competition of two symmetric companies and show how the competition may evolve
into three types of Nash equilibria. Building upon this result, we consider a leader-follower case where
one company has the first-mover advantage as the leader, and we derive the optimal strategy for the
leader to maximize its profit in anticipation of the follower’s response. For both types of competitions,
our model can effectively solve the optimal continuous facility densities, and sometimes it even yields
a closed-form solution for some special case (e.g., when the transportation cost is independent of
distance). The impacts of competition and facility disruption are studied through a series of numerical
experiments. The continuous facility density functions from our models are further converted into
discrete facility locations for validation. We also apply our approach to design biorefinery locations for
an Illinois biofuel company, where the expected profits calculated based on implementable discretized
facility locations are very close to the profits predicted in the CA results.
The model solution shows many interesting properties. In the symmetric two-company competition,
we show that there may not exist a Nash equilibrium. With the first-mover advantage in the Stackelberg
game, the leader company often should establish monopoly in the areas where the fixed facility costs are
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smaller than or approximately equal to those of the follower company. Sometimes the leader company
should sacrifice some profits by building extra facilities to deter the entry of the follower company.
The leader, however, should yield some of its market share to the follower if the follower facilities have
much smaller fixed costs and/or failure probabilities. The optimal decisions are also found to be very
sensitive to facility failure probabilities and transportation cost.
Then, through the biofuel industry context, we propose a systematic modeling framework for
designing an emerging industry infrastructure system, taking into account game-theoretic features
between the existing and emerging markets under supply uncertainty and facility disruption risks.
The simpler case without uncertainties is first introduced as a building block, followed by a more
generalized case with uncertainties. The CA based solution approach is developed to obtain the
resource allocation equilibrium. The equilibrium in turn determines the optimal facility density and
resource procurement price for the emerging industry. A series of hypothetical and realistic problem
instances are used to show the performance of the proposed solution algorithm, sensitivity of the
solution to system parameters, as well as real-life implications for the biofuel industry in the U.S.
Midwest.
This analysis has revealed several interesting managerial insights. First, without uncertainties, it
is shown that each supplier should use the resources exclusively for one type of outlets (either all for
competitor markets or all for new markets), and the emerging industry should focus on investing in a
relatively concentrated market region which are of high “revenue potential”. However, when uncertain-
ties are prominent, we find that the expected profit for the emerging industry always decreases, and
less resource will be used for new markets. This reflects that the emerging market is relatively more
vulnerable than the incumbent markets. To cope with the resource supply uncertainties, we find that
the emerging industry should build fewer facilities and consider moving to the areas with relatively
lower resource supply. To counteract possible facility disruptions, the emerging industry should build
more facilities to serve as back-ups.
Furthermore, we propose a continuum approximation framework for solving the dynamic facility
location problem. We first extend the static continuous facility location problem by augmenting
the time dimension. While the conversion yields a solution without maintaining consistent facility
locations over time, it provides an analytically tractable solution. We then develop a tube model,
an extension of the disk model, to convert the CA solution into discrete facility locations. Facility
location consistency is enforced through an iterative tube regulation procedure, i.e., via a penalty
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method, where the converged solution yields an approximate solution to the DFLP. Through a series
of numerical examples, we show the impact of spatial and temporal heterogeneity and also compare
the performance of the CA model with that of the discrete counterpart. We also apply the approach
to an empirical case study for the State of Illinois to explore its applicability in a more realistic setting.
We point out that the proposed model can be applied when a set of facilities may have already
been built at the beginning of the planning horizon. For such cases, we can simply fix the values
of such location variables. During the tube regulation procedure, we do not update the centers of
the corresponding tubes. This extension provides great practical value in deploying facilities. For
example, in case of high degree of system uncertainty and/or long planning horizon, our model can
be implemented in a rolling-horizon. We can redefine (modify) the DFLP in each prediction cycle to
apply the proposed algorithm and implement the solution in the nearest future. The set of facilities
opened up to that point then becomes the fixed initial condition for the new problem, and this can be
handled using the procedure discussed above.
Finally, we develop an analytical model that characterizes the impact of biofuel mandate and
subsidy on farmland configuration, taking into account interactions among multiple stake-holders. We
obtain several noteworthy findings. We show that the two policy instruments collectively play a critical
role in shaping the biofuel industry: subsidy incentivizes the firm’s mandate compliance toward the
binding window, whereas mandate regulates the biofuel production within the binding window; hence,
intuitively, the subsidy serves as a carrot while the mandate acts as a stick for steering the decisions
in biofuel industry. We further explore the impact of lack of coordination in mandate and subsidy and
show potential mechanisms that may lead to ineffective arrangement in the policy instrument setting.
Finally, using data from the U.S. Midwest, we obtained further insights on policy instruments and
explored the 3BL implications of the biofuel industry.
7.2 Future Directions
Further research can be conducted in the following directions.
First, the modeling of facility failure probability should be extended to capture more realistic
scenarios. Across our approaches, facility failure probability is assumed to be very small, and a
customer always benefits from seeking service. Future research should address the more complicated
scenarios where the facilities are disrupted at higher probabilities and the customers may refuse to
patronize facilities that are far away. On the other hand, our approach mainly focuses on static
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competition equilibrium. The dynamic evolution of the competition could be modeled in a similar
fashion to answer questions such as when to enter the market, where to build the next facility, or
which existing facility to shut down next. We also note the fact that, in reality, facility disruptions
tend to be correlated as well (e.g., under severe weather conditions such as hurricanes and earthquakes).
Analyzing its impact on the resource allocation equilibrium can be greatly important and insightful.
However, despite recent efforts in this regard (Xie et al., 2015), incorporation of general correlation
of facility disruptions turns out to be an extremely difficult task, especially along with many other
factors presented in our current modeling framework. To this end, we leave such challenging issue for
future research.
Second, it shall be noted that we model the biofuel supply chain in a manner much simpler than
what is happening in the real world. Hence, it will be interesting to see how the policy instruments
can be manifested by other factors we do not consider in this model. For example, given the perennial
nature and the infancy stage of technology of the advanced-generation biomass feedstock, it is well
documented that the risk-averse behavior in supply chain is one of the key barriers in biofuel industry
development. On one hand, farmers exhibit risk-aversion in their annual land use decisions, which in
turn affects the procurement of biomass in the short-term; on the other hand, biorefineries exhibit risk-
aversion in infrastructure investment decisions, which in turn affects the production and distribution of
biofuels in the long-term. Therefore, it is important to establish the role of government interventions
that counter risk-aversion at different levels in the biofuel supply chain. This can potentially be a
fruitful area for future research.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Additional Derivations for Chapter 6
A.1.1 Complete Solutions to the Farmer’s Problem
Let I = [If , Ie, Ir] indicate the farmland use allocation, where I = 1 represents a positive amount of
land allocation for market ξ (i.e., η∗ξ > 0), and 0 otherwise (i.e., η
∗
ξ = 0). Then we have the following
lemma. Note that the proof of Lemma 3 is provided in the Case 7 below.
Lemma 7. There are seven possible farmland use configurations in equilibrium. First, land is allocated
to only one type of market: I = [1, 0, 0], [0, 0, 1], or [0, 1, 0] (Cases 1,2,3). Second, land is allocated to
two types of markets: I = [1, 0, 1], [1, 1, 0], or [0, 1, 1] (Case 4,5,6). Lastly, land is allocated to all three
types of markets: I = [1, 1, 1] (Case 7). The condition for each configuration is provided in Table A.1
along with the corresponding farmland use.
Table A.1: Seven cases of land use configuration under different market conditions.
Case I
Market Conditions
Food & Reservation Energy
1: [1, 0, 0] ϕLf ≥ ϕUr , ϕe ≤ ϕLf
2: [0, 0, 1] ϕLr ≥ ϕUf , ϕe ≤ ϕLr
3: [1, 0, 1]
[
ϕUf , ϕ
U
r
]−
>
[
ϕLf , ϕ
L
r
]+
, ϕe ≤ ϕfr
4: [0, 1, 0] N/A ϕe ≥
[
ϕUf , ϕ
U
r
]+
5: [1, 1, 0] ϕUf > ϕ
U
r ,
[
ϕLf , ϕ
U
r
]+
≤ ϕe < ϕUf
6: [0, 1, 1] ϕUr > ϕ
U
f ,
[
ϕUf , ϕ
L
r
]+
≤ ϕe < ϕUr
7: [1, 1, 1]
[
ϕUf , ϕ
U
r
]−
>
[
ϕLf , ϕ
L
r
]+
, ϕfr < ϕe <
[
ϕUf , ϕ
U
r
]−
Note that [a, b]+ := max{a, b} and [a, b]− := min{a, b}.
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Proof. For notational convenience, we define ϕUξ := (aξ − cξ)gξ, ϕLξ := (aξ − cξ − bξgξ)gξ, ϕfr :=( ∑
ξ∈{f,r}
aξ−cξ
bξgξ
− 1
)( ∑
ξ∈{f,r}
1
bξg2ξ
)−1
, and ϕe := (pq − ce + s)ge.
Note that ϕUξ and ϕ
L
ξ are the upper and lower bounds of profit gained by a farmer at ξ ∈ {f, r}
market for sales, respectively, achieved when ηξ = 1 and ηξ = 0. Furthermore, we will show ϕfr is the
farmer’s profit under the equilibrium when sales only exist at food and environmental markets, i.e.,
in Case 3. In addition, ϕe is the farmer’s profit at energy markets for sales. Below, we provide the
details for each case.
Case 1: If ηf > 0 and ηe, ηr = 0, then, we directly obtain ηf = 1. Hence, the farmer gains a profit of
ϕLf at Market f . To guarantee there is no sale at either Market e or Market r, the sales at Market f
should be the most profitable one, that is ϕLf ≥ ϕUr and ϕLf ≥ ϕe.
Case 2: The proof of Case 2 follows immediately from Case 1 by replacing the Market (subscript) f
to r.
Case 3: If ηf , ηr > 0, and ηe = 0, then the farmer’s profits per unit farmland at Markets f and
r are identical, and greater than that at Market e. In addition, since there are positive sales on
Market f and r, the corresponding farmer’s profit lies between their upper and lower bounds, i.e.,
max
{
ϕLf , ϕ
L
r
}
< ϕ¯ = (pf − cf )gf = (pr − cr)gr < min
{
ϕUf , ϕ
U
r
}
, and ϕ¯ ≥ ϕe. Hence, we have
(af − cf − bfgfηf )gf = (ar − cr − brgrηr)gr = ϕ¯.
Now, for ξ ∈ {f, r}, we have ηξ = aξ−cξbξgξ −
ϕ¯
bξg2ξ
. Noting that ηf + ηr = 1, we have ϕ¯ =( ∑
ξ∈{f,r}
aξ−cξ
bξgξ
− 1
)( ∑
ξ∈{f,r}
1
bξg2ξ
)−1
= ϕfr.Hence, we have max
{
ϕLf , ϕ
L
r
}
< ϕfr = ϕ¯ < min
{
ϕUf , ϕ
U
r
}
.
Further, since ϕ¯ ≥ ϕe, we also have ϕe ≤ ϕfr holds. Therefore, the corresponding farmland use for
Market ξ ∈ {f, r} is ηξ = aξ−cξbξgξ −
ϕfr
bξg2ξ
.
Case 4: If ηe > 0 and ηf = ηr = 0, we directly obtain ηe = 1. Then the Market e must be the
most profitable one for farmers. Hence, we have ϕe ≥ max
{
ϕUf , ϕ
U
r
}
. We also note that, to optimize
the profit, the biofuel firm will choose pq as low as possible, leading to ϕe = max
{
ϕUf , ϕ
U
r
}
. That is,
pq = g
−1
e max
{
ϕUf , ϕ
U
r
}
− s+ ce.
Case 5: If ηf , ηe > 0 and ηr = 0, following the same logic of Case 3, we have ϕ
U
f > ϕ¯ = ϕe =
(pf − cf )gf > ϕLf . In addition, we have ϕ¯ ≥ ϕUr . Hence, it follows that ϕe = (af − cf − bfgfηf )gf = ϕ¯.
Therefore, we have the corresponding land uses for Markets f and e, which are ηf =
af−cf
bfgf
− ϕ¯
bfg2f
and
ηe = 1− ηf , where ϕ¯ = (pq + s− ce)ge.
Case 6: The proof of Case 6 follows immediately from Case 5 by replacing the Market (subscript) f
to r.
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Case 7: If ηf , ηe, ηr > 0, then we have min
{
ϕUf , ϕ
U
r
}
> ϕ¯ = ϕe = (pf − cf )gf = (pr − cr)gr >
max
{
ϕLf , ϕ
L
r
}
. Hence, we have ϕe = (af − cf − bfgfηf )gf = (ar − cr − brgrηr)gr = ϕ¯. This leads
to ηξ =
aξ−cξ
bξgξ
− ϕ¯
bξg2ξ
for ξ ∈ {f, r} and ηe = 1 −
∑
ξ∈{f,r}
ηξ = 1 −
∑
ξ∈{f,r}
aξ−cξ
bξgξ
+ ϕ¯
∑
ξ∈{f,r}
1
bξg2ξ
, where
ϕ¯ = (pq + s− ce)ge.
Furthermore, from the above equation, by setting ηe > 0, we can obtain ϕ¯ > ϕfr with simple
derivations. Hence we have ϕe > ϕfr.
This concludes the proofs for all seven possible cases.
A.1.2 Heterogeneous Model
Let x ∈ Ω denote the location of each farmers, then, according to (6.4)–(6.6), the corresponding biofuel
firm’s problem on a heterogeneous farmland is revised to the following.
max
pq(x),ρ(x),η(x)
Φ =
∑
x∈Ω
(
ae − be
A
∑
x∈Ω
ηe(x)ge(x)A(x)− pq(x)− ctκ
√
ηe(x)/ρ(x)
)
ge(x)ηe(x)A(x)
−
∑
x∈Ω
ρ(x)h(x)A(x)− cp
[
M −
∑
x∈Ω
ηe(x)ge(x)A(x)
]+
s.t. pξ = aξ − bξ
A
∑
x∈Ω
ηξ(x)gξ(x)A(x), ∀ξ ∈ {f, r},
η(x), ∀x ∈ Ω solves:
max
η(x)
ϕ(η(x)) =
∑
ξ∈{f,r}
(pξ − cξ(x)) ηξ(x)gξ(x) + (pq − ce(x) + s) ηe(x)ge(x)
s.t.
∑
ξ∈{f,e,r}
ηξ(x) = 1,
ηξ(x) ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ {f, e, r}.
Due to the farmland heterogeneity and the sharing market prices, the resulting farmer’s problem
can be solved choosing one type of crop with the highest profit. Unfortunately, the closed form solution
for the problem may not exist. Hence, the above problem can be numerically solved by searching the
best pq(x).
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A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Plug in all equation constraints to the integrand in the objective function, we have
α(x)g(x) (pe − p(x))− h(x)A−1(x)
=α(x)g(x)
(
pe − pf + crf (x)−
√
pi−1c2α(x)A(x)
)
− h(x)A−1(x)
=α(x)g(x)
(
ae − af + bfy − (be + bf )
∫
Ω
α(x)g(x)dx+ crf (x)
)
− α(x)g(x)
√
pi−1c2α(x)A(x)
− h(x)A−1(x)
≤α(x)g(x)
(
ae − af + bfy − (be + bf )
∫
Ω
α(x)g(x)dx+ crf (x)
)
−
(
27c2g2(x)h(x)
4pi
)1/3
α(x)
=α(x)g(x)
(
ae − af + bfy + crf (x)−
(
27c2h(x)
4pig¯(x)
)1/3)
− α(x)g(x)(be + bf )
∫
Ω
α(x)g(x)dx
=α(x)g(x)T (x)− α(x)g(x)(be + bf )
∫
Ω
α(x)g(x)dx.
The inequality holds when A(x) = 1α(x)
(
4pih2(x)
c2g2(x)
)1/3
.
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 9
To optimize the constrained problem (4.10), we consider the Lagrangian function,
L(α, λ, µ) =
∫
Ω
α(x)g(x)T (x)dx− (be + bf )
(∫
Ω
α(x)g(x)dx
)2
+
∫
Ω
λ(x) (1− α(x)) dx
+
∫
Ω
µ(x)α(x)dx,
where λ(x), µ(x) ≥ 0 are the Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to constraints α(x) ≤ 1 and
α(x) ≥ 0, respectively. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions indicate
∇αL(α, λ, µ) = 0, (A.1)
λ(x) (1− α(x)) = 0, µ(x)α(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ Ω, (A.2)
λ(x), µ(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Ω.
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Based on the Euler-Lagrange equation, (A.1) is equivalent to ∀x ∈ Ω,
g(x)T (x)− 2(be + bf )g(x)
∫
Ω
α(x)g(x)dx− λ(x) + µ(x) = 0.
Furthermore, note that ye =
∫
Ω
α(x)g(x)dx, with (A.2), we have

T (x)− 2(be + bf )ye ≤ 0, α(x) = 0
T (x)− 2(be + bf )ye = 0, α(x) ∈ (0, 1)
T (x)− 2(be + bf )ye ≥ 0, α(x) = 1
.
Without loss of generality, we assume T (x) is an injective function, i.e., T (x1) 6= T (x2), if x1 6= x2.
Otherwise, we can easily add an infinitesimal perturbation on T (x) to differentiate them. Hence given
ye, equation T (x) − 2(be + bf )ye = 0 only can hold at a single point, say x0 ∈ Ω. Then, since each
location only has an infinitesimal impact on the system, we can enforce α(x0) = 0 without affecting
the equilibrium. In doing so, we can rewrite the above equations as

T (x)− 2(be + bf )ye ≤ 0, α(x) = 0
T (x)− 2(be + bf )ye > 0, α(x) = 1
,
or in a simpler version,
α(x) = 1T (x)>2(be+bf )ye .
Now we will show the existence and uniqueness of such α∗(x). From the previous derivations, we
have known that the system equilibrium is not affected if the value of α(x) varies at a single point, e.g.,
x0. To avoid trivial solution cases, we do not differentiate the solutions of α(x) if they are only different
at a single point over Ω. In the solution, α∗(x) is determined by T (x) and g(x), which are both slow
varying and continuous functions according to the assumption. First, we consider extreme scenarios.
Since α∗(x) ∈ [0, 1], ∀x, we have y∗e ∈ [0, y]. If minT (x) > 2(be + bf )y, we have α∗(x) ≡ 1 and y∗e = y.
On the other hand, if maxT (x) ≤ 0, we have α∗(x) ≡ 0 and y∗e = 0. Then, we consider a general
scenario, there exists x ∈ Ω such that T (x) ∈ [0, 2(be + bf )y). Define αˆ(x; ye) := 1T (x)>2(be+bf )ye and
yˆe(ye) :=
∫
Ω
αˆ(x; ye)g(x)dx. It is straightforward that yˆe(ye) is continuous and decrease with respect
to ye. Then we observe that yˆe(0) > 0 and yˆe(y) < y, which implies there exists one and only one y
∗
e
such that yˆe(y
∗
e) = y
∗
e . Therefore, the solution exists and is unique.
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A.2.3 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is similar to Lemma 1 where only minor modifications are needed. Note that there is one
extra term in (4.15) comparing to (4.4) and the coefficient of α(x) is modified by (1− q(x))−1 from
(4.5) to (4.13). The rest of the proof is simply a repetition of Lemma 1, hence omitted.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 10
The Lagrangian function becomes
L(α, λ, µ) =
∫
Ω
α(x)g¯(x)T¯ (x)dx− (be + bf )
(∫
Ω
α(x)g¯(x)dx
)2
−be
∫
Ω
α2(x)ξ(x)dx+
∫
Ω
λ(x) (1− α(x)) dx+
∫
Ω
µ(x)α(x)dx.
Furthermore, the Euler-Lagrange equation is equivalent to ∀x ∈ Ω,
g¯(x)T¯ (x)− 2(be + bf )g¯(x)
∫
Ω
α(x)g¯(x)dx− 2beα(x)ξ(x)− λ(x) + µ(x) = 0.
Let y¯e =
∫
Ω
α(x)g¯(x)dx, then we have the following equilibrium condition for α(x),

g¯(x)T¯ (x)− 2(be + bf )g¯(x)y¯e ≤ 0, α(x) = 0
g¯(x)T¯ (x)− 2(be + bf )g¯(x)y¯e − 2beα(x)ξ(x) = 0, α(x) ∈ (0, 1)
g¯(x)T¯ (x)− 2(be + bf )g¯(x)y¯e − 2beξ(x) ≥ 0, α(x) = 1
.
Given ξ(x) > 0, following similar assumptions as in Appendix A.2.2: (i) T¯ (x) and T¯ (x)− 2beξ(x) are
both injective; (ii) if there exists x0 such that T¯ (x0)− 2(be + bf )y¯e = 0, we enforce α(x0) = 0; and (iii)
if there exists x1 such that T¯ (x1)− 2(be + bf )y¯e − 2beξ(x1) = 0, we enforce α(x1) = 1. Therefore, we
have
α(x) = mid
{
0, 1,
g¯(x)T¯ (x)− 2(be + bf )g¯(x)y¯e
2beξ(x)
}
.
Note that given y¯e, α(x) is determined. A binary search on y¯e can be conducted to solve α(x) satisfying
y¯e =
∫
Ω
α(x)g¯(x)dx.
The proof of existence and uniqueness of α∗(x) is almost exactly the same as Appendix A.2.2
(solutions of α(x) are treated as identical if they are only different at two points over Ω, e.g., x0, x1).
Note that α(x) is uniquely determined by a given y¯e, denoted by αˆ(x; y¯e), which is strictly monotone
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decreasing.
A.2.5 Proof of Lemma 4
We first simplify the objective function, i.e., the biofuel firm’s profit, by calculating the optimal density
decision as a function of ηe.
max
ρ>0
Φ =
(
ae − beηege − pq − ctκ
√
ηe/ρ− cv
)
geηeA− ρhA− cp[M − ηegeA]+
= (ae − beηege − pq − cv) geηeA− ctκ
√
ηe/ρgeηeA− ρhA− cp[M − ηegeA]+
≤ (ae − beηege − pq − cv) geηeA− 3
((
1
2
ctκ
√
ηe/ρgeηeA
)2
ρhA
)1/3
−cp[M − ηegeA]+
= (ae − beηege − pq − cv) geηeA−
(
27
4
c2tκ
2hg−1e
)1/3
ηegeA− cp[M − ηegeA]+
= (ae − beηege − pq − cq) geηeA− cp[M − ηegeA]+.
In the above, the equality holds when ρ = 1h
( cqgeηe
3
)3/2
. Hence we obtain the optimal density decision
given ηe.
Noting that from Case 7 in Lemma 7 and the definition of aq and bq, the solution to the farmer’s
problem can be expressed as pq = −aq+bqηege−s. Then, this expression can be fed to the biofuel firm’s
problem to further simplify the objective function. Hence, we obtain Φ = (ae + aq − (be + bq)ηege − cq + s) geηeA−
cp[M − ηegeA]+.
Then, depending on whether the biofuel production complies with the mandate level or not, we
can consider the following two scenarios.
First, when the biofuel production does not comply with the mandate, i.e., ηe ≤ MgeA , a penalty
cost incurs, and we have
Φ = (ae + aq − (be + bq)ηege − cq + s+ cp) geηeA− cpM.
Letting dΦdηe = 0, we obtain η
N
e =
[
ae+aq−cq+cp+s
2(bq+be)ge
, MgeA
]−
, which leads to
ΦN =
(
ae + aq − (be + bq)ηNe ge − cq + s
)
geη
N
e A− cp(M − ηNe geA).
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Second, if ηe ≥ MgeA , there is no penalty cost and we have
Φ = (ae + aq − (be + bq)ηege − cq + s) geηeA.
Letting dΦdηe = 0, we obtain η
C
e =
[
ae+aq−cq+s
2(be+bq)ge
, MgeA
]+
, which leads to
ΦC =
(
ae + aq + s− (be + bq)ηCe ge − cq
)
geη
C
e A.
Finally, by comparing the above two scenarios, the biofuel firm will choose the one with a higher
profit, resulting in a corresponding optimal η∗e . 
A.2.6 Proof of Proposition 13
From the proof to Lemma 4, we observe that the optimal energy land use η∗e may have three possible
outcomes, i.e.,
ae+aq+s−cq
2(be+bq)ge
,
ae+aq+s−cq+cp
2(be+bq)ge
, or MgeA . In fact, each possible outcome of η
∗
e reflects a
specific biofuel production scenario and is determined by the combination of M and s. We discuss the
details as follows.
Under-production (ΓU ). If η
N
e =
ae+aq+s−cq+cp
2(be+bq)ge
< MgeA , we have
ae+aq+s−cq
2(be+bq)ge
<
ae+aq+s−cq+cp
2(be+bq)ge
<
M
geA
, hence ηNe <
M
geA
= ηCe . Further, from (6.10) and (6.11), we have Φ
C ≡ ΦN
(
M
geA
)
< ΦN
(
ηNe
)
,
where the inequality holds as ηNe is the optimum.
Hence, under this condition, we have η∗e = η
N
e and Φ
∗ = (ae+aq−cq+cp+s)
2
4(bq+be)
A−cpM , which implies the
biofuel production should not comply with the mandate but paying a penalty cost. In addition, letting
Φ∗ ≥ 0, the condition for the biofuel firm to gain positive profit is provided as M ≤ (ae+aq+s−cq+cp)24(be+bq)cp A.
Over-production (ΓO). If η
C
e =
ae+aq+s−cq
2(be+bq)ge
> MgeA , we have
ae+aq+s−cq+cp
2(be+bq)ge
>
ae+aq+s−cq
2(be+bq)ge
> MgeA ,
hence ηCe >
M
geA
= ηNe . Similarly, we have Φ
N ≡ ΦC
(
M
geA
)
< ΦC
(
ηCe
)
.
Hence, under this condition, we have η∗e = η
C
e and Φ
∗ = (ae+aq−cq+s)
2
4(bq+be)
A, which implies the biofuel
production is beyond the mandated level. In addition, we note that Φ∗ ≥ 0 always holds in this
scenario.
Mandated-production (ΓM ). The conditions for the rest scenario are
ae+aq+s−cq+cp
2(be+bq)ge
≥ MgeA and
ae+aq+s−cq
2(be+bq)ge
≤ MgeA , i.e.,
ae+aq+s−cq
2(be+bq)
A ≤ M ≤ ae+aq+s−cq+cp2(be+bq) A. Then, it follows that η∗e = ηNe =
ηCe =
M
geA
and Φ∗ =
(
ae + aq − (be + bq)MA − cq + s
)
M , which implies the biofuel production exactly
matches the mandated level. In addition, letting Φ∗ ≥ 0, the feasibility condition is given by M ≤
ae+aq+s−cq
be+bq
A. 
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A.2.7 Proof of Proposition 14
Note that when s ≤ −ae − aq + cq, we always have (M, s) ∈ ΓI from the result of Proposition 13.
Therefore, s > −ae − aq + cq always holds in ΓO, ΓM , and ΓU , which will be used in the following
proof.
Part 1. We obtain the following comparative statics for s:
In ΓM , we have
dϕ∗
ds = 0 and
dΦ∗
ds = M > 0. Hence, we obtain
dWEco
ds > 0. Furthermore, we have
dη∗ξ
ds = 0 for ξ ∈ {f, e, r}, which results in dCSξds = 0 for ξ ∈ {f, e, r} and dGEds = ηege > 0. Thus, this
leads to dW
Env
ds = 0 and
dWSoc
ds < 0.
In ΓU or ΓO, we have
dη∗e
ds =
1
2(bq+be)ge
> 0. A direct result shows dϕ
∗
ds > 0 and
dΦ∗
ds > 0.
Hence, we have dW
Eco
ds > 0. Furthermore, we can obtain
dη∗ξ
ds = − bqg
2
e
bξg2ξ
dη∗e
ds < 0, which leads to
dWEnv
ds = ge
dη∗e
ds
(
−λf begebfg2f + λe
1
ge
− λr begebrg2r
)
= ge
dη∗e
ds (λe∆e − λf∆f − λr∆f ). This, we have dW
Env
ds >
0 if λe∆e > λf∆f + λr∆f holds.
Next, we have dCSeds =
beηege
2(bq+be)
> 0,
dCSξ
ds = − bqηξge2(bq+be) < 0, for ξ ∈ {f, r}, and dGEds =
(
aq+ae+2s−cq
2(bq+be)
)
<
0. This leads to
dWSoc
ds
=
ge
2(bq + be)
(beηe − bq(1− ηe))−
(
aq + ae + 2s− cq
2(bq + be)
)
=
1
4(bq + be)
(−aq − ae + cq − 2bqge − 3s) < 0.
Part 2. We now obtain the comparative statics for M :
In ΓM , we have
dϕ∗
dM =
bqge
A > 0,
dΦ∗
dM = aq + ae − 2(bq + be)MA − cq + s ≤ 0,dW
Eco
dM = aq + ae −
2(bq + be)
M
A − cq + s + bqge. Hence, if M < aq+ae−cq+s+bege2(bq+be) A, we have dW
Eco
dM > 0. Otherwise, we
have dW
Eco
dM ≤ 0.
Furthermore, we have
dη∗f
dM = − bqgebfg2fA < 0,
dη∗e
dM =
1
geA
> 0, and dW
Env
dM = −λf begebfg2fA + λe
1
geA
−
λr
bege
brg2rA
. Hence, if λe∆e > λf∆f + λr∆f , then we have
dWEnv
dM > 0.
Next, we have
dCSξ
dM = − begeA η∗ξ < 0, for ξ ∈ {f, r}, dCSedM = bqgeA η∗e > 0, and dGEdM = sA > 0. This
leads to
dWSoc
dM
=
bqηege − begeηf − begeηr − s
A
=
1
A2
((bq + be)M − begeA−As).
Hence, if M > bege+sbq+be A, we have
dWSoc
dM > 0.
In ΓO, we have
dϕ∗
dM = 0,
dΦ∗
dM = 0, and
dη∗ξ
dM = 0, for ξ ∈ {f, e, r}. Hence dW
Eco
dM =
dWEnv
dM =
dWSoc
dM =
0.
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In ΓU , similarly as that in ΓO, we have
dϕ∗
dM = 0 and
dη∗ξ
dM = 0, for ξ ∈ {f, e, r}, except now
dΦ∗
M = −cp < 0. Hence, we have dW
Env
dM =
dWSoc
dM = 0, while
dWEco
dM < 0. 
A.2.8 Proof of Corollary 1
The condition provided in the corollary is a direct result of the Proposition 14, hence we omit the
proof.
A.2.9 Proof of Lemma 5
First, note that we have U1(s) = (ae+aq−(be+bq)MS −cq+s+α)M . Hence, by letting dU1dM = 0, we have
M∗(s) = ae+aq+s−cq+α2(be+bq) A. Considering the constraint, we have M
∗(s) = min
{
M(s),
ae+aq+s−cq+α
2(be+bq)
A
}
since
ae+aq+s−cq+α
2(be+bq)
A < M(s) always holds when α < cp.
Second, note that U2(M) is decreasing in s since ϕ
∗ and η∗e remains constant in the binding window.
Hence, we have s∗(M) = s(M).
The equilibrium is then obtained by setting MNE = min
{
M(sNE),
ae+aq+s
NE−cq+α
2(be+bq)
A
}
and
sNE = s(MNE). 
A.2.10 Proof of Lemma 6
For the coordinated problem, we note that
U = U1 + U2
=
(
ae + aq − (be + bq)M
A
− cq + α+ s
)
M − (aq + ce)geA+ bqgeM −Ms
=
(
ae + aq + bqge − (be + bq)M
A
− cq + α
)
M − (aq + ce)geA.
Hence, by letting dUdM = 0 and considering the constraint of M ≥ 0, we directly have MCoor =
max
{
ae+aq+bqge−cq+α
2(be+bq)
A, 0
}
. Here we shall note that MCoor can not achieve 0 since M > 0 always
holds in the binding window.
Since s does not affect U , given MCoor, sCoor takes any value within the binding window, i.e.,
sCoor ∈ [s(MCoor) ≤ s ≤ s(MCoor)] . 
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A.2.11 Proof of Proposition 15
If Ψ ≤ −α holds, this implies ae + aq + bqge − cq < 0. Hence, it follows that MCoor → 0 ≤MNE and
sCoor = −(ae + aq − cq) > 0 ≤ sNE .
On the contrary, if Ψ > −α, we always have MCoor = ae+aq+bqge−cq+α2(be+bq) A. In particular, if Ψ > α
holds, we have MCoor =
ae+aq+bqge−cq+α
2(be+bq)
A > αbe+bqA ≥ MNE . A direct observation shows sCoor ≥
s(MCoor) > sNE . 
A.2.12 Proof of Proposition 16
(i) Recall the definitions of aq = bqge
(
1−∑ξ∈{f,r} aξ−cξbξgξ ) − ce and cq = ( 274 c2tκ2hg−1e )1/3 + cv. We
directly have aq decreases in ce and cq increases in h. Hence, Ψ = ae + aq − cq + bqge decreases in ce
and h.
In addition, we have dM
Coor
dΨ =
A
2(be+bq)
> 0. Hence, MCoor increases in Ψ. Furthermore, noting
that sCoor =
−ae−aq+cq+bqge+α
2 , it follows that
ds
daq
< 0 and dsdcq > 0.
Therefore, MCoor decreases in ce and h, while s
Coor increases in ce and h.
(ii) Recall the definition of bq =
(∑
ξ∈{f,r}
g2e
bξg2ξ
)−1
. We further have
dbq
dge
= −2g−1e bq, daqdge = −g−1e (aq+
ce), and
dcq
dge
= − 13g−1e cq.
Given the assumption of farmer’s profit is positive, even when all land is used for one purpose, i.e.,
aξ − cξ − bξgξ > 0 holds for ξ ∈ {f, r}. Hence, we have dΨdge = −bq
(
2−∑ξ∈{f,r} aξ−cξbξgξ )+ 13g−1e cq > 0.
Therefore, Ψ increases in ge. Note that bq decreases in ge, we immediately have M
Coor increases in ge.
Finally, we have dsdge =
aq+ce− 13 cq−bqge
2ge
=
−bqge
(∑
ξ∈{f,r}
aξ−cξ
bξgξ
)
− 13 cq
2ge
< 0. Hence, it follows that
sCoor decreases in ge. 
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